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INTRODUCTION
For the last forty years, Supreme Court Justices, Presidents, Senators,
and constitutional law scholars have fiercely debated the question of whether
we ought to follow the original public meaning of the text of the Constitu-
tion and of the Fourteenth Amendment, or whether we should embrace liv-
ing constitutionalism and, by extension, more modern rights, like the right
to privacy.  The originalist camp has included former President Ronald Rea-
gan, former Attorney General Edwin Meese III, former Supreme Court Jus-
tice Antonin Scalia, and current Supreme Court Justices Clarence Thomas,
Neil Gorsuch, and Brett Kavanaugh as well as Senator Orrin Hatch.  The
living-constitutionalist camp, which also identifies itself as the pragmatist
camp, is represented by former Presidents Bill Clinton and Barack Obama;
former Senator and Vice President Joe Biden and current Senator Chuck
Schumer; and by Justices Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Stephen Breyer, Sonia
Sotomayor, and Elena Kagan.  Three other Justices, Chief Justice John Rob-
erts, Justice Samuel Alito, and former Justice Anthony Kennedy, lean in a
conservative direction but largely for practical, as opposed to originalist,
reasons.
The same split can be found among constitutional law professors.
Professors Michael McConnell, Randy Barnett, Michael Stokes Paulsen, Gary
Lawson, John Harrison, and Mike Rappaport all fall in the originalist camp
while Professors Bruce Ackerman, William Eskridge, Lawrence Lessig, Reva
Siegel, Laurence Tribe, and Pamela Karlan all fall in the living constitutional-
ist, or pragmatist, camp.  Two constitutional law scholars at Yale Law School,
Akhil Reed Amar and Jack M. Balkin, have adopted originalist methodologies
while reaching liberal political outcomes.  Thus, Balkin entitled one of his
recent books Living Originalism.1
We propose in this Article to put aside normative theorizing for the
moment and instead to mostly present some data and empirical proof that
we think suggest that the two sides of this debate are not really all that far
apart.  We seek to prove this by comparing the rights that exist in today’s
state constitutions in 2018 with the rights that existed in state constitutions in
1868, when the Fourteenth Amendment was ratified 150 years ago this year.
What our comparison will show is that the original and the living Fourteenth
Amendment are not nearly as different as normative theorists have claimed.
This is an appropriate way to celebrate the 150th anniversary of the Four-
teenth Amendment, which was ratified in July of 2018.
State constitutions are an almost ideal vehicle for measuring what new
rights are coming into fashion and what old rights are going out of fashion
because they are so much easier to amend than the Federal Constitution.  In
many states, like California, a 51% majority of the voters can amend the state
constitution by passing an initiative or referendum.2  One would thus expect
state constitutional law to be much more up to date than the Federal Consti-
1 JACK M. BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM (2011).
2 See CAL. CONST. art. XVIII, § 4.
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tution, which has only been amended seventeen times in the 227 years since
the Founders adopted the Federal Bill of Rights.
On the other hand, why might rights not be included in state constitu-
tions?  First, perhaps there might be a difference in the locus of power
between state and federal governments.  For example, education has tradi-
tionally been a province of state and local governments so it would more
likely be included in a state constitution than in the federal one.3  Second,
some rights (such as wearing a hat or sleeping in bed on one’s right side)
may have been deemed too trivial to be noted in either state or federal con-
stitutions.4  Third, personal rights (such as marriage) would be somewhat less
likely to be explicitly listed in either sort of constitution than political rights.
This Article is actually the third and final article in a series that began
with (A) Steven G. Calabresi & Sarah E. Agudo, Individual Rights Under State
Constitutions When the Fourteenth Amendment Was Ratified in 1868: What Rights
Are Deeply Rooted in American History and Tradition?; and (B) Steven G. Cala-
bresi, Sarah E. Agudo, and Kathryn L. Dore, State Bills of Rights in 1787 and
1791: What Individual Rights Are Really Deeply Rooted in American History and
Tradition?.5  This Article looks at what rights are protected by state constitu-
tions today, in 2018, and compares our findings with the data we collected in
our earlier two articles, which looked at rights under state constitutional law
in 1868 when the Fourteenth Amendment was ratified, and at what rights
were protected in state constitutional law in 1791 when the Federal Bill of
Rights with its Ninth Amendment was ratified.
Comparing state constitutional-law rights today, in 2018, with rights pro-
tected in 1868 when the Fourteenth Amendment was ratified reveals an over-
whelmingly similar number of outcomes, but a few startling and
counterintuitive differences.  We will save the discussion of the major differ-
ences for the conclusion of our Article and will first present our data.  As to
each right, we will discuss what number of states protect that right today in
2018 and what number protected that right in 1868, when the Fourteenth
Amendment was ratified, and in 1791, when the Ninth Amendment was
ratified.
We begin in Part I by presenting the methodology that we used in com-
piling our data.  We then discuss the data as to each right in Part II and
summarize our results in Part III.  Last, in Part IV, we analyze the implica-
tions of our findings.
3 See infra subsection II.K.4.
4 Philip A. Hamburger, Trivial Rights, 70 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1 (1994).
5 Steven G. Calabresi & Sarah E. Agudo, Individual Rights Under State Constitutions
When the Fourteenth Amendment Was Ratified in 1868: What Rights Are Deeply Rooted in American
History and Tradition?, 87 TEX. L. REV. 7 (2008); Steven G. Calabresi, Sarah E. Agudo &
Kathryn L. Dore, State Bills of Rights in 1787 and 1791: What Individual Rights Are Really
Deeply Rooted in American History and Tradition?, 85 S. CAL. L. REV. 1451 (2012).
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I. METHODOLOGY
Our method involved four steps: collecting, categorizing, resolving cod-
ing differences, and counting.  First, we obtained copies of the present-day
version of all fifty state constitutions through the official state website of each
individual state.6  Next, at least two of us both separately and jointly
examined each state constitution closely.  In a comprehensive database, we
kept track of each individual right that is discussed below, notating within
our records which states protect those rights.  Whenever a given state’s con-
stitution contained a relevant clause, we included in our database both the
pincite of the clause and the text of the clause.  Note that this Article is not
an exhaustive listing of all rights included in the present-day versions of all
fifty state constitutions—instead, it is a sampling of rights that have strong
support across the state constitutions.  For space reasons, we have not quoted
each state constitutional clause that we count in this printed version of our
Article.  We will, however, post on SSRN a version of our Article that includes
the text of each right that we cite in the footnotes.  This will make it easier for
future scholars to check our work and dispute our state rights counts if they
want to do so.
After a collaborative coding was agreed on by at least two coders, the
results were described in draft text, with some summary statements of the
criteria used in classifying.  Then an independent coder, with no knowledge
of how any particular state had been coded, did a new coding of the poten-
tially relevant provisions of the 2018 constitutions.  This independent coding
matched the earlier coding to a very high degree.  Indeed, a standard mea-
sure of inter-rater reliability, Cohen’s Kappa, was computed, producing a
score of .915.  By convention, a Cohen’s Kappa of over .81 is often viewed as
“almost perfect or perfect agreement,” sufficient for making “definite conclu-
sions.”7  Then Professors Calabresi and Lindgren resolved the differences
between the two codings.
After each stage, we counted the number of state constitutions that tex-
tually enumerated each individual right (or denied each right) discussed
below.8  Our analysis below usually includes (a) the total number of states
that protect each right; (b) what percentage of the states that number consti-
tutes; and (c) what percentage of the overall U.S. population lives in a state
that protects each right in 2018.  We used the 2010 census (excluding the
6 Our research is current up to January 4, 2018.  The database is on file with the
authors.
7 Kevin A. Hallgren, Computing Inter-Rater Reliability for Observational Data: An Overview
and Tutorial, 8 TUTORIALS QUANTITATIVE METHODS FOR PSYCHOL. 23 (2012), https://www
.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3402032/.  Most of our initial discrepancies in cod-
ing resulted from having slightly different interpretations of the coding criteria, rather
than different interpretations of the provisions.
8 Because of the enormous amount of data involved, we looked only at rights textually
enumerated in state constitutions, and did not extensively look at state court opinions
construing those clauses.  That project would be a valuable, if not essential, one to under-
take in the future.
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District of Columbia and U.S. territories) when calculating population totals
for rights protected in 2018.
Our analysis discusses a large number of individual positive-law rights
that exist under state constitutional law in 2018.  Since such a large number
of rights were recognized within the state constitutions, we thought it useful
to group the rights in question into the following categories: (1) rights bear-
ing on religion; (2) freedom of expression rights; (3) gun rights and clauses
bearing on the military; (4) rights against unreasonable searches and
seizures; (5) criminal procedure rights; (6) due process rights; (7) property
rights; (8) the right to trial by jury; (9) rights against excessive punishment;
(10) state constitutional acknowledgements of unenumerated rights; and
(11) other state constitutional rights without federal analogs.
These groupings are intended to make the information presented below
clearer and more accessible, and we do not mean to suggest or imply any
normative arguments for the underlying importance or meaning of the
rights by the categorizations we have used here.  Finally, we organized the
clauses in the order given because we wanted to generally follow the struc-
ture of the Federal Constitution’s Bill of Rights.  Again, this organization is
not meant to suggest any normative view of the importance of each right.
II. THE DATA ON THE STATE CONSTITUTIONS
A. Rights Bearing on Religion
The first set of rights we discuss are rights bearing on religion.  We
describe these clauses first in order to follow the structure of the Federal Bill
of Rights, which protects religious liberty before all other rights by placing it
first in the Bill of Rights, at the beginning of the First Amendment.9  “Relig-
ious freedom [was] a central issue in the English Glorious Revolution of
1688, and it was of central concern to the framers and ratifiers of the federal
Bill of Rights as well.”10  As we explain below, religious liberty clauses are
found in the constitutions of all fifty states, “suggest[ing] that the [religious
liberty] rights embodied in the First Amendment are [considered] funda-
mental” to the states as well today in 2018.11
1. Establishment Clauses
According to our analysis, all fifty states today in 2018—comprising
100% of the states and 100% of the U.S. population12—prohibit the estab-
9 U.S. CONST. amend. I.
10 Calabresi & Agudo, supra note 5, at 31 (first citing ENCYCLOPEDIA OF RELIGIOUS FREE-
DOM 115–16 (Catharine Cookson ed., 2003); and then citing CONSTITUTIONAL DEBATES ON
FREEDOM OF RELIGION: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 318–19 (John J. Patrick & Gerald P. Long
eds., 1999)).
11 Calabresi & Agudo, supra note 5, at 31.
12 2010 Census: Population Density Data, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU (2010), https://www
.census.gov/data/tables/2010/dec/density-data-text.html [hereinafter 2010 Census]
(308,143,815 out of 308,143,815 residents).  All U.S. population figures in this Article refer
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lishment of a state religion in some form within the present-day version of
their state constitutions.13  This represents a small increase from the state
constitutions in 1868, when thirty-six out of thirty-seven states had establish-
ment clauses in their state constitutions.14  It is a striking departure from the
practice in 1791, when five of the states had established churches featured in
their state constitutions, although it must be acknowledged that eight states
out of twelve which drafted constitutions between 1776 and 1791 already had
state establishment clauses in their state constitutions.15  Of the remaining
six states in 1791, Rhode Island had a Royal Charter issued by Charles II,
which it continued to use as its state constitution and which barred establish-
ments of religion in 1791.16  Thus, in 1791, only five out of fourteen states
did not bar establishments of religion.  The original purpose of the Federal
Establishment Clause was to serve as a federalism provision, preventing the
new national government from interfering with the five state-established
churches that existed in 1791.  By 1868, with thirty-six states forbidding estab-
lishments of religion in their state constitutions, the nonestablishment right
to the population of the fifty states according to the 2010 Census, excluding the popula-
tion of Washington, D.C. and the territories.
13 See ALA. CONST. art. I, § 3; ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 4; ARIZ. CONST. art. II, § 12; ARK.
CONST. art. II, §§ 24–25; CAL. CONST. art. I, § 4; COLO. CONST. art. II, § 4; CONN. CONST. art.
I, § 3; id. art. VII; DEL. CONST. art. I, § 1; FLA. CONST. art. I, § 3; GA. CONST. art. I, § 1, paras.
3, 4; id. art. I, § 2, para. 7; HAW. CONST. art. I, § 4; IDAHO CONST. art. I, § 4; ILL. CONST. art.
I, § 3; IND. CONST. art. I, § 4; IOWA CONST. art. I, § 3; KAN. CONST. Bill of Rights, § 7; KY.
CONST. Bill of Rights, § 5; LA. CONST. art. I, § 8; ME. CONST. art. I, § 3; MD. CONST. Declara-
tion of Rights, art. XXXVI; MASS. CONST. art. of amend. XI; MICH. CONST. art. I, § 4; MINN.
CONST. art. I, § 16; MISS. CONST. art. III, § 18; MO. CONST. art. I, § 5; MONT. CONST. art. II,
§ 5; NEB. CONST. art. I, § 4; NEV. CONST. art. I, § 4; N.H. CONST. pt. 1, art. VI; N.J. CONST.
art. I, § 4; N.M. CONST. art. II, § 11; N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 3; N.C. CONST. art. I, § 13; N.D.
CONST. art. I, § 3; OHIO CONST. art. I, § 7; OKLA. CONST. art. I, § 2; id. art. II, § 5; OR.
CONST. art. I, §§ 3, 5; PA. CONST. art. I, § 3; R.I. CONST. art. I, § 3; S.C. CONST. art. I, § 2;
S.D. CONST. art. VI, § 3; TENN. CONST. art. I, § 3; TEX. CONST. art. I, §§ 6–7; UTAH CONST.
art. I, § 4; VT. CONST. ch. 1, art. III; VA. CONST. art. I, § 16; WASH. CONST. art. I, § 11; W. VA.
CONST. art. III, § 15; WIS. CONST. art. I, § 18; WYO. CONST. art. I, §§ 18–19.
14 See Calabresi & Agudo, supra note 5, at 31.  Note that in our earlier analysis, we only
coded twenty-seven states as having establishment clauses in their state constitutions in
1868. Id.  We now believe that was an undercount, though we acknowledge that some of
the new additions to our count of states included clauses in their state constitutions that
are biased in favor of Christians.  In our updated analysis, only one state—Louisiana—did
not have an establishment clause.  An example of a state with an establishment clause
biased in favor of Christians is Connecticut’s constitution, which stated that “[n]o prefer-
ence shall be given by law to any christian sect or mode of worship” in article I, section 4,
and which stated that all religions should be treated “without discrimination” in article I,
section 3. CONN. CONST. art. I, §§ 3, 4 (1818).  Another example is the Massachusetts Con-
stitution, which held that “every denomination of Christians, demeaning themselves peace-
ably and as good subjects of the commonwealth, shall be equally under the protection of
the law; and no subordination of any [one] sect or denomination to another shall ever be
established by law.” MASS. CONST. Declaration of Rights, art. III (1780).
15 See Calabresi, Agudo & Dore, supra note 5, at 1470–72.
16 Id. at 1543–44.
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had become a right of individuals against the government and not merely a
right of the states against the federal government.  The 2018 data show that
this individualistic nature of the nonestablishment right has now been
endorsed unanimously by all fifty state constitutions—a huge change from
the situation in 1791.
Out of the fifty states with antiestablishment clauses in 2018, twenty-five
state constitutions—comprising 50% of the states and 51.4% of the U.S. pop-
ulation17—use explicit nonestablishment of religion language.18  For exam-
ple, South Carolina’s state constitution says that “[t]he General Assembly
shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion.”19  This is a direct
analog to the U.S. Constitution, which states that “Congress shall make no
law respecting an establishment of religion.”20  Other states use slightly modi-
fied but equally as explicit antiestablishment language, such as Alabama’s
constitution, which requires that “no religion shall be established by law”21
and New Jersey’s constitution, which prevents any “establishment of one
religious sect in preference to another.”22  The state constitution of Utah,
after prohibiting any “establishment of religion,” even goes on to add that
“[t]here shall be no union of Church and State, nor shall any church domi-
nate the State or interfere with its functions.”23
17 See 2010 Census, supra note 12 (158,349,926 out of 308,143,815 residents).
18 See ALA. CONST. art. I, § 3; ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 4; ARIZ. CONST. art. II, § 12; ARK.
CONST. art. II, § 24; CAL. CONST. art. I, § 4; FLA. CONST. art. I, § 3; HAW. CONST. art. I, § 4;
IOWA CONST. art. I, § 3; KAN. CONST. Bill of Rights, § 7; LA. CONST. art. I, § 8; ME. CONST.
art. I, § 3; MD. CONST. Declaration of Rights, art. XXXVI; MASS. CONST. art. of amend. XI;
MINN. CONST. art. I, § 16; MO. CONST. art. I, § 5; MONT. CONST. art. II, § 5; N.H. CONST. pt.
1, art. VI; N.J. CONST. art. I, § 4; PA. CONST. art. I, § 3; S.C. CONST. art. I, § 2; S.D. CONST. art
VI, § 3; TENN. CONST. art. I, § 3; UTAH CONST. art. I, § 4; WASH. CONST. art. I, § 11; WIS.
CONST. art. I, § 18.
19 S.C. CONST. art. I, § 2.
20 U.S. CONST. amend. I.
21 ALA. CONST. art. I, § 3.
22 N.J. CONST. art. I, § 4.
23 UTAH CONST. art. I, § 4.
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FIGURE 1.  ANTIESTABLISHMENT CLAUSES OR OTHER RESTRICTIONS ON
STATE RELIGIONS IN STATE CONSTITUTIONS
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Other state constitutions prohibit the establishment of a state religion by
ensuring that the state cannot treat any particular sect or denomination of a
religion with discrimination or preference.  Connecticut’s constitution, for
instance, requires that “[n]o preference shall be given by law to any religious
society or denomination in the state”24 and that “[t]he exercise and enjoy-
ment of religious profession and worship, without discrimination, shall for-
ever be free to all persons.”25  Nevada’s constitution uses a more concise
formulation, holding that “[t]he free exercise and enjoyment of religious
profession and worship without discrimination or preference shall forever be
allowed in this State,”26 and Arkansas’s constitution states that “the General
Assembly shall enact suitable laws to protect every religious denomination in
the peaceable enjoyment of its own mode of public worship.”27  In total,
thirty-one state constitutions in 2018—comprising 62% of the states and
67.5% of the U.S. population28—follow this no discrimination or preference
approach to prohibiting the establishment of religion.29  Overall, we have
24 CONN. CONST. art. VII.
25 Id. art. I, § 3.
26 NEV. CONST. art. 1, § 4.
27 ARK. CONST. art. 2, § 25.
28 2010 Census, supra note 12 (208,067,037 out of 308,143,815 residents).
29 See ALA. CONST. art. I, § 3; ARK. CONST. art. II, § 24; CAL. CONST. art. I, § 4; COLO.
CONST. art. II, § 4; CONN. CONST. art. I, § 3; id. art. VII; DEL. CONST. art. I, § 1; IDAHO
CONST. art. I, § 4; ILL. CONST. art. I, § 3; IND. CONST. art. I, § 4; KAN. CONST. Bill of Rights,
§ 7; KY. CONST. Bill of Rights, § 5; ME. CONST. art. I, § 3; MASS. CONST. art. of amend. XI;
MINN. CONST. art. I, § 16; MISS. CONST. art. III, § 18; NEB. CONST. art. I, § 4; NEV. CONST.
art. I, § 4; N.H. CONST. pt. 1, art. VI; N.J. CONST. art. I, § 4; N.M. CONST. art. II, § 11; N.Y.
CONST. art. I, § 3; N.D. CONST. art. I, § 3; OHIO CONST. art. I, § 7; PA. CONST. art. I, § 3; S.D.
CONST. art. VI, § 3; TENN. CONST. art. I, § 3; TEX. CONST. art. I, § 6; VA. CONST. art. I, § 16;
W. VA. CONST. art. III, § 15; WIS. CONST. art. I, § 18; WYO. CONST. art. I, § 18.
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used broad criteria for determining whether a constitution contained an
establishment clause, even including some with expansive free exercise
clauses that prohibited control or burdens on religion.  For example, we
counted states as having establishment clauses if they merely barred govern-
ment from controlling or interfering with religious conscience.30
Additionally, in 2018, thirty-nine states31—comprising 78% of the states
and 85% percent of the U.S. population32—have Blaine Amendments within
their state constitutions, which “forbid any kind of government financial aid
to educational or other government institutions that have any religious affili-
ation.”33  The Blaine Amendments are named after a former Republican
presidential nominee, James G. Blaine, who originally proposed an identical
amendment for the Federal Constitution—an amendment that Congress
never passed.34  Wyoming’s constitution uses a common Blaine Amendment
text saying that “[n]o money of the state shall ever be given or appropriated
to any sectarian or religious society or institution.”35  Oklahoma’s constitu-
tion contains another version of this language, saying:
No public money or property shall ever be appropriated, applied,
donated, or used, directly or indirectly, for the use, benefit, or support of
any sect, church, denomination, or system of religion, or for the use, benefit,
or support of any priest, preacher, minister, or other religious teacher or
dignitary, or sectarian institution as such.36
30 E.g., N.C. CONST. art. I, § 13 (“All persons have a natural and inalienable right to
worship Almighty God according to the dictates of their own consciences, and no human
authority shall, in any case whatever, control or interfere with the rights of conscience.”).
31 See ALA. CONST. art. I, § 3; id. art. IV, § 73; id. art. XIV, § 263; ALASKA CONST. art.
VII, § 1; ARIZ. CONST. art. II, § 12; id. art. IX, § 10; CAL. CONST. art. IX, § 8; id. art. XVI, § 5;
COLO. CONST. art. V, § 34; id. art. IX, § 7; DEL. CONST. art. X, § 3; FLA. CONST. art. I, § 3;
GA. CONST. art. I, § 2, para. 7; HAW. CONST. art. 10, § 1; IDAHO CONST. art. I, § 4; id. art. IX,
§ 5; ILL. CONST. art. X, § 3; IND. CONST. art. I, § 6; IOWA CONST. art. I, § 3; KAN. CONST. art.
VI, § 6; KY. CONST. Bill of Rights, § 5; id. § 189; MASS. CONST. art. XVIII, § 2; MICH. CONST.
art. I, § 4; id. art. VIII, § 2; MINN. CONST. art. I, § 16; id. art. XIII, § 2; MISS. CONST. art. VIII,
§ 208; MO. CONST. art. I, § 7; id. art. IX, § 8; MONT. CONST. art. X, § 6; NEB. CONST. art. VII,
§ 11; NEV. CONST. art. XI, § 10; N.H. CONST. pt. 1, art. 6; id. pt. 2, art. 83; N.M. CONST. art.
XII, § 3; id. art. XXI, § 4; N.Y. CONST. art. XI, § 3; N.D. CONST. art. VIII, § 5; OHIO CONST.
art. VI, § 2; OKLA. CONST. art. II, § 5; OR. CONST. art. I, § 5; PA. CONST. art. III, § 15; S.C.
CONST. art. XI, § 4; S.D. CONST. art. VI, § 3; id. art. VIII, § 16; TEX. CONST. art. I, § 7; id. art.
VII, § 5(c); UTAH CONST. art. I, § 4; id. art. X, § 9; VA. CONST. art. IV, § 16; WASH. CONST.
art. I, § 11; id. art. IX, § 4; WIS. CONST. art. I, § 18; WYO. CONST. art. I, § 19; id. art. III, § 36.
The states without a Blaine Amendment are Arkansas, Connecticut, Louisiana, Maine,
Maryland, New Jersey, North Carolina, Rhode Island, Tennessee, Vermont, and West
Virginia.
32 2010 Census, supra note 12 (261,813,731 out of 308,143,815 residents).
33 Calabresi & Agudo, supra note 5, at 39.
34 Id. at 39 nn.105–06 (explaining that the proposed amendment passed in the
House, but “failed to garner the necessary two-thirds vote in the Senate”).
35 WYO. CONST. art. I, § 19.
36 OKLA. CONST. art. II, § 5.
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We count these clauses as a type of establishment clause because they
prevent the government from forcing taxpayers to support any particular
religion or pay the salaries of its ministers, priests, rabbis, or imams, thereby
shielding all people from an establishment of a state religion, under which
individuals could be asked to pay taxes toward the state-supported church.
There is a consensus among constitutional law professors that the core evil
that James Madison was concerned with when he drafted the Federal Estab-
lishment Clause was preventing the government from paying the salaries of
church officials.37  We thus count states that have Blaine Amendments as also
having, in effect, an establishment clause.
FIGURE 2.  BLAINE AMENDMENTS IN STATE CONSTITUTIONS
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There is a striking increase in the number of states that have Blaine
Amendments from the situation in 1868 when the Fourteenth Amendment
was adopted.  At that time, only eight state constitutions out of thirty-seven
had Blaine Amendments, and only 22% of the public lived in those states.38
In 2018, in contrast, thirty-nine states comprising 85% percent of the popula-
tion live in states that have Blaine Amendments.  In 1791, no states had
Blaine Amendments in their state constitutions.39  What accounts for this
extraordinary increase in the prevalence of Blaine Amendments from 1791
to 1868 to 2018?  Part of the answer can be found in Separation of Church and
State by Philip Hamburger.40  Professor Hamburger shows conclusively that
most of these clauses began to appear in state constitutions in the 1870s and
1880s, as a wave of anti-Catholic bias arose against new immigrants to the
37 See, e.g., Erika King, Tax Exemptions and the Establishment Clause, 49 SYRACUSE L. REV.
971, 990 (1999).
38 See Calabresi & Agudo, supra note 5, at 39.
39 Calabresi, Agudo & Dore, supra note 5, at 1477.
40 PHILIP HAMBURGER, SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE (2002).
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United States hailing from such Catholic countries as Ireland and Italy.41
The Protestant majority felt threatened that it would have to fund Catholic
parochial schools, and so the movement to adopt Blaine Amendments took
off.42  There was also an increase in the number of agnostics and atheists
after Charles Darwin proposed his theory of evolution in 1871, arguing that
human beings are descended from ape-like ancestors.43  As a result, there are
more intellectual leaders who have fallen into the secular camp since 1871.44
This may explain the opposition to government funding of religious schools
since secular intellectuals think that biblical creationism is nonsense.
As a matter of the original understanding of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment in 1868 when the Privileges or Immunities Clause was added into the
Federal Bill of Rights and made applicable to the states, there can be no
question that Blaine Amendments were oddities at best.  As a matter of living
constitutionalism, however, Blaine Amendments are in effect in an Article V
consensus of three-quarters of the states.  We believe45 that the state Blaine
Amendments are unconstitutional as a violation of the Free Exercise Clause,
as Justice Antonin Scalia argued in his dissent joined by Justice Clarence
Thomas in Locke v. Davey.46  The Supreme Court recently took an important
step in that direction in its seven–two decision in Trinity Lutheran Church of
Columbia, Inc. v. Comer.47
We feel that we should also mention that thirty-four states—comprising
68% of the states and 61.4% of the U.S. population48—use a fourth formula-
tion of the establishment clause.49  These states ban the establishment of a
state religion by ensuring that civilians cannot be compelled or forced to
attend any church, or to support any church (financially or otherwise).  Ver-
mont’s constitution, as an example, provides:
41 Id. at 191–92, 201–03.
42 Id. at 219–23, 296–302.
43 See Stephen LeDrew, The Evolution of Atheism: Scientific and Humanistic Approaches, 25
HIST. HUM. SCI. 70, 75–77 (2012).
44 See id.
45 When the authors of this Article express their views using such words as “we,” “our,”
and “us,” the opinions expressed reflect the views of at least the two faculty authors, not
necessarily the authors who were students when they did the bulk of their work on the
project. See supra note *.
46 540 U.S. 712, 725 (2004) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
47 137 S. Ct. 2012 (2017).
48 2010 Census, supra note 12 (189,092,274 out of 308,143,815 residents).
49 See ALA. CONST. art. I, § 3; ARK. CONST. art. II, § 24; COLO. CONST. art. II, § 4; CONN.
CONST. art. VII; DEL. CONST. art. I, § 1; GA. CONST. art. I, § 1, paras. 3, 4; IDAHO CONST. art.
I, § 4; ILL. CONST. art. I, § 3; IND. CONST. art. I, § 4; IOWA CONST. art. I, § 3; KAN. CONST. Bill
of Rights, § 7; KY. CONST. Bill of Rights, § 5; ME. CONST. art. I, § 3; MD. CONST. Declaration
of Rights, art. XXXVI; MICH. CONST. art. I, § 4; MINN. CONST. art. I, § 16; MO. CONST. art. I,
§ 5; NEB. CONST. art. I, § 4; N.H. CONST. pt. 1, art. VI; N.M. CONST. art. II, § 11; N.C. CONST.
art. I, § 13; OHIO CONST. art. I, § 7; OKLA. CONST. art. I, § 2; OR. CONST. art. I, § 3; PA.
CONST. art. I, § 3; R.I. CONST. art. I, § 3; S.D. CONST. art. VI, § 3; TENN. CONST. art. I, § 3;
TEX. CONST. art. I, § 6; VT. CONST. ch. 1, art. III; VA. CONST. art. I, § 16; WASH. CONST. art. I,
§ 11; W. VA. CONST. art. III, § 15; WIS. CONST. art. I, § 18.
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That all persons have a natural and unalienable right, to worship
Almighty God, according to the dictates of their own consciences and under-
standings, as in their opinion shall be regulated by the word of God; and
that no person ought to, or of right can be compelled to attend any religious
worship, or erect or support any place of worship, or maintain any minister,
contrary to the dictates of conscience, nor can any person be justly deprived
or abridged of any civil right as a citizen, on account of religious sentiments,
or peculia[r] mode of religious worship; and that no authority can, or ought
to be vested in, or assumed by, any power whatever, that shall in any case
interfere with, or in any manner control the rights of conscience, in the free
exercise of religious worship.  Nevertheless, every sect or denomination of
christians ought to observe the sabbath or Lord’s day, and keep up some sort
of religious worship, which to them shall seem most agreeable to the
revealed will of God.50
Colorado’s constitution contains a similar clause, stating that:
The free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship, with-
out discrimination, shall forever hereafter be guaranteed; and no person
shall be denied any civil or political right, privilege or capacity, on account
of his opinions concerning religion; but the liberty of conscience hereby
secured shall not be construed to dispense with oaths or affirmations, excuse
acts of licentiousness or justify practices inconsistent with the good order,
peace or safety of the state.  No person shall be required to attend or sup-
port any ministry or place of worship, religious sect or denomination against
his consent.  Nor shall any preference be given by law to any religious
denomination or mode of worship.51
Protections like these are critically important for religious freedom.
Indeed, this type of coercion was one of James Madison’s primary concerns
when he led the fight to disestablish the Episcopal Church as the established
church of Virginia.  For instance, in 1784, James Madison fought against a
Virginia General Assembly bill that sought “to collect tax money for all Chris-
tian churches in the name of ‘public morality.’  Madison and others saw the
bill for what it was: an attempt to prop up the Protestant Episcopal
(Anglican) church with taxpayers’ money.”52  In the end, then, we count
these clauses as anti–establishment of religion clauses because, by prohibit-
ing the state from engaging in coercive practices that force individuals to
support any given church, they protect religious liberty at a fundamental
level and prevent the establishment—in an indirect way—of a state religion.
Finally, while no state constitutions in 2018 establish a state religion, we
think it is worth pointing out that two states express support for Christianity
within their religious freedom clauses.  Vermont’s constitution, to begin with,
holds that “every sect or denomination of christians ought to observe the
sabbath or Lord’s day, and keep up some sort of religious worship, which to
50 VT. CONST. ch. 1, art. III (alteration in original).
51 COLO. CONST. art. II, § 4.
52 Joseph Loconte, James Madison and Religious Liberty, HERITAGE FOUND. (Mar. 16,
2001), http://www.heritage.org/political-process/report/james-madison-and-religious-
liberty.
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them shall seem most agreeable to the revealed will of God.”53  Virginia’s
constitution, in comparison, states that “it is the mutual duty of all to practice
Christian forbearance, love, and charity towards each other.”54  Nevertheless,
we still count these states as prohibiting an establishment of religion because
their constitutions also contain clear antiestablishment language.55  The ref-
erences to Christianity are obviously dated and only an indication of ceremo-
nial deism.
2. Free Exercise Clauses
In 2018, free exercise clause analogs—which guarantee citizens the right
to freedom of religious worship—are found universally in all fifty state consti-
tutions.56  All thirty-seven state constitutions in 1868 also had free exercise of
religion clauses,57 so there has been no evolution with respect to this consti-
tutional right.  In addition, thirteen out of fourteen state constitutions or
colonial charters functioning as a state constitution had free exercise clauses
53 VT. CONST. ch. 1, art. III.
54 VA. CONST. art. I, § 16.
55 E.g., VT. CONST. ch. 1, art. III (“[T]hat no person ought to, or of right can be com-
pelled to attend any religious worship, or erect or support any place of worship, or main-
tain any minister, contrary to the dictates of conscience . . . and that no authority can, or
ought to be vested in, or assumed by, any power whatever, that shall in any case interfere
with, or in any manner control the rights of conscience, in the free exercise of religious
worship.”); VA. CONST. art. I, § 16 (“That religion . . . can be directed only by reason and
conviction, not by force or violence; and, therefore, . . . [n]o man shall be compelled to
frequent or support any religious worship, place, or ministry whatsoever, nor shall be
enforced, restrained, molested, or burthened in his body or goods, nor shall otherwise
suffer on account of his religious opinions or belief . . . . And the General Assembly shall
not prescribe any religious test whatever, or confer any peculiar privileges or advantages on
any sect or denomination, or pass any law requiring or authorizing any religious society, or
the people of any district within this Commonwealth, to levy on themselves or others, any
tax for the erection or repair of any house of public worship, or for the support of any
church or ministry . . . .”).
56 See ALA. CONST. art. I, § 3; ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 4; ARIZ. CONST. art. XX, § 1; ARK.
CONST. art. II, §§ 24–25; CAL. CONST. art. I, § 4; COLO. CONST. art. II, § 4; CONN. CONST. art.
I, § 3; id. art. VII; DEL. CONST. art. I, § 1; FLA. CONST. art. I, § 3; GA. CONST. art. I, § 1, para.
3; HAW. CONST. art. I, § 4; IDAHO CONST. art. I, § 4; ILL. CONST. art. I, § 3; IND. CONST. art. I,
§§ 2–4; IOWA CONST. art. I, § 3; KAN. CONST. Bill of Rights, § 7; KY. CONST. Bill of Rights,
§ 5; LA. CONST. art. I, § 8; ME. CONST. art. I, § 3; MD. CONST. Declaration of Rights, art.
XXXVI; MASS. CONST. pt. 1, art. II; id. arts. of amend. XVIII; MICH. CONST. art. I, §§ 2, 4;
MINN. CONST. art. I, § 16; MISS. CONST. art. III, § 18; MO. CONST. art. I, § 5; MONT. CONST.
art. II, § 5; NEB. CONST. art. I, § 4; NEV. CONST. art. I, § 4; N.H. CONST. pt. 1, arts. IV, V; N.J.
CONST. art. I, § 3; N.M. CONST. art. II, § 11; N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 3; N.C. CONST. art. I, § 13;
N.D. CONST. art. I, § 3; OHIO CONST. art. I, § 7; OKLA. CONST. art. I, § 2; OR. CONST. art. I,
§§ 2–3; PA. CONST. art. I, § 3; R.I. CONST. art. I, § 3; S.C. CONST. art. I, § 2, S.D. CONST. art.
VI, § 3; TENN. CONST. art. I, § 3; TEX. CONST. art. I, § 6; UTAH CONST. art. I, §§ 1, 4; VT.
CONST. ch. 1, art. III; VA. CONST. art. I, § 16; WASH. CONST. art. I, § 11; W. VA. CONST. art.
III, § 15; WIS. CONST. art. I, § 18; WYO. CONST. art. I, § 18.
57 Calabresi & Agudo, supra note 5, at 33.
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in their Bills of Rights in 1791 when the Federal Bill of Rights was ratified.58
The right to the free exercise of one’s religion is more deeply rooted in
American history, tradition, and modern-day state constitutional consensus
than any other rights and is as deeply rooted as the rights to jury trial and to
habeas corpus.59
FIGURE 3.  FREE EXERCISE OF RELIGION CLAUSES IN
STATE CONSTITUTIONS
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It should be noted that the 1791 free exercise clauses all protected “free-
dom of worship” rather than the “free exercise of religion.”  One could argue
that the federal right to free exercise is even broader than the state rights in
1791 to freedom of worship.  We think the words “exercise” and “worship”
mean the same thing in these various clauses although it is more of a stretch
to say that, for example, running a religious preschool is “worship” rather
than an “exercise” of freedom of religion.  In the present day, we think the
federal language has completely informed and possibly expanded the mean-
ing of the state language providing for freedom of worship.
The language used in the free exercise clause analogs varies widely from
state to state.  Some states adhere closely to the rhetoric used in the Federal
Constitution,60 electing to protect “free exercise” by name.  For example,
Indiana’s constitution holds that “[n]o law shall, in any case whatever, con-
trol the free exercise and enjoyment of religious opinions, or interfere with
the rights of conscience.”61  Others provide that all people have a right to
worship in whatever way they see fit, according to the dictates of their own
conscience.  Tennessee’s constitution, for instance, states:
58 Calabresi, Agudo & Dore, supra note 5, at 1473.
59 See infra notes 229–31, 338–40, 346–48 and accompanying text.
60 U.S. CONST. amend. I.
61 IND. CONST. art. I, § 3.
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That all men have a natural and indefeasible right to worship Almighty God
according to the dictates of their own conscience; that no man can of right
be compelled to attend, erect, or support any place of worship, or to main-
tain any minister against his consent; that no human authority can, in any
case whatever, control or interfere with the rights of conscience; and that no
preference shall ever be given, by law, to any religious establishment or
mode of worship.62
Arizona’s free exercise clause, in comparison, is quite broad, and it uses
some of the most rights-protective language out of all of the free exercise
clause analogs, drawing a circle of protection that even encompasses atheism.
It provides that “[p]erfect toleration of religious sentiment shall be secured
to every inhabitant of this state, and no inhabitant of this state shall ever be
molested in person or property on account of his or her mode of religious
worship, or lack of the same.”63
Other states place limitations on the right to worship in their free exer-
cise clause analogs, clarifying that the religious liberty they guarantee cannot
be construed to justify otherwise illegal or dangerous behavior.  Among other
things, such limitations can be used to prohibit polygamous marriages, cer-
tain kinds of illicit drug use, and the burning of a widow on her husband’s
pyre.  California’s free exercise clause, for example, states that the “[f]ree
exercise and enjoyment of religion without discrimination or preference are
guaranteed.  This liberty of conscience does not excuse acts that are licen-
tious or inconsistent with the peace or safety of the State”64 and Maine’s con-
stitution states that:
All individuals have a natural and unalienable right to worship Almighty
God according to the dictates of their own consciences, and no person shall
be hurt, molested or restrained in that person’s liberty or estate for worship-
ping God in the manner and season most agreeable to the dictates of that
person’s own conscience, nor for that person’s religious professions or senti-
ments, provided that that person does not disturb the public peace, nor
obstruct others in their religious worship . . . .65
62 TENN. CONST. art. I, § 3.
63 ARIZ. CONST. art. XX, § 1.  Oklahoma’s free exercise clause is similar to Arizona’s,
except that it doesn’t have the “or lack of the same” language and it limits free exercise to
some extent by banning polygamy. See OKLA. CONST. art. I, § 2 (“Perfect toleration of
religious sentiment shall be secured, and no inhabitant of the State shall ever be molested
in person or property on account of his or her mode of religious worship; and no religious
test shall be required for the exercise of civil or political rights.  Polygamous or plural
marriages are forever prohibited.”).
64 CAL. CONST. art. I, § 4.  Mississippi’s constitution contains a similar clause. MISS.
CONST. art. III, § 18 (“No religious test as a qualification for office shall be required; and
no preference shall be given by law to any religious sect or mode of worship; but the free
enjoyment of all religious sentiments and the different modes of worship shall be held
sacred.  The rights hereby secured shall not be construed to justify acts of licentiousness injurious
to morals or dangerous to the peace and safety of the state, or to exclude the Holy Bible from use
in any public school of this state.” (emphasis added)).
65 ME. CONST. art. I, § 3.
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In addition, Idaho’s constitution indicates that:
The exercise and enjoyment of religious faith and worship shall forever be
guaranteed; and no person shall be denied any civil or political right, privi-
lege, or capacity on account of his religious opinions; but the liberty of con-
science hereby secured shall not be construed to dispense with oaths or
affirmations, or excuse acts of licentiousness or justify polygamous or other
pernicious practices, inconsistent with morality or the peace or safety of the
state; nor to permit any person, organization, or association to directly or
indirectly aid or abet, counsel or advise any person to commit the crime of
bigamy or polygamy, or any other crime.  No person shall be required to
attend or support any ministry or place of worship, religious sect or denomi-
nation, or pay tithes against his consent; nor shall any preference be given by
law to any religious denomination or mode of worship.  Bigamy and polyg-
amy are forever prohibited in the state, and the legislature shall provide by
law for the punishment of such crimes.66
It is thus clear that many states have included textual caveats that qualify
the right to free exercise of religion, ensuring that their free exercise clause
analogs are not limitless, and do not validate otherwise illicit actions that
disturb the public peace or that harm other people.  Neo-Aztecs who wanted
to commit a human sacrifice of a consenting neo-Aztec would not be pro-
tected in doing so by the free exercise clauses of either the federal or of any
of the state constitutions in our opinion.  The same thing goes for commit-
ting suttee, whereby a willing Hindu wife was burned alive on the funeral pyre
of her dead husband.67
Another difference between the free exercise clause analogs is that four
states, Delaware, Maryland, Massachusetts, and Virginia, use language that
appears to imply a duty to worship some sort of deity or God.68  Delaware’s
constitution, as an example, states:
Although it is the duty of all persons frequently to assemble together for the
public worship of Almighty God; and piety and morality, on which the pros-
perity of communities depends, are hereby promoted; yet no person shall or
ought to be compelled to attend any religious worship, to contribute to the
erection or support of any place of worship, or to the maintenance of any
ministry, against his or her own free will and consent; and no power shall or
ought to be vested in or assumed by any magistrate that shall in any case
interfere with, or in any manner control the rights of conscience, in the free
exercise of religious worship, nor a preference given by law to any religious
societies, denominations, or modes of worship.69
We still count these states as providing for the free exercise of religion in
their state constitutions because even though they mention a supposed duty
to worship, they then go on to provide typical free exercise clause protec-
66 IDAHO CONST. art. I, § 4.
67 Luke Harding, The Ultimate Sacrifice, GUARDIAN (Aug. 23, 2002), https://www
.theguardian.com/world/2002/aug/23/gender.uk1.
68 DEL. CONST. art. I, § 1; MD. CONST. Declaration of Rights, art. XXXVI; MASS. CONST.
pt. 1, art. II; VA. CONST. art. I, § 16.
69 DEL. CONST. art. I, § 1 (emphasis added).
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tions, such as noting that “no person shall or ought to be compelled to
attend any religious worship” and “no power shall or ought to be vested in or
assumed by any magistrate that shall in any case interfere with, or in any
manner control the rights of conscience, in the free exercise of religious
worship.”70
Finally, it is worth pointing out that two states used language that
appears to be biased in favor of the Christian faith within their free exercise
clause analogs.  Vermont’s constitution, to begin with, includes the statement
that “every sect or denomination of christians ought to observe the sabbath
or Lord’s day, and keep up some sort of religious worship, which to them
shall seem most agreeable to the revealed will of God.”71  Likewise, Virginia’s
constitution holds that “it is the mutual duty of all to practice Christian for-
bearance, love, and charity towards each other.”72  Yet, despite their refer-
ences to Christianity, the free exercise clause analogs of these two states still
protect a general right to religious liberty.  Indeed, they each prevent people
from being “compelled” to worship in any way, and prohibit authorities from
interfering with the “free exercise” of religious worship.  For those reasons,
we count them as states that protect a right to free exercise of religion.73
70 Id.
71 VT. CONST. ch. 1, art. III (“That all persons have a natural and unalienable right, to
worship Almighty God, according to the dictates of their own consciences and understand-
ings, as in their opinion shall be regulated by the word of God; and that no person ought
to, or of right can be compelled to attend any religious worship, or erect or support any
place of worship, or maintain any minister, contrary to the dictates of conscience, nor can
any person be justly deprived or abridged of any civil right as a citizen, on account of
religious sentiments, or peculia[r] mode of religious worship; and that no authority can, or
ought to be vested in, or assumed by, any power whatever, that shall in any case interfere
with, or in any manner control the rights of conscience, in the free exercise of religious
worship.  Nevertheless, every sect or denomination of christians ought to observe the sab-
bath or Lord’s day, and keep up some sort of religious worship, which to them shall seem
most agreeable to the revealed will of God.”).
72 VA. CONST. art. I, § 16 (“That religion or the duty which we owe to our Creator, and
the manner of discharging it, can be directed only by reason and conviction, not by force
or violence; and, therefore, all men are equally entitled to the free exercise of religion,
according to the dictates of conscience; and that it is the mutual duty of all to practice
Christian forbearance, love, and charity towards each other.  No man shall be compelled to
frequent or support any religious worship, place, or ministry whatsoever, nor shall be
enforced, restrained, molested, or burthened in his body or goods, nor shall otherwise
suffer on account of his religious opinions or belief; but all men shall be free to profess
and by argument to maintain their opinions in matters of religion, and the same shall in
nowise diminish, enlarge, or affect their civil capacities.  And the General Assembly shall
not prescribe any religious test whatever, or confer any peculiar privileges or advantages on
any sect or denomination, or pass any law requiring or authorizing any religious society, or
the people of any district within this Commonwealth, to levy on themselves or others, any
tax for the erection or repair of any house of public worship, or for the support of any
church or ministry; but it shall be left free to every person to select his religious instructor,
and to make for his support such private contract as he shall please.”).
73 VT. CONST. ch. 1, art. III; VA. CONST. art. I, § 16.
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3. References to God in the Preamble
Forty-six of the fifty states in 2018—comprising 92% of the states and
95.5% of the U.S. population74—expressly refer to God in the preamble of
their state constitutions.75  A typical example appears in Wisconsin’s constitu-
tion, which says that “[w]e, the people of Wisconsin, grateful to Almighty
God for our freedom, in order to secure its blessings, form a more perfect
government, insure domestic tranquility and promote the general welfare,
do establish this constitution.”76  Some of the states were more creative with
their references to God, like the Missouri Constitution, which says “[w]e, the
people of Missouri, with profound reverence for the Supreme Ruler of the
Universe, and grateful for His goodness, do establish this Constitution for the
better government of the state,”77 and the Massachusetts Constitution, which
includes the phrase “acknowledging, with grateful hearts, the goodness of the
great Legislator of the universe.”78  The Texas Constitution utilizes a pithier
preamble, simply writing, “[h]umbly invoking the blessings of Almighty God,
the people of the State of Texas, do ordain and establish this Constitution.”79
74 2010 Census, supra note 12 (294,369,506 out of 308,143,815 residents).
75 See ALA. CONST. pmbl.; ALASKA CONST. pmbl.; ARIZ. CONST. pmbl.; ARK. CONST.
pmbl.; CAL. CONST. pmbl.; COLO. CONST. pmbl.; CONN. CONST. pmbl.; DEL. CONST. pmbl.;
FLA. CONST. pmbl.; GA. CONST. pmbl.; HAW. CONST. pmbl.; IDAHO CONST. pmbl.; ILL.
CONST. pmbl.; IND. CONST. pmbl.; IOWA CONST. pmbl.; KAN. CONST. pmbl.; KY. CONST.
pmbl.; LA. CONST. pmbl.; ME. CONST. pmbl.; MD. CONST. pmbl.; MASS. CONST. pmbl.; MICH.
CONST. pmbl.; MINN. CONST. pmbl.; MISS. CONST. pmbl.; MO. CONST. pmbl.; MONT. CONST.
pmbl.; NEB. CONST. pmbl.; NEV. CONST. pmbl.; N.J. CONST. pmbl.; N.M. CONST. pmbl.; N.Y.
CONST. pmbl.; N.C. CONST. pmbl.; N.D. CONST. pmbl.; OHIO CONST. pmbl.; OKLA. CONST.
pmbl.; PA. CONST. pmbl.; R.I. CONST. pmbl.; S.C. CONST. pmbl.; S.D. CONST. pmbl.; TENN.
CONST. pmbl.; TEX. CONST. pmbl.; UTAH CONST. pmbl.; WASH. CONST. pmbl.; W. VA.
CONST. pmbl.; WIS. CONST. pmbl.; WYO. CONST. pmbl.  The four states without God in the
preamble are New Hampshire, Oregon, Vermont, and Virginia.
76 WIS. CONST. pmbl.
77 MO. CONST. pmbl.
78 MASS. CONST. pmbl.
79 TEX. CONST. pmbl.
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FIGURE 4.  REFERENCES TO GOD IN PREAMBLES TO
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Such widespread inclusion of explicit references to God in the pream-
bles of the modern state constitutions is striking because it represents a
departure from the Federal Constitution, a document that conspicuously
avoids referring to God.  Though they largely identified with different sects
of the Protestant faith,80 the Framers left God out of the Constitution for a
few key reasons.  First, the Framers wanted to leave matters of religion and
worship up to the states in order to respect reserved state powers, a value that
is both enshrined throughout the Federal Constitution81 and in other found-
80 See Sch. Dist. of Abington Twp. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 240 (1963) (Brennan, J.,
concurring) (“[O]ur religious composition makes us a vastly more diverse people than
were our forefathers.  They knew differences chiefly among Protestant sects.  Today the
Nation is far more heterogeneous religiously, including as it does substantial minorities
not only of Catholics and Jews but as well of those who worship according to no version of
the Bible and those who worship no God at all.”); see also McCreary County v. ACLU of Ky.,
545 U.S. 844, 884 (2005) (O’Connor, J., concurring) (“[T]he Framers lived at a time when
our national religious diversity was neither as robust nor as well recognized as it is now.
They may not have foreseen the variety of religions for which this Nation would eventually
provide a home.”).
81 U.S. CONST. pmbl. (“We the People of the United States . . . ordain and establish
this Constitution for the United States of America.”); id. amend. IX (“The enumeration in
the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others
retained by the people.”); id. amend. X (“The powers not delegated to the United States
by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respec-
tively, or to the people.”); Anthony J. Minna, Why God Is in the Declaration but Not the Consti-
tution, J. AM. REVOLUTION (Feb. 22, 2016), https://allthingsliberty.com/2016/02/why-god-
is-in-the-declaration-but-not-the-constitution/ (“[T]he theory of government underpin-
ning the United States Constitution is popular sovereignty.  The government derives its
legitimacy from the consent of the governed, not from an assembly of elders, not from a
king or a prelate, and not from a higher power.  The stirring opening words of the Pream-
ble, ‘We the People of the United States,’ make it clear both who is establishing the govern-
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ing documents, such as the Declaration of Independence.82  In addition, the
Federal Constitution sought to achieve strict religious neutrality, both
because the Framers valued it for its own sake83 and because there was a
pervasive fear of governmental tyranny, making the Framers and the colo-
nists deeply suspicious of centralized national powers that might attempt to
“claim, as European rulers did, that their authority was divine in origin.”84
The Framers of the Federal Constitution were acutely aware of the fact that
the Episcopal or Anglican Church was run by the Archbishop of Canterbury
who was appointed by the King of England, one of whose titles was, and still
ment and for whose benefit it exists.  There is no consent required beyond the will of the
people for the people to govern themselves.”).
82 THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776) (“That to secure these
Rights, Governments are instituted among Men, deriving their just Powers from the Consent of
the Governed, that whenever any Form of Government becomes destructive of these Ends, it
is the Right of the People to alter or to abolish it, and to institute new Government, laying its Founda-
tion on such Principles, and organizing its Powers in such Form, as to them shall seem most likely to
effect their Safety and Happiness.” (emphasis added)).
83 See Minna, supra note 81 (“Eighteenth century America was religiously diverse, and
by the time of the Revolution religion was widely viewed as a matter of voluntary individual
choice.  The Constitution acknowledged these realities and, unlike contemporary Euro-
pean political orders, promoted no sect and took no position whatsoever on theological
issues.  There is no state religion and Article VI of the Constitution provides that ‘no relig-
ious Test shall ever be required as a qualification to any Office or public Trust under the
United States.’  The First Amendment to the Constitution, ratified in 1791, provides that
‘Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the
free exercise thereof.’  The absence of references to a deity in the Constitution is consis-
tent with the strict religious neutrality of the entire document.” (first quoting U.S. CONST.
art. VI; and then quoting U.S. CONST. amend I)); see also id. (“Whereas the Declaration
explained and justified a rebellion to secure God-given rights, the Constitution is a
blueprint for stable and effective republican government in a free country.  The Preamble
to the Constitution declares that its purposes are ‘to form a more perfect Union, establish
Justice, insure domestic Tranquility, provide for the common defence, promote the gen-
eral Welfare, and secure the Blessings of Liberty.’  These are wholly secular objects; relig-
ious references are extraneous in a document drafted to further them.” (quoting U.S.
CONST. pmbl.)).
84 Id. (“And in the early years of the American republic, the people in question were
deeply suspicious of power.  There was considerable opposition to the Constitution as ini-
tially drafted, both in the state conventions called to ratify it and among ordinary Ameri-
cans.  Opponents believed that a centralization of authority would lead to tyranny and
argued either for outright rejection or, at a minimum, for amendments to limit the powers
of the new government and safeguard liberties.  In such an anti-power environment, few
Americans wished to see their new rulers claim, as European rulers did, that their authority
was divine in origin.  In creating a political order based on popular sovereignty, the Found-
ing Fathers thus turned prevailing European political theory on its head.  In place of the
divine right of monarchs, the Declaration asserted the divine rights of all men, and both
the Declaration and the Constitution source the legitimacy of political rule exclusively in
the consent of the governed.”).
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is, “the Defender of the Faith.”85  The Framers did not want any President or
future Congress to be able to defend the faith by establishing a national
church, and this too probably explains the Framers’ decision not to refer to
God in the Preamble to the Federal Constitution.
The Framers’ fears are less applicable to the state governments, since the
states hold decidedly less power than a centralized national government, and
because the states are able to shape their laws and ruling documents to fit the
sensibilities of the local population that they serve.  For that reason, it is pos-
sible that the states included references to God in their constitutions pre-
cisely because of popular sovereignty, as well as due to a lack of fear about
states governments attempting to amass power under the claim that their
power is divine in origin.
There are noticeably more references to God in the preambles of mod-
ern 2018 state constitutions than there were in 1868, when only twenty-nine
out of thirty-seven state constitutions mentioned God in their preambles.86
Only six states out of fourteen referred to God in the preambles of their
constitutions in 1791.87  The modern 2018 numbers, again, are forty-six of
the fifty states88—comprising 92% of the states and 95.5% of the U.S. popula-
tion.89  We believe that this fact suggests that living constitutionalism ought
to be at least somewhat more deistic than originalist constitutionalism,
though we think it is worth noting that increased inclusion of the word “God”
in the preamble could be seen as a form of ceremonial deism, discussed in
more detail below.  Either way, we have no idea at all as to what that would
85 See Charles Vows to Keep “Defender of the Faith” Title as King, NAT’L SECULAR SOC’Y (Feb.
9, 2015), https://www.secularism.org.uk/news/2015/02/charles-vows-to-keep-defender-of-
the-faith-title-as-king.
86 See Calabresi & Agudo, supra note 5, at 37.  Note that in our original analysis, we
coded only twenty-seven states as having a reference to God in the preamble. Id.  We now
believe that framing was too narrow.  Under our updated count, the states that mention
God in the preamble of their 1868 constitution are Alabama, Arkansas, California, Con-
necticut, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Maine, Maryland, Mas-
sachusetts, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Nebraska, Nevada, New Jersey, New York,
North Carolina, Ohio, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Virginia, and
Wisconsin.
87 Calabresi, Agudo & Dore, supra note 5, at 1473–75.
88 See ALA. CONST. pmbl.; ALASKA CONST. pmbl.; ARIZ. CONST. pmbl.; ARK. CONST.
pmbl.; CAL. CONST. pmbl.; COLO. CONST. pmbl.; CONN. CONST. pmbl.; DEL. CONST. pmbl.;
FLA. CONST. pmbl.; GA. CONST. pmbl.; HAW. CONST. pmbl.; IDAHO CONST. pmbl.; ILL.
CONST. pmbl.; IND. CONST. pmbl.; IOWA CONST. pmbl.; KAN. CONST. pmbl.; KY. CONST.
pmbl.; LA. CONST. pmbl.; ME. CONST. pmbl.; MD. CONST. pmbl.; MASS. CONST. pmbl.; MICH.
CONST. pmbl.; MINN. CONST. pmbl.; MISS. CONST. pmbl.; MO. CONST. pmbl.; MONT. CONST.
pmbl.; NEB. CONST. pmbl.; NEV. CONST. pmbl.; N.J. CONST. pmbl.; N.M. CONST. pmbl.; N.Y.
CONST. pmbl.; N.C. CONST. pmbl.; N.D. CONST. pmbl.; OHIO CONST. pmbl.; OKLA. CONST.
pmbl.; PA. CONST. pmbl.; R.I. CONST. pmbl.; S.C. CONST. pmbl.; S.D. CONST. pmbl.; TENN.
CONST. pmbl.; TEX. CONST. pmbl.; UTAH CONST. pmbl.; WASH. CONST. pmbl.; W. VA.
CONST. pmbl.; WIS. CONST. pmbl.; WYO. CONST. pmbl.  The four states without God in the
preamble are New Hampshire, Oregon, Vermont, and Virginia.
89 2010 Census, supra note 12 (294,369,506 out of 308,143,815 residents).
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mean except that it suggests continuing themes of theism in American state
constitutional law.  It perhaps suggests that the words “under God” in the
Pledge of Allegiance and the national motto of “In God We Trust” are not
constitutionally problematic.
4. Ceremonial Deism
All fifty states have constitutions with rhetoric that can be described as
including instances of what might be called “ceremonial deism.”90  Ceremo-
nial deism is a concept that was introduced by the Supreme Court in recent
decades in relation to the inclusion of religious phrases like “In God We
Trust” in government-affiliated documents and statements, such as in our
national motto.91  Examples of ceremonial deism include the textual use of
phrases such as “Almighty God,”92 “Sovereign Ruler of the Universe,”93
“Divine Providence,”94 and “their Creator”95 in the state constitutions.
90 See ALA. CONST. pmbl.; ALASKA CONST. pmbl.; ARIZ. CONST. pmbl.; ARK. CONST.
pmbl.; CAL. CONST. pmbl.; COLO. CONST. pmbl.; CONN. CONST. pmbl.; DEL. CONST. pmbl.;
FLA. CONST. pmbl.; GA. CONST. pmbl.; HAW. CONST. pmbl.; IDAHO CONST. pmbl.; ILL.
CONST. pmbl.; IND. CONST. pmbl.; IOWA CONST. pmbl.; KAN. CONST. pmbl.; KY. CONST.
pmbl.; LA. CONST. pmbl.; ME. CONST. pmbl.; MD. CONST. pmbl.; MASS. CONST. pmbl.; MICH.
CONST. pmbl.; MINN. CONST. pmbl.; MISS. CONST. pmbl.; MO. CONST. pmbl.; MONT. CONST.
pmbl.; NEB. CONST. pmbl.; NEV. CONST. pmbl.; N.H. CONST. pt. 1, art. V; N.J. CONST. pmbl.;
N.M. CONST. pmbl.; N.Y. CONST. pmbl.; N.C. CONST. pmbl.; N.D. CONST. pmbl.; OHIO
CONST. pmbl.; OKLA. CONST. pmbl.; OR. CONST. art. I, § 2; PA. CONST. pmbl.; R.I. CONST.
pmbl.; S.C. CONST. pmbl.; S.D. CONST. pmbl.; TENN. CONST. pmbl.; TEX. CONST. pmbl.;
UTAH CONST. pmbl.; VT. CONST. ch. 2, §§ 17, 56; VA. CONST. art. II, § 7; WASH. CONST.
pmbl.; W. VA. CONST. pmbl.; WIS. CONST. pmbl.; WYO. CONST. pmbl.
91 See Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 716 (1984) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (“While I
remain uncertain about these questions, I would suggest that such practices as the designa-
tion of ‘In God We Trust’ as our national motto, or the references to God contained in the
Pledge of Allegiance to the flag can best be understood, in Dean Rostow’s apt phrase, as a
form [of] ‘ceremonial deism,’ protected from Establishment Clause scrutiny chiefly
because they have lost through rote repetition any significant religious content.” (footnote
omitted)); see also Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 37 (2004)
(O’Connor, J., concurring in the judgment) (explaining how ceremony can strip refer-
ences to God of their religious significance and replace it with historical significance
instead).
92 E.g., IDAHO CONST. pmbl. (“We, the people of the state of Idaho, grateful to
Almighty God for our freedom, to secure its blessings and promote our common welfare
do establish this Constitution.”).
93 E.g., ME. CONST. pmbl. (“We the people of Maine, in order to establish justice,
insure tranquility, provide for our mutual defense, promote our common welfare, and
secure to ourselves and our posterity the blessings of liberty, acknowledging with grateful
hearts the goodness of the Sovereign Ruler of the Universe in affording us an opportunity,
so favorable to the design; and, imploring God’s aid and direction in its accomplishment,
do agree to form ourselves into a free and independent State, by the style and title of the
State of Maine and do ordain and establish the following Constitution for the government
of the same.”).
94 E.g., W. VA. CONST. pmbl. (“Since through Divine Providence we enjoy the blessings
of civil, political and religious liberty, we, the people of West Virginia, in and through the
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Largely, these phrases appear in the preambles of the state constitutions.
However, even the states that do not have a preamble96 or do not reference
God in their preamble97 still mention God elsewhere in their constitution,
such as in their religious liberty clauses98 or in their oath of office clauses.99
We found ceremonial deism in thirty-six of the thirty-seven state consti-
tutions in 1868 when the Fourteenth Amendment was ratified,100 whereas
today all fifty states use such language.  We again think this suggests that the
living constitution is as theistic as were the original thirty-seven states, which
ratified the Fourteenth Amendment, and more theistic than were the origi-
nal twelve state constitutions as they stood in 1791 when only six out of twelve
newly written state constitutions included ceremonial deist language.101
It is worth noting that all fifty states have establishment clauses,102 and
yet all fifty states also refer to God in their constitutions.103  There thus
appears to be a unanimous agreement amongst the fifty states that references
to ceremonial deism are consistent with the principles of religious neutrality
and separation of church and state enshrined both in the Federal Constitu-
tion and in their individual state constitutions.  This suggests that the
Supreme Court has correctly read these references to ceremonial deism as
being cultural and historic rather than as being religious in nature.  This
suggests that the use of the words “under God” in the pledge of allegiance
and of “In God We Trust” in the national motto are not constitutionally
problematic.
provisions of this Constitution, reaffirm our faith in and constant reliance upon God and
seek diligently to promote, preserve and perpetuate good government in the state of West
Virginia for the common welfare, freedom and security of ourselves and our posterity.”).
95 E.g., DEL. CONST. pmbl. (“Through Divine goodness, all people have by nature the
rights of worshiping and serving their Creator according to the dictates of their con-
sciences, of enjoying and defending life and liberty, of acquiring and protecting reputation
and property, and in general of obtaining objects suitable to their condition, without injury
by one to another; and as these rights are essential to their welfare, for due exercise
thereof, power is inherent in them; and therefore all just authority in the institutions of
political society is derived from the people, and established with their consent, to advance
their happiness; and they may for this end, as circumstances require, from time to time,
alter their Constitution of government.”).
96 New Hampshire, Vermont, and Virginia do not have a preamble affixed to their
state constitutions.
97 Oregon does not reference God in the preamble of its state constitution.
98 E.g., OR. CONST. art. I, § 2.
99 E.g., VT. CONST. ch. 2, §§ 17, 56; VA. CONST. art. II, § 7.
100 See Calabresi & Agudo, supra note 5, at 38.  Note that in our original analysis, id., we
coded only thirty states as including ceremonial deism.  We now believe that all of the
states except West Virginia included ceremonial deism in their state constitutions in 1868.
Typically, the thirty-six states either mention God in the text of their constitutions (such as
in their freedom of religion clauses or in their preambles), or they include phrases like “so
help me God” in their oath of office.
101 Calabresi, Agudo, & Dore, supra note 5, at 1475–76.
102 See supra subsection II.A.1.
103 See supra subsection II.A.4.
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B. Freedom of Expression Rights
We now turn to the right to freedom of expression, which appears in the
Federal First Amendment104 after the religion clauses and which has largely
been used—in all areas of American federal and state constitutional law—to
protect against the suppression of freedom of speech or of the use of the
printing press.105  These clauses have been applied purposively, rather than
literally, so that they protect freedom of expression via new technologies such
as video broadcasting, the internet, and social media use, as well as protect-
ing the freedom of the use of printing presses.  We, of course, agree with this
purposive interpretation.  As we explain below, the right to freedom of
expression is not only codified in the Federal Constitution, but it has also
been codified in the state constitutions of all fifty states, indicating that the
right to freedom of expression is yet another fundamental right that is uni-
versally protected by both the federal and all fifty state constitutions.
1. Freedom of the Press
In a display of full constitutional uniformity, all fifty states guarantee
freedom of the press to their citizens, although there is some variation in the
specific phrasing of their freedom of the press clauses.106  Some constitutions
mention the press specifically, like Rhode Island’s constitution, which states
“[t]he liberty of the press being essential to the security of freedom in a state,
104 U.S. CONST. amend. I.
105 See, e.g., Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343 (2003) (explaining that a blanket ban on
cross burning is unconstitutional because it represents a content-based restriction on free
speech); N.Y. Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971) (per curiam) (holding that a
claimed threat to national security is not a sufficient justification for prior restraint con-
cerning the publication of the Pentagon Papers); Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch.
Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969) (holding that students wearing black armbands at school to
protest the Vietnam War were engaging in symbolic speech, which is protected under the
First Amendment); N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) (stating that the First
Amendment protects the publication of all statements about public officials, caveating that
false statements which are made with actual malice can be prohibited).
106 See ALA. CONST. art. I, § 4; ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 5; ARIZ. CONST. art. II, § 6; ARK.
CONST. art. II, § 6; CAL. CONST. art. I, § 2; COLO. CONST. art. II, § 10; CONN. CONST. art. I,
§§ 4–5; DEL. CONST. art. I, § 5; FLA. CONST. art. I, § 4; GA. CONST. art. I, § 1, para. 5; HAW.
CONST. art. I, § 4; IDAHO CONST. art. I, § 9; ILL. CONST. art. I, § 4; IND. CONST. art. I, § 9;
IOWA CONST. art. I, § 7; KAN. CONST. Bill of Rights, § 11; KY. CONST. Bill of Rights, § 8; LA.
CONST. art. I, § 7; ME. CONST. art. I, § 4; MD. CONST. Declaration of Rights, art. XL; MASS.
CONST. art. of amend. LXXVII; MICH. CONST. art. I, § 5; MINN. CONST. art. I, § 3; MISS.
CONST. art. III, § 13; MO. CONST. art. I, § 8; MONT. CONST. art. II, § 7; NEB. CONST. art. I,
§ 5; NEV. CONST. art. I, § 9; N.H. CONST. pt. 1, art. XXII; N.J. CONST. art. I, § 6; N.M. CONST.
art. II, § 17; N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 8; N.C. CONST. art. I, § 14; N.D. CONST. art. I, § 4; OHIO
CONST. art. I, § 11; OKLA. CONST. art. II, § 22; OR. CONST. art. I, § 8; PA. CONST. art. I, § 7;
R.I. CONST. art. I, § 20; S.C. CONST. art. I, § 2; S.D. CONST. art. VI, § 5; TENN. CONST. art. I,
§ 19; TEX. CONST. art. I, § 8; UTAH CONST. art. I, §§ 1, 15; VT. CONST. ch. 1, art. XIII; VA.
CONST. art. I, § 12; WASH. CONST. art. I, § 5; W. VA. CONST. art. III, § 7; WIS. CONST. art. I,
§ 3; WYO. CONST. art. I, § 20.
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any person may publish sentiments on any subject, being responsible for the
abuse of that liberty.”107  Other state constitutions contain a less concrete
reference to the word “press,” instead guaranteeing the right to write and
publish.  For example, South Dakota’s constitution holds that “[e]very per-
son may freely speak, write and publish on all subjects, being responsible for
the abuse of that right.”108
FIGURE 5.  FREEDOM OF THE PRESS IN STATE CONSTITUTIONS
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The great majority of the states—forty-two states, representing 84% of
the states and 92.8% of the U.S. population109—include the caveat that indi-
viduals will be held responsible for any abuse of right to freedom of the
press.110  For example, New Mexico’s constitution states that “[e]very person
may freely speak, write and publish his sentiments on all subjects, being
responsible for the abuse of that right; and no law shall be passed to restrain
107 R.I. CONST. art. I, § 20.
108 S.D. CONST. art. VI, § 5.
109 See 2010 Census, supra note 12 (286,084,134 out of 308,143,815 residents).
110 See ALA. CONST. art. I, § 4; ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 5; ARIZ. CONST. art. II, § 6; ARK.
CONST. art. II, § 6; CAL. CONST. art. I, § 2; COLO. CONST. art. II, § 10; CONN. CONST. art. I,
§ 4; DEL. CONST. art. I, § 5; FLA. CONST. art. I, § 4; GA. CONST. art. I, § 1, para. 5; IDAHO
CONST. art. I, § 9; ILL. CONST. art. I, § 4; IND. CONST. art. I, § 9; IOWA CONST. art. I, § 7; KAN.
CONST. Bill of Rights, § 11; KY. CONST. Bill of Rights, § 8; LA. CONST. art. I, § 7; ME. CONST.
art. I, § 4; MD. CONST. Declaration of Rights, art. XL; MICH. CONST. art. I, § 5; MINN. CONST.
art. I, § 3; MO. CONST. art. I, § 8; MONT. CONST. art. II, § 7; NEB. CONST. art. I, § 5; NEV.
CONST. art. I, § 9; N.J. CONST. art. I, § 6; N.M. CONST. art. II, § 17; N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 8;
N.C. CONST. art. I, § 14; N.D. CONST. art. I, § 4; OHIO CONST. art. I, § 11; OKLA. CONST. art.
II, § 22; OR. CONST. art. I, § 8; PA. CONST. art. I, § 7; R.I. CONST. art. I, § 20; S.D. CONST. art.
VI, § 5; TENN. CONST. art. I, § 19; TEX. CONST. art. I, § 8; VA. CONST. art. I, § 12; WASH.
CONST. art. I, § 5; WIS. CONST. art. I, § 3; WYO. CONST. art. I, § 20.
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\94-1\NDL102.txt unknown Seq: 27 21-NOV-18 10:57
2018] born  free  and  equal 75
or abridge the liberty of speech or of the press.”111  The Rhode Island and
South Dakota constitutions, quoted above, also contain the same caveat.112
Two additional states have similar limitations on the right to freedom of
the press.  To begin with, although West Virginia’s constitution did not con-
tain a “responsible for the abuse of that right” caveat, it arguably featured an
even steeper limitation on the right to freedom of the press, noting that:
No law abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press, shall be
passed; but the Legislature may, by suitable penalties, restrain the publica-
tion or sale of obscene books, papers, or pictures, and provide for the pun-
ishment of libel, and defamation of character, and for the recovery, in civil
actions, by the aggrieved party, of suitable damages for such libel, or
defamation.113
Similarly, while Utah’s state constitution did not contain the “responsi-
ble for the abuse of that right” caveat in relation to the right to freedom of
the press, it did apply that right to freedom of communication, which could
arguably include freedom of the press.  Specifically, Utah’s constitution states
that “[a]ll men have the inherent and inalienable right . . . to communicate
freely their thoughts and opinions, being responsible for the abuse of that
right.”114
The other six state constitutions contained no such caveats, thereby
allowing them arguably to protect the right to freedom of the press to a
greater extent than their counterparts.115  As an example, South Carolina’s
constitution holds that “[t]he General Assembly shall make no law . . . abridg-
ing the freedom of speech or of the press”116 and New Hampshire’s constitu-
tion holds that “[f]ree [s]peech and liberty of the press are essential to the
security of [f]reedom in a [s]tate: They ought, therefore, to be inviolably
preserved.”117  Still, regardless of any caveats, freedom of the press is secured
by all fifty states.
The freedom of the press was protected in all thirty-seven state constitu-
tions in 1868,118 just as it is protected in all fifty state constitutions today.
Ten states out of the twelve that wrote new constitutions between 1776 and
1791 also protected freedom of the press.119  This is clearly a right that is
deeply rooted in history, tradition, and in a modern-day consensus of the fifty
states.
111 N.M. CONST. art. II, § 17.
112 See supra notes 107–08 and accompanying text.
113 W. VA. CONST. art. III, § 7.
114 UTAH CONST. art. I, § 1.
115 HAW. CONST. art. I, § 4; MASS. CONST. arts. of amend. LXXVII; MISS. CONST. art. III,
§ 13; N.H. CONST. pt. 1, art. XXII; S.C. CONST. art. I, § 2; VT. CONST. ch. 1, art. XIII.
116 S.C. CONST. art. I, § 2.
117 N.H. CONST. pt. 1, art. XXII.
118 See Calabresi & Agudo, supra note 5, at 41.
119 Calabresi, Agudo & Dore, supra note 5, at 1478.
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2. Freedom of Speech
Another core right to expression protected under the Federal Constitu-
tion is freedom of speech.  As with freedom of the press, all fifty states pro-
vide protections for freedom of speech in their state constitutions.120  A
typical formulation can be found in California’s constitution, which provides
that “[e]very person may freely speak, write and publish his or her sentiments
on all subjects, being responsible for the abuse of this right.  A law may not
restrain or abridge liberty of speech or press.”121  Some states did not include
such an explicit textual reference to freedom of speech in their constitutions,
merely holding, for example, that “[e]very person may freely speak, write,
and publish on all subjects, being responsible for the abuse of that right.”122
In contrast to the other states, Arkansas’s constitution does not  mention
speech or speaking explicitly.  Instead, it holds that “[t]he free communica-
tion of thoughts and opinions, is one of the invaluable rights of man; and all
persons may freely write and publish their sentiments on all subjects, being
responsible for the abuse of such right.”123  We count Arkansas’s constitution
as protecting freedom of speech despite this lack of an explicit reference
because it protects the right to free communication of thoughts and ideas,
which we believe encompasses freedom of verbal communication in the form
of speech.
120 See ALA. CONST. art. I, § 4; ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 5; ARIZ. CONST. art. II § 6; ARK.
CONST. art. II, § 6; CAL. CONST. art. I, § 2; COLO. CONST. art. II, § 10; CONN. CONST. art. I,
§§ 4–5; DEL. CONST. art. I, § 5; FLA. CONST. art. I, § 4; GA. CONST. art. I, § 1, para. 5; HAW.
CONST. art. I, § 4; IDAHO CONST. art. I, § 9; ILL. CONST. art. I, § 4; IND. CONST. art. I, § 9;
IOWA CONST. art. I, § 7; KAN. CONST. Bill of Rights, § 11; KY. CONST. Bill of Rights, § 8; LA.
CONST. art. I, § 7; ME. CONST. art. I, § 4; MD. CONST. Declaration of Rights, art. XL; MASS.
CONST. arts. of amend. LXXVII; MICH. CONST. art. I, § 5; MINN. CONST. art. I, § 3; MISS.
CONST. art. III, § 13; MO. CONST. art. I, § 8; MONT. CONST. art. II, § 7; NEB. CONST. art. I,
§ 5; NEV. CONST. art. I, § 9; N.H. CONST. pt. 1, art. XXII; N.J. CONST. art. I, § 6; N.M. CONST.
art. II, § 17; N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 8; N.C. CONST. art. I, § 14; N.D. CONST. art. I, § 4; OHIO
CONST. art. I, § 11; OKLA. CONST. art. II, § 22; OR. CONST. art. I, § 8; PA. CONST. art. I, § 7;
R.I. CONST. art. I, § 21; S.C. CONST. art. I, § 2; S.D. CONST. art. VI, § 5; TENN. CONST. art. I,
§ 19; TEX. CONST. art. I, § 8; UTAH CONST. art. I, §§ 1, 15; VT. CONST. ch. 1, art. XIII; VA.
CONST. art. I, § 12; WASH. CONST. art. I, § 5; W. VA. CONST. art. III, § 7; WIS. CONST. art. I,
§ 3; WYO. CONST. art. I, § 20.
121 CAL. CONST. art. I, § 2.
122 ARIZ. CONST. art. II, § 6.
123 ARK. CONST. art. II, § 6.
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FIGURE 6.  FREEDOM OF SPEECH IN STATE CONSTITUTIONS
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The fact that 100% of the states provide a right to freedom of speech in
their state constitutions is interesting because historically, the right to free-
dom of the press came before the right to freedom of speech.  Indeed, in
1868, only thirty-two out of thirty-seven states protected a right to freedom of
speech in their state constitutions,124 while all thirty-seven states protected a
right to freedom of the press.125  Moreover, in 1791 when the Federal Bill of
Rights was ratified, only one state—Pennsylvania—protected freedom of
speech.126  It thus appears that over time the right to freedom of speech has
become increasingly fundamental, to the point where it is now a universally
acknowledged basic liberty, enshrined both in the Federal Constitution and
in the state constitutions of all fifty states.  This may reflect state constitu-
tional copying of the Federal Bill of Rights.
3. Petition and Assembly
Forty-eight of the fifty states—comprising 96% of the states and 97.6% of
the U.S. population127—constitutionally protect the right to freedom of peti-
tion in their state constitutions.128  All of these states but Maryland129 com-
124 See Calabresi & Agudo, supra note 5, at 42.
125 Id. at 41.
126 See Calabresi, Agudo & Dore, supra note 5, at 1479.
127 See 2010 Census, supra note 12 (300,780,711 out of 308,143,815 residents).
128 See ALA. CONST. art. I, § 25; ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 6; ARIZ. CONST. art. II, § 5; ARK.
CONST. art. II, § 4; CAL. CONST. art. I, § 3, pt. A; COLO. CONST. art. II, § 24; CONN. CONST.
art. I, § 14; DEL. CONST. art. I, § 16; FLA. CONST. art. I, § 5; GA. CONST. art. I, § 1, para. 9;
HAW. CONST. art. I, § 4; IDAHO CONST. art. I, § 10; ILL. CONST. art. I, § 5; IND. CONST. art. I,
§ 31; IOWA CONST. art. I, § 20; KAN. CONST. Bill of Rights, § 3; KY. CONST. Bill of Rights, § 1;
LA. CONST. art. I, § 9; ME. CONST. art. I, § 15; MD. CONST. Declaration of Rights, art. XIII;
MASS. CONST. pt. 1, art. XIX; MICH. CONST. art. I, § 3; MISS. CONST. art. III, § 11; MO.
CONST. art. I, § 9; MONT. CONST. art. II, § 6; NEB. CONST. art. I, § 19; NEV. CONST. art. I,
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bine this with the right of assembly.  Colorado’s clause is typical and reads
“[t]he people have the right peaceably to assemble for the common good,
and to apply to those invested with the powers of government for redress of
grievances, by petition or remonstrance.”130  One state, Delaware, was notice-
ably more cautious in its clause discussing the freedom of assembly and peti-
tion, emphasizing that danger can result from some types of group protests:
Although disobedience to laws by a part of the people, upon suggestions of
impolicy or injustice in them, tends by immediate effect and the influence of
example not only to endanger the public welfare and safety, but also in gov-
ernments of a republican form contravenes the social principles of such gov-
ernments, founded on common consent for common good; yet the citizens
have a right in an orderly manner to meet together, and to apply to persons
intrusted with the powers of government, for redress of grievances or other
proper purposes, by petition, remonstrance or address.131
Interestingly, Maryland’s constitution is the only one that contains a
right to petition without an explicit right to assemble.  The clause reads:
“That every man hath a right to petition the Legislature for the redress of
grievances in a peaceable and orderly manner.”132  Accordingly, we do not
count this clause as protecting a right of assembly, though it embraces the
general underlying principle of offering the people a source of recourse
when the government acts in ways they dislike or disagree with.
§ 10; N.H. CONST. pt. 1, art. XXXII; N.J. CONST. art. I, § 18; N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 9; N.C.
CONST. art. I, § 12; N.D. CONST. art. I, § 5; OHIO CONST. art. I, § 3; OKLA. CONST. art. II, § 3;
OR. CONST. art. I, § 26; PA. CONST. art. I, § 20; R.I. CONST. art. I, § 21; S.C. CONST. art. I, § 2;
S.D. CONST. art. VI, § 4; TENN. CONST. art. I, § 23; TEX. CONST. art. I, § 27; UTAH CONST. art.
I, § 1; VT. CONST. ch. 1, art. XX; VA. CONST. art. I, § 12; WASH. CONST. art. I, § 4; W. VA.
CONST. art. III, § 16; WIS. CONST. art. I, § 4; WYO. CONST. art. I, § 21.  The two states without
a right to assembly and petition in their state constitutions are Minnesota and New Mexico.
129 MD. CONST. Declaration of Rights, art. XIII.
130 COLO. CONST. art. II, § 24.
131 DEL. CONST. art. I, § 16.
132 MD. CONST. Declaration of Rights, art. XIII.
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FIGURE 7.  FREEDOM OF PETITION IN STATE CONSTITUTIONS
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In 1868 when the Fourteenth Amendment was ratified, thirty-four state
constitutions protected the rights of petition133 and all but Maryland among
them protected the related right of assembly.  The rights of petition and
assembly are thus solidly recognized by both the original and the present-day
meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment.  In 1791, seven out of twelve states
that wrote constitutions between 1776 and 1791 protected the rights of peti-
tion and assembly.134  Support for these rights thus grew immensely between
1791 and 1868.
FIGURE 8.  FREEDOM OF ASSEMBLY IN STATE CONSTITUTIONS
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133 See Calabresi & Agudo, supra note 5, at 43.
134 Calabresi, Agudo & Dore, supra note 5, at 1479–80.
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\94-1\NDL102.txt unknown Seq: 32 21-NOV-18 10:57
80 notre dame law review [vol. 94:1
C. Gun Rights and Clauses Bearing on the Military
Gun-related rights, found in the Second Amendment, are the next set of
rights protected in the Federal Bill of Rights, of course coming after the First
Amendment’s protection of freedom of religion, freedom of expression, and
freedom to petition and assemble.135  While “[t]his could be argued to
reflect the priority the ratifiers and framers attached to each of these sets of
rights,” it is worth noting that there were two additional amendments pro-
posed in 1791 that would have been placed ahead of the First Amendment,
but they “were not ratified at that time.”136  Moreover, there has long been a
famous debate over whether the Second Amendment protects an individual’s
right to own a gun for his self-defense or whether it protects a collective right
of the people of a state to own rifles so they can serve as members of a well-
regulated state militia.137  As we explain below, the states have differing per-
spectives on this issue, which are reflected throughout their state constitu-
tions in how they protect gun-related rights and in other clauses that bear on
the military.
1. The Right to Keep and Bear Arms
Forty-four states in 2018—representing 88% of the states and 74.2% of
the U.S. population138—provide at least some protection for the right to
keep and bear arms within their state constitutions.139
Of those, at least thirty-three states—comprising 66% of the states—pro-
tect the right to keep and bear arms explicitly as an individual right.140  Many
135 U.S. CONST. amends. I, II.
136 See Calabresi & Agudo, supra note 5, at 49 (citing AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF
RIGHTS: CREATION AND RECONSTRUCTION 14–15, 17–18, 36–37 (1998)).
137 Id. (citing District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 605–10 (2008); id. at 665–71
(Stevens, J., dissenting)).
138 See 2010 Census, supra note 12 (228,596,031 out of 308,143,815 residents).
139 See ALA. CONST. art. I, § 26; ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 19; ARIZ. CONST. art. II, § 26; ARK.
CONST. art. II, § 5; COLO. CONST. art. II, § 13; CONN. CONST. art. I, § 15; DEL. CONST. art. I,
§ 20; FLA. CONST. art. I, § 8; GA. CONST. art. I, § 1, para. 8; HAW. CONST. art. I, § 17; IDAHO
CONST. art. I, § 11; ILL. CONST. art. I, § 22; IND. CONST. art. I, § 32; KAN. CONST. Bill of
Rights, § 4; KY. CONST. Bill of Rights, § 1; LA. CONST. art. I, § 11; ME. CONST. art. I, § 16;
MASS. CONST. pt. 1, art. XVII; MICH. CONST. art. I, § 6; MISS. CONST. art. III, § 12; MO.
CONST. art. I, § 23; MONT. CONST. art. II, § 12; NEB. CONST. art. I, § 1; NEV. CONST. art. I,
§ 11; N.H. CONST. pt. 1, art. II(a); N.M. CONST. art. II, § 6; N.C. CONST. art. I, § 30; N.D.
CONST. art. I, § 1; OHIO CONST. art. I, § 4; OKLA. CONST. art. II, § 26; OR. CONST. art. I, § 27;
PA. CONST. art. I, § 21; R.I. CONST. art. I, § 22; S.C. CONST. art. I, § 20; S.D. CONST. art. VI,
§ 24; TENN. CONST. art. I, § 26; TEX. CONST. art. I, § 23; UTAH CONST. art. I, § 6; VT. CONST.
ch. 1, art. XVI; VA. CONST. art. I, § 13; WASH. CONST. art. I, § 24; W. VA. CONST. art. III, § 22;
WIS. CONST. art. I, § 25; WYO. CONST. art. I, § 24.  The states without a constitutional provi-
sion that protects the right to keep and bear arms are California, Iowa, Maryland, Minne-
sota, New Jersey, and New York.
140 See ALA. CONST. art. I, § 26; ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 19; ARIZ. CONST. art. II, § 26;
COLO. CONST. art. II, § 13; CONN. CONST. art. I, § 15; DEL. CONST. art. I, § 20; FLA. CONST.
art. I, § 8; ILL. CONST. art I, § 22; IND. CONST. art. I, § 32; KAN. CONST. Bill of Rights, § 4; KY.
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of these constitutions specifically note the personal self-defense element of
an individual right to keep and bear arms.  For example, Michigan’s constitu-
tion states that “[e]very person has a right to keep and bear arms for the
defense of himself and the state”141 and Oklahoma’s constitution holds that
“[t]he right of a citizen to keep and bear arms in defense of his home, per-
son, or property, or in aid of the civil power, when thereunto legally sum-
moned, shall never be prohibited.”142  Notably, two states—Alaska and
Utah—explicitly suggest the existence of an individual right to keep and bear
arms in the text of their constitutions.  For example, Alaska’s constitution
states that “[t]he individual right to keep and bear arms shall not be denied
or infringed by the State or a political subdivision of the State.”143  Three
more states (Illinois, Arizona, and Washington) recognize that the right
belongs to an “individual citizen.”144
Out of the remaining eleven states that protect a right to keep and bear
arms in their state constitutions,145 only three of those states restrict the right
to keep and bear arms only to the purpose of providing for the common
defense.146  In particular, Massachusetts’s constitution states that “[t]he peo-
ple have a right to keep and to bear arms for the common defence.”147
Another three states use a militia preamble similar to that in the Second
Amendment.148  South Carolina’s constitution uses a typical formulation,
holding that “[a] well regulated militia being necessary to the security of a
free State, the right of the people to keep and bear arms shall not be
CONST. Bill of Rights, § 1; MICH. CONST. art. I, § 6; MISS. CONST. art. III, § 12; MO. CONST.
art. I, § 23; MONT. CONST. art. II, § 12; NEB. CONST. art. I, § 1; NEV. CONST. art. I, § 11; N.H.
CONST. pt. 1, art. II(a); N.M. CONST. art. II, § 6; N.C. CONST. art. I, § 30; N.D. CONST. art. I,
§ 1; OHIO CONST. art. I, § 4; OKLA. CONST. art. II, § 26; OR. CONST. art. I, § 27; PA. CONST.
art. I, § 21; S.D. CONST. art. VI, § 24; TEX. CONST. art. I, § 23; UTAH CONST. art. I, § 6; VT.
CONST. ch. 1, art. XVI; WASH. CONST. art. I, § 24; W. VA. CONST. art. III, § 22; WIS. CONST.
art. I, § 25; WYO. CONST. art. I, § 24.
141 MICH. CONST. art. 1, § 6.
142 OKLA. CONST. art. II, § 26.
143 ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 19; see also UTAH CONST. art. I, § 6 (“The individual right of
the people to keep and bear arms for security and defense of self, family, others, property,
or the state, as well as for other lawful purposes shall not be infringed; but nothing herein
shall prevent the Legislature from defining the lawful use of arms.”).
144 ARIZ. CONST. art. II, § 26 (“The right of the individual citizen to bear arms in
defense of himself or the state shall not be impaired, but nothing in this section shall be
construed as authorizing individuals or corporations to organize, maintain, or employ an
armed body of men.”); ILL. CONST. art I, § 22 (“Subject only to the police power, the right
of the individual citizen to keep and bear arms shall not be infringed.”); WASH. CONST. art.
I, § 24 (“The right of the individual citizen to bear arms in defense of himself, or the state,
shall not be impaired, but nothing in this section shall be construed as authorizing individ-
uals or corporations to organize, maintain or employ an armed body of men.”).
145 Arkansas, Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho, Louisiana, Maine, Massachusetts, Rhode Island,
South Carolina, Tennessee, and Virginia.
146 ARK. CONST. art. II, § 5; MASS. CONST. pt. 1, art. XVII; TENN. CONST. art. I, § 26.
147 MASS. CONST. pt. 1, art. XVII.
148 HAW. CONST. art. I, § 17; S.C. CONST. art. I, § 20; VA. CONST. art. I, § 13.
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infringed.”149  Besides South Carolina, Hawaii and Virginia also have “right
to bear arms” clauses that are nearly perfect analogs to the Second Amend-
ment of the U.S. Constitution, which states that “[a] well regulated Militia,
being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the people to keep
and bear Arms, shall not be infringed.”150  Since the Supreme Court of the
United States frames the Federal Second Amendment as an individual rights
guarantee rather than a collective rights or civic rights guarantee, one could
argue that the “right to bear arms” clauses of South Carolina, Hawaii, and
Virginia all ought to be considered individual rights, regardless of the fact
that they purport to give the people the right to keep and bear arms in order
to make them more effective militia members.  If so, the number of states in
2018 with individual rights guarantees for the right to keep and bear arms in
their state constitutions is thirty-six states, representing 72% of the states.
The final five states that protect a right to keep and bear arms in their
state constitutions contained a general grant of the right to keep and bear
arms.  Some were unqualified, such as Rhode Island’s constitution, which
provides that “[t]he right of the people to keep and bear arms shall not be
infringed.”151  Other state constitutions contained caveats or limitations on
the right to keep and bear arms, such as Idaho’s constitution, which states
that:
The people have the right to keep and bear arms, which right shall not be
abridged; but this provision shall not prevent the passage of laws to govern
the carrying of weapons concealed on the person nor prevent passage of
legislation providing minimum sentences for crimes committed while in pos-
session of a firearm, nor prevent the passage of legislation providing penal-
ties for the possession of firearms by a convicted felon, nor prevent the
passage of any legislation punishing the use of a firearm.  No law shall
impose licensure, registration or special taxation on the ownership or pos-
session of firearms or ammunition.  Nor shall any law permit the confisca-
tion of firearms, except those actually used in the commission of a felony.152
Finally, Louisiana’s constitution even provided a strict scrutiny clause,
holding that “[t]he right of each citizen to keep and bear arms is fundamen-
tal and shall not be infringed.  Any restriction on this right shall be subject to
strict scrutiny.”153  This is striking because it indicates that Louisiana values
the right to keep and bear arms enough to give it the highest, most stringent
standard of judicial review used by U.S. courts.
149 S.C. CONST. art. I, § 20.
150 U.S. CONST. amend. II.
151 R.I. CONST. art. I, § 22.  Note that this clause could also be construed as an individ-
ual rights guarantee.  If so, that could bring the total number of states with an individual
rights guarantee for the right to keep and bear arms in their state constitutions in 2018 up
to thirty-seven states, representing 74% of the states and 63.5% of the U.S. population. See
2010 Census, supra note 12 (195,699,411 out of 308,143,815 residents).
152 IDAHO CONST. art. I, § 11.
153 LA. CONST. art. I, § 11.
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FIGURE 9.  RIGHT TO KEEP AND BEAR ARMS IN STATE CONSTITUTIONS
88%
59%
36%
0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%
2018
1868
1791
1791: n=14; 1868: n=37; 2018: n=50 
There is a striking change between 1868 and 2018 in terms of state con-
stitutional protection of the right to keep and bear arms.  In 1868, only
twenty-two state constitutions out of thirty-seven, or 59% of the states, had
language that explicitly guaranteed the right of the people to keep and bear
arms;154 61% of the public in 1868 lived in those states.155  Only twelve states
in 1868, about 36%, explicitly protected an individual’s right to keep and
bear arms for his own defense.156  Obviously, there has been an enormous
increase in the number of states both that protect the right to keep and bear
arms by individuals for their own defense and in the number of states that
protect gun rights in some way, shape, or form.  Only five states out of the
twelve that wrote new constitutions and bills of rights between 1776 and 1791
protected the right to keep and bear arms in any way.157
This outcome is surprising because many scholars—including Professor
Sanford Levinson in a law review article titled The Embarrassing Second Amend-
ment—hold that the Second Amendment is a leftover relic of our colonial
days.158  To the contrary, gun rights were not constitutionalized when
English settlers were fighting the Native Americans in the eighteenth and
early nineteenth centuries, but have mostly been added to state constitutions
in the 149 years between 1868 and 2018.  Why this happened is a question we
will leave for others to investigate, but the first really striking contrast
between state constitutional law in 1868 and state constitutional law today is a
154 See Calabresi & Agudo, supra note 5, at 50–54.
155 See id.
156 See id.
157 Calabresi, Agudo & Dore, supra note 5, at 1485–87.
158 See Sanford Levinson, Comment, The Embarrassing Second Amendment, 99 YALE L.J.
637 (1989).
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substantial growth in the protection of gun rights—rights that are almost
never mentioned in foreign constitutions.159
2. Quartering Soldiers
In the U.S. Constitution, the Third Amendment provides a constraint on
military power by prohibiting the quartering of soldiers in private homes.160
This acts as a means of subordinating the military power to the civil power,
thereby protecting the public from abuses of military power.  In 2018, forty-
two states—representing 84% of the states and 77.1% of the U.S. popula-
tion161—provide a similar no quartering of soldiers clause.162  Most states
protect this right using language that is very similar to the Federal Constitu-
tion.  For example, Wyoming’s state constitution holds that “[n]o soldier in
time of peace shall be quartered in any house without consent of the owner,
nor in time of war except in the manner prescribed by law.”163  The eight
states that did not provide a quartering clause are Florida, Georgia, Minne-
sota, Mississippi, New York, Vermont, Virginia, and Wisconsin.
In 1791, five states out of fourteen barred quartering soldiers,164 and in
1868, twenty-six out of thirty-seven state constitutions—representing about
two-thirds of the states but not quite an Article V three-quarters majority—
barred quartering soldiers in peoples’ houses.165  Today, more than an Arti-
159 It has been stated that only the United States, Mexico, and Guatemala protect gun
rights in their national constitutions. See Ty McCormick, How Many Countries Have Gun
Rights Enshrined in Their Constitutions?, FOREIGN POL’Y (Apr. 5, 2013), https://foreignpolicy
.com/2013/04/05/how-many-countries-have-gun-rights-enshrined-in-their-constitutions/.
160 U.S. CONST. amend. III (“No Soldier shall, in time of peace be quartered in any
house, without the consent of the Owner, nor in time of war, but in a manner to be pre-
scribed by law.”).
161 See 2010 Census, supra note 12 (237,691,777 out of 308,143,815 residents).
162 See ALA. CONST. art. I, § 28; ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 20; ARIZ. CONST. art. II, § 27; ARK.
CONST. art. II, § 27; CAL. CONST. art. I, § 5; COLO. CONST. art. II, § 22; CONN. CONST. art. I,
§ 17; DEL. CONST. art. I, § 18; HAW. CONST. art. I, § 18; IDAHO CONST. art. I, § 12; ILL.
CONST. art. I, § 21; IND. CONST. art. I, § 34; IOWA CONST. art. I, § 15; KAN. CONST. Bill of
Rights, § 14; KY. CONST. Bill of Rights, § 22; LA. CONST. art. I, § 6; ME. CONST. art. I, § 18;
MD. CONST. Declaration of Rights, art. XXXI; MASS. CONST. pt. 1, art. XXVII; MICH. CONST.
art. I, § 8; MO. CONST. art. I, § 24; MONT. CONST. art. II, § 32; NEB. CONST. art. I, § 18; NEV.
CONST. art. I, § 12; N.H. CONST. pt. 1, art. XXVII; N.J. CONST. art. I, § 16; N.M. CONST.
art. II, § 9; N.C. CONST. art. I, § 31; N.D. CONST. art. 1, § 19; OHIO CONST. art. I, § 13; OKLA.
CONST. art. II, § 14; OR. CONST. art. I, § 28; PA. CONST. art. I, § 23; R.I. CONST. art. I, § 19;
S.C. CONST. art. I, § 20; S.D. CONST. art. VI, § 16; TENN. CONST. art. I, § 27; TEX. CONST. art.
I, § 25; UTAH CONST. art. I, § 20; WASH. CONST. art. I, § 31; W. VA. CONST. art. III, § 12;
WYO. CONST. art. I, § 25.
163 WYO. CONST. art. I, § 25.
164 Calabresi, Agudo & Dore, supra note 5, at 1490–91; 1543.
165 See Calabresi & Agudo, supra note 5, at 56–57.  Note that our earlier analysis men-
tioned twenty-seven states with quartering clauses.  We now think that was an overcount.
Id. at 1490–91.  The states with quartering clauses in their 1868 state constitutions are:
Alabama, Arkansas, California, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kan-
sas, Kentucky, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Missouri, Nevada, New Hamp-
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cle V three-quarters majority bars this practice, which has never been
engaged in since before 1776 by the British.  We assume that one plausible
explanation for the added number of states barring this practice is that they
have engaged in a form of copying of the Federal Constitution.
FIGURE 10.  PROHIBITION OF QUARTERING SOLDIERS IN
STATE CONSTITUTIONS
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D. Rights Against Unreasonable Searches and Seizures
In the Fourth Amendment, the U.S. Bill of Rights protects individuals
against unreasonable searches and seizures by governmental officials such as
the police and the FBI, and the Fourth Amendment outlines details about
the lawful issuance of warrants.166  This is the fourth set of rights discussed in
the Federal Constitution, coming after freedom of religion, freedom of
expression, and gun-related and military rights.  Acting as a “core aspect of
the right to privacy,” the Fourth Amendment “constitutes a fundamental
limit on government power” by ensuring that the state cannot unreasonably
shire, New Jersey, North Carolina, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South
Carolina, and Tennessee. ALA. CONST. of 1868, art. I, § 31; ARK. CONST. of 1861, art. I,
§ 22; CAL. CONST. of 1849, art. I, § 13; CONN. CONST. of 1818, art. I, § 19; DEL. CONST. of
1831, art. I, § 18; FLA CONST. of 1868, Declaration of Rights, § 13; ILL. CONST. of 1848, art.
VII, § 22; IND. CONST. of 1851, art. I, § 34; IOWA. CONST. of 1857, art. I, § 15; KAN. CONST. of
1859, Bill of Rights, § 14; KY. CONST. of 1850, art. VIII, § 27; ME. CONST. of 1820, art. I, § 8;
MD. CONST. of 1864, Declaration of Rights., art. XXVIII; MASS. CONST. of 1780, pt. I,
art. XXVII; MICH. CONST. of 1865, art. XVIII, § 9; MO. CONST. of 1865, art. II, § 33; NEV.
CONST. of 1864, art. I, § 12; N.H. CONST. of 1784, pt. 1, art. XXVII; N.J. CONST. of 1844, art.
I, § 13; N.C. CONST. of 1868, art. I, § 36; OHIO. CONST. of 1851, art. I, § 13; OR. CONST. of
1857, art. I, § 28; PA. CONST. of 1838, art. IV, § 23; R.I. CONST. of 1842, art. I, § 19; S.C.
CONST. of 1868, art. I, § 29; TENN. CONST. of 1835, art. I, § 27.
166 U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
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intrude upon individual’s private lives.167  It is not surprising, then, that this
right has turned out to be widely recognized in state constitutional law.
1. Unreasonable Search and Seizure
As of 2018, all fifty states guarantee the right to be free from unreasona-
ble searches and seizures in their state constitutions.168  Nevada’s constitu-
tion follows the typical formulation, stating that “[t]he right of the people to
be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable
seizures and searches shall not be violated.”169  Missouri’s constitution was
even amended in 2014 to reflect modern technological developments, hold-
ing “[t]hat the people shall be secure in their persons, papers, homes,
effects, and electronic communications and data, from unreasonable
searches and seizures.”170
A few of the states had abnormal search and seizure clauses.  Maryland’s
constitution, for instance, holds:
That all warrants, without oath or affirmation, to search suspected
places, or to seize any person or property, are grevous [grievous] and
oppressive; and all general warrants to search suspected places, or to appre-
hend suspected persons, without naming or describing the place, or the per-
son in special, are illegal, and ought not to be granted.171
We count this clause as a protection against unreasonable search and seizure
because it prohibits general warrants that seek to “search suspected places”
or “seize any person or property” without specifying additional details about
the search or seizure, which we view as sufficiently in line with a general pro-
tection against unreasonable search and seizure.172  The Framers’ primary
concern that led them to write the Federal Fourth Amendment was a desire
167 See Calabresi & Agudo, supra note 5, at 57.
168 See ALA. CONST. art. I, § 5; ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 14; ARIZ. CONST. art. II, § 8; ARK.
CONST. art. II, § 15; CAL. CONST. art. I, § 13; COLO. CONST. art. II, § 7; CONN. CONST. art. I,
§ 7; DEL. CONST. art. I, § 6; FLA. CONST. art. I, § 12; GA. CONST. art. I, § 1, para. 13; HAW.
CONST. art. I, § 7; IDAHO CONST. art. I, § 17; ILL. CONST. art. I, § 6; IND. CONST. art. I, § 11;
IOWA CONST. art. I, § 8; KAN. CONST. Bill of Rights, § 15; KY. CONST. Bill of Rights, § 10; LA.
CONST. art. I, § 5; ME. CONST. art. I, § 5; MD. CONST. Declaration of Rights, art. XXVI;
MASS. CONST. pt. 1, art. XIV; MICH. CONST. art. I, § 11; MINN. CONST. art. I, § 10; MISS.
CONST. art. III, § 23; MO. CONST. art. I, § 15; MONT. CONST. art. II, § 11; NEB. CONST. art. I,
§ 7; NEV. CONST. art. I, § 18; N.H. CONST. pt. 1, art. XIX; N.J. CONST. art. I, § 7; N.M.
CONST. art. II, § 10; N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 12; N.C. CONST. art. I, § 20; N.D. CONST. art. I, § 8;
OHIO CONST. art. I, § 14; OKLA. CONST. art. II, § 30; OR. CONST. art. I, § 9; PA. CONST. art. I,
§ 8; R.I. CONST. art. I, § 6; S.C. CONST. art. I, § 10; S.D. CONST. art. VI, § 11; TENN. CONST.
art. I, § 7; TEX. CONST. art. I, § 9; UTAH CONST. art. I, § 14; VT. CONST. ch. 1, art. XI; VA.
CONST. art. I, § 10; WASH. CONST. art. I, § 7; W. VA. CONST. art. III, § 6; WIS. CONST. art. I,
§ 11; WYO. CONST. art. I, § 4.
169 NEV. CONST. art. I, § 18.
170 MO. CONST. art. I, § 15.
171 MD. CONST. Declaration of Rights, art. XXVI (alteration in original).  North Caro-
lina and Virginia had similar clauses. N.C. CONST. art. I, § 20; VA. CONST. art. I, § 10.
172 MD. CONST. Declaration of Rights, art. XXVI.
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to outlaw the British practice of conducting general searches, wherein
English authorities attempted to find evidence that colonial merchants were
failing to pay taxes that they owed to the Crown by conducting general
searches in unspecified warehouses.173  This makes it clear to us that we are
right to count the Maryland clause in the way we have done.  Other states did
not explicitly mention the phrase “search” or “seizure” in their clause, but
they still seemed to protect the underlying idea of a right against unreasona-
ble searches and seizures by extending privacy rights to the homes and to the
private affairs of all citizens.  Arizona’s constitution is an example of that for-
mulation, and it states that “[n]o person shall be disturbed in his private
affairs, or his home invaded, without authority of law.”174
FIGURE 11.  UNREASONABLE SEARCH AND SEIZURE IN
STATE CONSTITUTIONS
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In 1791, eight states out of fourteen protected their citizens from unrea-
sonable searches and seizures,175 and, in 1868, an Article V three-quarters
majority of thirty-six out of thirty-seven state constitutions banned unreasona-
ble searches and seizures.176  Today, all fifty states ban unreasonable searches
173 See Tracey Maclin, The Central Meaning of the Fourth Amendment, 35 WM & MARY L.
REV. 197, 218–19 (1993).
174 ARIZ. CONST. art. II, § 8.  Washington’s constitution follows a similar format. WASH.
CONST. art. I, § 7 (“No person shall be disturbed in his private affairs, or his home invaded,
without authority of law.”).
175 Calabresi, Agudo & Dore, supra note 5, at 1491–92.
176 See Calabresi & Agudo, supra note 5, at 57–58.  Note that in our original analysis, id.,
we coded only thirty-four states as having search and seizure clauses.  We now believe this
was an undercount, and that the only state without a search and seizure clause in its consti-
tution in 1868 was New York.  The two new states that we are now counting—North Caro-
lina and Virginia—discuss search and seizure in their warrant clauses. N.C. CONST. of
1868, art. 1 § 15; VA. CONST. of 1864 Declaration of Rights, § 10.  We believe that the text
of their warrant clauses ought to be counted as a search and seizure clause as well.  For
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and seizures.  This is an old constitutional right that was overwhelmingly pro-
tected in 1868 and for which state constitutional protection has only
increased over time.
2. Lawful Warrants
The Federal Constitution, in the Fourth Amendment,177 also sets rules
for the issuance of lawful warrants, “a protection that was designed in
response to the controversial writs of assistance, which were a significant fac-
tor leading up to the American Revolution.”178  All fifty states179 contain a
similar constitutional clause, typically requiring all warrants: (1) to be sup-
ported by oath or affirmation, (2) to describe particularly the person or
things to be seized, and (3) to be issued only upon probable cause, thereby
closely mirroring the Fourth Amendment.180  Montana’s constitution, as an
example, provides that “[n]o warrant to search any place, or seize any person
or thing shall issue without describing the place to be searched or the person
or thing to be seized, or without probable cause, supported by oath or affir-
mation reduced to writing.”181
Several of the states used unusual formulations of this right against
unlawful warrants.  To begin with, four states—Maryland, North Carolina,
example, Virginia’s constitution stated that “general warrants, whereby an officer or mes-
senger may be commanded to search suspected places without evidence of a fact commit-
ted, or to seize any person or persons not named, or whose offence is not particularly
described and supported by evidence, are grievous and oppressive, and ought not to be
granted.” VA. CONST. of 1864 Declaration of Rights, § 10.  Since these clauses carry the
general essence or spirit of a search and seizure clause, we have decided to recode North
Carolina and Virginia and raise our count to thirty-six states.
177 U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
178 See Calabresi & Agudo, supra note 5, at 58.
179 See ALA. CONST. art. I, § 5; ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 14; ARIZ. CONST. art. II, § 8; ARK.
CONST. art. II, § 15; CAL. CONST. art. I, § 13; COLO. CONST. art. II, § 7; CONN. CONST. art. I,
§ 7; DEL. CONST. art. I, § 6; FLA. CONST. art. I, § 12; GA. CONST. art. I, § 1, para. 13; HAW.
CONST. art. I, § 7; IDAHO CONST. art. I, § 17; ILL. CONST. art. I, § 6; IND. CONST. art. I, § 11;
IOWA CONST. art. I, § 8; KAN. CONST. Bill of Rights, § 15; KY. CONST. Bill of Rights, § 10; LA.
CONST. art. I, § 5; ME. CONST. art. I, § 5; MD. CONST. Declaration of Rights, art. XXVI;
MASS. CONST. pt. 1, art. XIV; MICH. CONST. art. I, § 11; MINN. CONST. art. I, § 10; MISS.
CONST. art. III, § 23; MO. CONST. art. I, § 15; MONT. CONST. art. II, § 11; NEB. CONST. art. I,
§ 7; NEV. CONST. art. I, § 18; N.H. CONST. pt. 1, art. XIX; N.J. CONST. art. I, § 7; N.M.
CONST. art. II, § 10; N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 12; N.C. CONST. art. I, § 20; N.D. CONST. art. I, § 8;
OHIO CONST. art. I, § 14; OKLA. CONST. art. II, § 30; OR. CONST. art. I, § 9; PA. CONST. art. I,
§ 8; R.I. CONST. art. I, § 6; S.C. CONST. art. I, § 10; S.D. CONST. art. VI, § 11; TENN. CONST.
art. I, § 7; TEX. CONST. art. I, § 9; UTAH CONST. art. I, § 14; VT. CONST. ch. 1, art. XI; VA.
CONST. art. I, § 10; WASH. CONST. art. I, § 7; W. VA. CONST. art. III, § 6; WIS. CONST. art. I,
§ 11; WYO. CONST. art. I, § 4.
180 U.S. CONST. amend. IV (“The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be vio-
lated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirma-
tion, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be
seized.”).
181 MONT. CONST. art. II, § 11.
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Tennessee, and Virginia—used modified language to bar the issuance of gen-
eral warrants in their state constitutions.182  Tennessee’s constitution, for
example, holds “that general warrants, whereby an officer may be com-
manded to search suspected places, without evidence of the fact committed,
or to seize any person or persons not named, whose offences are not particu-
larly described and supported by evidence, are dangerous to liberty and
ought not be granted.”183  We count these clauses as protecting a right to
lawfully issued warrants because they include many of the same rights-protec-
tive restrictions as the Federal Constitution.184  Moreover, since one of the
foundational motivations of the Fourth Amendment was a distaste for writs of
assistance—which are a form of general warrant—we count prohibitions
against general warrants as a right to lawfully issued warrants.
The lawful warrants clauses in the constitutions of Massachusetts, New
Hampshire, and Vermont are also unusual because they neglect to explicitly
mention probable cause.185  Indeed, the Massachusetts Constitution holds
that:
Every subject has a right to be secure from all unreasonable searches,
and seizures, of his person, his houses, his papers, and all his possessions.
All warrants, therefore, are contrary to this right, if the cause or foundation
of them be not previously supported by oath or affirmation; and if the order
in the warrant to a civil officer, to make search in suspected places, or to
arrest one or more suspected persons, or to seize their property, be not
accompanied with a special designation of the persons or objects of search,
arrest, or seizure: and no warrant ought to be issued but in cases, and with
the formalities prescribed by the laws.186
Similarly, Vermont’s constitution states:
That the people have a right to hold themselves, their houses, papers,
and possessions, free from search or seizure; and therefore warrants, without
oath or affirmation first made, affording sufficient foundation for them, and
whereby by any officer or messenger may be commanded or required to
search suspected places, or to seize any person or persons, his, her or their
property, not particularly described, are contrary to that right, and ought
not to be granted.187
Overall, we believe that these clauses embody the same general rights
protections as the Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, even though
182 MD. CONST. Declaration of Rights, art. XXVI; N.C. CONST. art. I, § 20; TENN. CONST.
art. I, § 7; VA. CONST. art. I, § 10.
183 TENN. CONST. art. I, § 7.
184 Tennessee’s constitution states that an officer may not be “commanded to search
suspected places . . . or to seize any person or persons not named.” Id. In addition, the
Tennessee Constitution arguably references probable cause when it states that warrants
cannot be issued “without evidence of the fact committed.” Id. In this sense, the Tennes-
see Constitution appears to protect two out of three elements featured in the Federal
Fourth Amendment.
185 MASS. CONST. pt. 1, art. XIV; N.H. CONST. pt. 1, art. XIX; VT. CONST. ch. 1, art. XI.
186 MASS. CONST. pt. 1, art. XIV.
187 VT. CONST. ch. 1, art. XI.
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they do not textually refer to probable cause or prohibit general warrants by
name.  This is because they indicate that warrants must be based on oath or
affirmation and must particularly describe the person or property to be
searched or seized.  In that regard, they include at least two out of three of
the protections outlined in the Federal Constitution, thereby guarding
against most of the repugnant elements of a general warrant.  They even
arguably protect the third portion of the Fourth Amendment—probable
cause—by stating that warrants must have a “sufficient foundation”188 or
must follow “the formalities prescribed by the laws.”189  In that sense, we
believe that they ought to be counted as protecting against unlawful warrants.
Finally, the constitutions of Arizona and Washington contain another
unusual formulation of the right against unlawful warrants.  Washington’s
constitution, for instance, holds that “[n]o person shall be disturbed in his
private affairs, or his home invaded, without authority of law.”190  Though
this clause does not mention any of the three elements of the Fourth Amend-
ment, we still count it as protecting a right against unlawful warrants because
it extends a privacy right to the homes and private affairs of citizens and
requires any intrusions to be based upon “authority of law.”191  Ultimately,
according to caselaw in both Arizona and Washington, these clauses have
been read to grant the same—or even greater, in the case of homes—rights
protections compared to the Fourth Amendment.192  As such, we count
them in our analysis as protecting the right to lawful warrants.
FIGURE 12.  WARRANTS CLAUSES IN STATE CONSTITUTIONS
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188 Id.
189 MASS. CONST. pt. 1, art. XIV.
190 WASH. CONST. art. I, § 7.
191 Id.
192 See, e.g., State v. Wilson, 350 P.3d 800 (Ariz. 2015); State v. Bolt, 689 P.2d 519 (Ariz.
1984) (in banc); State v. Eisfeldt, 185 P.3d 580 (Wash. 2008) (en banc); State v. Simpson,
622 P.2d 1199 (Wash. 1980) (en banc).
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Eight out of twelve states that wrote new constitutions between 1776 and
1791 had warrant requirements,193 thirty-six states out of thirty-seven had
warrant requirements in 1868,194 and all fifty have such requirements today.
This is an ancient right, which remains foundational in modern state consti-
tutional law.
E. Criminal Procedure Rights
The fifth major subject discussed in the Federal Bill of Rights is constitu-
tional criminal procedure.  Throughout both the Fifth and Sixth Amend-
ments,195 the U.S. Constitution safeguards criminal defendants from
numerous rights infringements, including protections against double jeop-
ardy, self-incrimination, and the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus.  As
such, we turn now to a discussion of how the fifty states have framed these
rights within their own constitutions.
1. Double Jeopardy
Forty-five states—representing 90% of the states and 91.5% of the popu-
lation196—have double jeopardy clauses that prevent citizens from being
tried in a court of law more than once for the same offense.197  The Idaho
Constitution uses a typical formulation, stating that “[n]o person shall be
twice put in jeopardy for the same offense.”198  Alabama uses another com-
mon format, holding “[t]hat no person shall, for the same offense, be twice
put in jeopardy of life or limb.”199  Some states offer more detail in their
double jeopardy clauses, such as Colorado’s constitution, which provides that
“[n]o person shall be . . . twice put in jeopardy for the same offense.  If the
jury disagree, or if the judgment be arrested after the verdict, or if the judg-
ment be reversed for error in law, the accused shall not be deemed to have
193 Calabresi, Agudo & Dore, supra note 5, at 1492.
194 See Calabresi & Agudo, supra note 5, at 58.
195 U.S. CONST. amends. V, VI.
196 See 2010 Census, supra note 12 (282,087,313 out of 308,143,815 residents).
197 See ALA. CONST. art. I, § 9; ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 9; ARIZ. CONST. art. II, § 10; ARK.
CONST. art. II, § 8; CAL. CONST. art. I, §§ 15, 24; COLO. CONST. art. II, § 18; DEL. CONST. art.
I, § 8; FLA. CONST. art. I, § 9; GA. CONST. art. I, § 1, para. 18; HAW. CONST. art. I, § 10; IDAHO
CONST. art. I, § 13; ILL. CONST. art. I, § 10; IND. CONST. art. I, § 14; IOWA CONST. art. I, § 12;
KAN. CONST. Bill of Rights, § 10; KY. CONST. Bill of Rights, § 13; LA. CONST. art. I, § 15; ME.
CONST. art. I, § 8; MICH. CONST. art. I, § 15; MINN. CONST. art. I, § 7; MISS. CONST. art. III,
§ 22; MO. CONST. art. I, § 19; MONT. CONST. art. II, § 25; NEB. CONST. art. I, § 12; NEV.
CONST. art. I, § 8; N.H. CONST. pt. 1, art. XVI; N.J. CONST. art. I, § 11; N.M. CONST. art. II,
§ 15; N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 6; N.D. CONST. art. I, § 12; OHIO CONST. art. I, § 10; OKLA. CONST.
art. II, § 21; OR. CONST. art. I, § 12; PA. CONST. art. I, § 10; R.I. CONST. art. I, § 7; S.C.
CONST. art. I, § 12; S.D. CONST. art. VI, § 9; TENN. CONST. art. I, § 10; TEX. CONST. art. I,
§ 14; UTAH CONST. art. I, § 12; VA. CONST. art. I, § 8; WASH. CONST. art. I, § 9; W. VA.
CONST. art. III, § 5; WIS. CONST. art. I, § 8; WYO. CONST. art. I, § 11.
198 IDAHO CONST. art. I, § 13.
199 ALA. CONST. art. I, § 9.
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been in jeopardy.”200  The states without double jeopardy clauses are Con-
necticut, Maryland, Massachusetts, North Carolina, and Vermont.
Although only one state out of fourteen protected against double jeop-
ardy in 1791,201 thirty-one states out of thirty-seven in 1868 banned double
jeopardy when the Fourteenth Amendment was ratified.202  There was an
Article V consensus that double jeopardy was unconstitutional in 1868 when
the Fourteenth Amendment was ratified.  Forty-five states—representing 90%
of the states and 91.5% of the population203—ban it today.204  This suggests
that Palko v. Connecticut, which held that double jeopardy was not a funda-
mental right in 1937, was erroneously decided both as a matter of the origi-
nal meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment, when it was ratified in 1868,
and as a matter of living constitutionalism, which has seen support for the
right continuing to exist.205 Palko was overruled and the Fourteenth Amend-
ment was correctly held to bar double jeopardy in Benton v. Maryland, a case
that was decided in 1969.206
200 COLO. CONST. art. II, § 18.
201 Calabresi, Agudo & Dore, supra note 5, at 1499.
202 See Calabresi & Agudo, supra note 5, at 59.
203 See 2010 Census, supra note 12 (282,087,313 out of 308,143,815 residents).
204 See ALA. CONST. art. I, § 9; ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 9; ARIZ. CONST. art. II, § 10; ARK.
CONST. art. II, § 8; CAL. CONST. art. I, §§ 15, 24; COLO. CONST. art. II, § 18; DEL. CONST. art.
I, § 8; FLA. CONST. art. I, § 9; GA. CONST. art. I, § 1, para. 18; HAW. CONST. art. I, § 10; IDAHO
CONST. art. I, § 13; ILL. CONST. art. I, § 10; IND. CONST. art. I, § 14; IOWA CONST. art. I, § 12;
KAN. CONST. Bill of Rights, § 10; KY. CONST. Bill of Rights, § 13; LA. CONST. art. I, § 15; ME.
CONST. art. I, § 8; MICH. CONST. art. I, § 15; MINN. CONST. art. I, § 7; MISS. CONST. art. III,
§ 22; MO. CONST. art. I, § 19; MONT. CONST. art. II, § 25; NEB. CONST. art. I, § 12; NEV.
CONST. art. I, § 8; N.H. CONST. pt. 1, art. XVI; N.J. CONST. art. I, § 11; N.M. CONST. art. II,
§ 15; N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 6; N.D. CONST. art. I, § 12; OHIO CONST. art. I, § 10; OKLA. CONST.
art. II, § 21; OR. CONST. art. I, § 12; PA. CONST. art. I, § 10; R.I. CONST. art. I, § 7; S.C.
CONST. art. I, § 12; S.D. CONST. art. VI, § 9; TENN. CONST. art. I, § 10; TEX. CONST. art. I,
§ 14; UTAH CONST. art. I, § 12; VA. CONST. art. I, § 8; WASH. CONST. art. I, § 9; W. VA.
CONST. art. III, § 5; WIS. CONST. art. I, § 8; WYO. CONST. art. I, § 11.
205 Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 (1937), overruled by Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S.
784 (1969).
206 Benton, 395 U.S. at 793–96.
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2. Habeas Corpus
All fifty states have provisions in their constitutions that forbid the state
legislature from suspending the writ of habeas corpus.207  The great majority
of those states—thirty-six states—include the same specific qualification in
their habeas corpus clause, stating that the writ of habeas corpus may only be
suspended in cases of rebellion or invasion, or in order to protect the pub-
lic’s safety.208  Alaska’s constitution offers a good example, as it provides that
207 See ALA. CONST. art. I, § 17; ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 13; ARIZ. CONST. art. II, § 14; ARK.
CONST. art. II, § 11; CAL. CONST. art. I, § 11; COLO. CONST. art. II, § 21; CONN. CONST. art. I,
§ 12; DEL. CONST. art. I, § 13; FLA. CONST. art. I, § 13; GA. CONST. art. I, § 1, para. 15; HAW.
CONST. art. I, § 15; IDAHO CONST. art. I, § 5; ILL. CONST. art. I, § 9; IND. CONST. art. I, § 27;
IOWA CONST. art. I, § 13; KAN. CONST. Bill of Rights, § 8; KY. CONST. Bill of Rights, § 16; LA.
CONST. art. I, § 21; ME. CONST. art. I, § 10; MD. CONST. art. III, § 55; MASS. CONST. pt. 2, ch.
6, art. VII; MICH. CONST. art. I, § 12; MINN. CONST. art. I, § 7; MISS. CONST. art. III, § 21;
MO. CONST. art. I, § 12; MONT. CONST. art. II, § 19; NEB. CONST. art. I, § 8; NEV. CONST. art.
I, § 5; N.H. CONST. pt. 2, art. XCI; N.J. CONST. art. I, § 14; N.M. CONST. art. II, § 7; N.Y.
CONST. art. I, § 4; N.C. CONST. art. I, § 21; N.D. CONST. art. I, § 14; OHIO CONST. art. I, § 8;
OKLA. CONST. art. II, § 10; OR. CONST. art. I, § 23; PA. CONST. art. I, § 14; R.I. CONST. art. I,
§ 9; S.C. CONST. art. I, § 18; S.D. CONST. art. VI, § 8; TENN. CONST. art. I, § 15; TEX. CONST.
art. I, § 12; UTAH CONST. art. I, § 5; VT. CONST. ch. 2, § 41; VA. CONST. art. I, § 9; WASH.
CONST. art. I, § 13; W. VA. CONST. art. III, § 4; WIS. CONST. art. I, § 8; WYO. CONST. art. I,
§ 17.
208 See ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 13; ARK. CONST. art. II, § 11; CAL. CONST. art. I, § 11;
COLO. CONST. art. II, § 21; CONN. CONST. art. I, § 12; DEL. CONST. art. I, § 13; FLA. CONST.
art. I, § 13; GA. CONST. art. I, § 1, para. 15; HAW. CONST. art. I, § 15; IDAHO CONST. art. I,
§ 5; ILL. CONST. art. I, § 9; IND. CONST. art. I, § 27; IOWA CONST. art. I, § 13; KAN. CONST. Bill
of Rights, § 8; KY. CONST. Bill of Rights, § 16; ME. CONST. art. I, § 10; MICH. CONST. art. I,
§ 12; MINN. CONST. art. I, § 7; MISS. CONST. art. III, § 21; NEV. CONST. art. I, § 5; N.J. CONST.
art. I, § 14; N.M. CONST. art. II, § 7; N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 4; N.D. CONST. art. I, § 14; OHIO
CONST. art. I, § 8; OR. CONST. art. I, § 23; PA. CONST. art. I, § 14; R.I. CONST. art. I, § 9; S.C.
CONST. art. I, § 18; S.D. CONST. art. VI, § 8; TENN. CONST. art. I, § 15; UTAH CONST. art. I,
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“[t]he privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall not be suspended, unless
when in cases of rebellion or actual or imminent invasion, the public safety
requires it.”209
Two more states, Massachusetts and New Hampshire, contain limited
habeas corpus clauses that follow a different, distinctive pattern.  New Hamp-
shire’s constitution, for instance, holds that “[t]he privilege and benefit of
the Habeas Corpus, shall be enjoyed in this State, in the most free, easy,
cheap, expeditious, and ample manner, and shall not be suspended by the
Legislature, except upon most urgent and pressing occasions, and for a time
not exceeding three months.”210  Massachusetts has a similar clause, but gives
a larger time window for the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus, stating
that the “the writ of habeas corpus shall be enjoyed in this commonwealth in
the most free, easy, cheap, expeditious and ample manner; and shall not be
suspended by the legislature, except upon the most urgent and pressing
occasions, and for a limited time not exceeding twelve months.”211
Finally, twelve states provide an unqualified right to the writ of habeas
corpus, stating, as Maryland’s constitution does, that “[t]he General Assem-
bly shall pass no Law suspending the privilege of the Writ of Habeas
Corpus.”212  Of these states, Texas and Vermont had unusual formulations of
their unqualified habeas corpus clauses.  Texas’s constitution, for instance,
states that “[t]he writ of habeas corpus is a writ of right, and shall never be
suspended.  The Legislature shall enact laws to render the remedy speedy
and effectual,”213 and Vermont’s constitution holds that “[t]he Writ of
Habeas Corpus shall in no case be suspended.  It shall be a writ issuable of
right; and the General Assembly shall make provision to render it a speedy
and effectual remedy in all cases proper therefor.”214
§ 5; VA. CONST. art. I, § 9; WASH. CONST. art. I, § 13; WIS. CONST. art. I, § 8; WYO. CONST.
art. I, § 17.
209 ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 13.
210 N.H. CONST. pt. 2, art. XCI.
211 MASS. CONST. pt. 2, ch. 6, art. VII.
212 MD. CONST. art. III, § 55.  The other eleven states are Alabama, Arizona, Louisiana,
Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, North Carolina, Oklahoma, Texas, Vermont, and West Vir-
ginia. See ALA. CONST. art. I, § 17; ARIZ. CONST. art. II, § 14; LA. CONST. art. I, § 21; MO.
CONST. art. I, § 12; MONT. CONST. art. II, § 19; NEB. CONST. art. I, § 8; N.C. CONST. art. I,
§ 21; OKLA. CONST. art. II, § 10; TEX. CONST. art. I, § 12; VT. CONST. ch. 2, § 41; W. VA.
CONST. art. III, § 4.
213 TEX. CONST. art. I, § 12.
214 VT. CONST. ch. 2, § 41.
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Although only four states out of fourteen guaranteed the right to habeas
corpus in their constitutions in 1791,215 all thirty-seven states guaranteed the
right to habeas corpus in 1868, when the Fourteenth Amendment was rati-
fied.216  There has been no change in the constitutional status of this corner-
stone right of Anglo-American law from 1868 to the present day.  The small
number of states protecting the right of habeas corpus in 1791 as compared
to the Article V three-quarters consensus on this issue in 1868 suggests that
Amar is right that the framing era was more collectivist than the individualis-
tic era of Reconstruction in 1868.217
3. Self-Incrimination
The right against self-incrimination is also widely protected in 2018 by
state bills of rights.  Forty-eight of the states—representing 96% of the states
and 96.2% of the U.S. population218—have a provision in their state constitu-
tions that guarantees an individual right against self-incrimination.219  Colo-
215 Calabresi, Agudo & Dore, supra note 5, at 1492–93.
216 See Calabresi & Agudo, supra note 5, at 59–60.  Note that in our original analysis, id.,
we coded only thirty-six states as having habeas corpus clauses, but we now believe upon
further review that all thirty-seven states had habeas corpus clauses in their state constitu-
tions in 1868.
217 See id. at 115 (citing AMAR, supra note 136).
218 See 2010 Census, supra note 12 (296,305,566 out of 308,143,815 residents).
219 See ALA. CONST. art. I, § 6; ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 9; ARIZ. CONST. art. II, § 10; ARK.
CONST. art. II, § 8; CAL. CONST. art. I, §§ 15, 24; COLO. CONST. art. II, § 18; CONN. CONST.
art. I, § 8; DEL. CONST. art. I, § 7; FLA. CONST. art. I, § 9; GA. CONST. art. I, § 1, para. 16;
HAW. CONST. art. I, § 10; IDAHO CONST. art. I, § 13; ILL. CONST. art. I, § 10; IND. CONST. art.
I, § 14; KAN. CONST. Bill of Rights, § 10; KY. CONST. Bill of Rights, § 11; LA. CONST. art. I,
§ 13; ME. CONST. art. I, § 6; MD. CONST. Declaration of Rights, art. XXII; MASS. CONST. pt.
1, art. XII; MICH. CONST. art. I, § 17; MINN. CONST. art. I, § 7; MISS. CONST. art. III, § 26;
MO. CONST. art. I, § 19; MONT. CONST. art. II, § 25; NEB. CONST. art. I, § 12; NEV. CONST.
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rado’s constitution uses one common formulation, stating that “[n]o person
shall be compelled to testify against himself in a criminal case.”220  Kansas’s
constitution similarly holds that “[n]o person shall be a witness against him-
self,”221 and Maine’s constitution indicates that “[i]n all criminal prosecu-
tions” “the accused shall not be compelled to furnish or give evidence against
himself or herself.”222
Some states provide for a more nuanced right.  Oklahoma, for example,
states that “[n]o person shall be compelled to give evidence which will tend
to incriminate him, except as in this Constitution specifically provided”223
and then goes on to hold that:
Any person having knowledge or possession of facts that tend to estab-
lish the guilt of any other person or corporation under the laws of the state
shall not be excused from giving testimony or producing evidence, when
legally called upon so to do, on the ground that it may tend to incriminate
him under the laws of the state; but no person shall be prosecuted or sub-
jected to any penalty or forfeiture for or on account of any transaction, mat-
ter, or thing concerning which he may so testify or produce evidence.  All
other provisions of the Constitution or the laws of this state in conflict with
the provisions of this constitutional amendment are hereby expressly
repealed.224
Ohio’s constitution is also unusual, providing that “[n]o person shall be
compelled, in any criminal case, to be a witness against himself; but his fail-
ure to testify may be considered by the court and jury and may be made the
subject of comment by counsel.”225
art. I, § 8; N.H. CONST. pt. 1, art. XV; N.M. CONST. art. II, § 15; N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 6; N.C.
CONST. art. I, § 23; N.D. CONST. art. I, § 12; OHIO CONST. art. I, § 10; OKLA. CONST. art. II,
§ 21; OR. CONST. art. I, § 12; PA. CONST. art. I, § 9; R.I. CONST. art. I, § 13; S.C. CONST. art. I,
§ 12; S.D. CONST. art. VI, § 9; TENN. CONST. art. I, § 9; TEX. CONST. art. I, § 10; UTAH
CONST. art. I, § 12; VT. CONST. ch. 1, art. X; VA. CONST. art. I, § 8; WASH. CONST. art. I, § 9;
W. VA. CONST. art. III, § 5; WIS. CONST. art. I, § 8; WYO. CONST. art. I, § 11.  The states
without a self-incrimination clause are Iowa and New Jersey.
220 COLO. CONST. art. II, § 18.
221 KAN. CONST. Bill of Rights, § 10.
222 ME. CONST. art. I, § 6.
223 OKLA. CONST. art. II, § 21.
224 Id. § 27.
225 OHIO CONST. art. I, § 10.
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FIGURE 15.  PROTECTION AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION IN
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Eight out of twelve states that wrote new constitutions between 1776 and
1791 protected the right against self-incrimination.226  Thirty-four of the
thirty-seven states in 1868, an Article V three-quarters majority, protected the
right against self-incrimination in 1868.227  Today, forty-eight of the states—
representing 96% of the states and 96.2% of the U.S. population228—protect
this right.229  The cornerstone nature of the right against self-incrimination
in U.S. constitutional law is important because under the civil-law legal tradi-
tion, which prevails in Continental Europe, Latin America, and in Asia
(except for India), there is no fundamental right not to incriminate oneself.
The issue is also important because Justice Hugo Black wrote a powerful dis-
sent in Adamson v. California230 to Justice Felix Frankfurter’s majority opinion
226 Calabresi, Agudo & Dore, supra note 5, at 1493–94.
227 See Calabresi & Agudo, supra note 5, at 60–61.
228 See 2010 Census, supra note 12 (296,305,566 out of 308,143,815 residents).
229 See ALA. CONST. art. I, § 6; ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 9; ARIZ. CONST. art. II, § 10; ARK.
CONST. art. II, § 8; CAL. CONST. art. I, §§ 15, 24; COLO. CONST. art. II, § 18; CONN. CONST.
art. I, § 8; DEL. CONST. art. I, § 7; FLA. CONST. art. I, § 9; GA. CONST. art. I, § 1, para. 16;
HAW. CONST. art. I, § 10; IDAHO CONST. art. I, § 13; ILL. CONST. art. I, § 10; IND. CONST. art.
I, § 14; KAN. CONST. Bill of Rights, § 10; KY. CONST. Bill of Rights, § 11; LA. CONST. art. I,
§ 13; ME. CONST. art. I, § 6; MD. CONST. Declaration of Rights, art. XXII; MASS. CONST. pt.
1, art. XII; MICH. CONST. art. I, § 17; MINN. CONST. art. I, § 7; MISS. CONST. art. III, § 26;
MO. CONST. art. I, § 19; MONT. CONST. art. II, § 25; NEB. CONST. art. I, § 12; NEV. CONST.
art. I, § 8; N.H. CONST. pt. 1, art. XV; N.M. CONST. art. II, § 15; N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 6; N.C.
CONST. art. I, § 23; N.D. CONST. art. I, § 12; OHIO CONST. art. I, § 10; OKLA. CONST. art. II,
§ 21; OR. CONST. art. I, § 12; PA. CONST. art. I, § 9; R.I. CONST. art. I, § 13; S.C. CONST. art. I,
§ 12; S.D. CONST. art. VI, § 9; TENN. CONST. art. I, § 9; TEX. CONST. art. I, § 10; UTAH
CONST. art. I, § 12; VT. CONST. ch. 1, art. X; VA. CONST. art. I, § 8; WASH. CONST. art. I, § 9;
W. VA. CONST. art. III, § 5; WIS. CONST. art. I, § 8; WYO. CONST. art. I, § 11.  The states
without a self-incrimination clause are Iowa and New Jersey.
230 332 U.S. 46 (1947), overruled in part by Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964).
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holding that the right not to incriminate oneself is a fundamental right and
that the Fourteenth Amendment incorporates the entire Federal Bill of
Rights against the states.231  Since thirty-four out of thirty-seven state constitu-
tions protected the right not to incriminate oneself in 1868, an Article V
three-quarters majority of the states makes it clear that Black was right and
Frankfurter was wrong on the original meaning of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment with respect to this issue. Adamson was correctly overruled in Malloy v.
Hogan,232 and support for the right has only grown since 1868.
4. Confrontation
The Confrontation Clause in the Federal Bill of Rights guarantees crimi-
nal defendants the right to confront any witnesses against them.233  In the
modern day, forty-seven states—comprising 94% of the states and 98.4% of
the U.S. population234—guarantee criminal defendants the right to confron-
tation in their state constitutions.235  Wisconsin’s constitution uses a typical
format, stating that “[i]n all criminal prosecutions the accused shall enjoy the
right . . . to meet the witnesses face to face.”236  Utah’s constitution follows
another common formulation, holding that “[i]n criminal prosecutions the
accused shall have the right . . . to be confronted by the witnesses against
him.”237  It is worth noting that the Utah Constitution more closely tracks the
Federal Constitution, which provides that “[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the
accused shall enjoy the right . . . to be confronted with the witnesses against
him.”238  The states without a confrontation clause are Idaho, Nevada, and
North Dakota.
231 See AMAR, supra note 136, at 213–14.
232 Malloy, 378 U.S.1.
233 U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
234 See 2010 Census, supra note 12 (303,203,091 out of 308,143,815 residents).
235 See ALA. CONST. art. I, § 6; ALASKA CONST. art. I, §  11; ARIZ. CONST. art. II, § 24; ARK.
CONST. art. II, § 10; CAL. CONST. art. I, § 15; COLO. CONST. art. II, § 16; CONN. CONST. art. I,
§ 8; DEL. CONST. art. I, § 7; FLA. CONST. art. I, § 16; GA. CONST. art. I, § 1, para. 14; HAW.
CONST. art. I, § 14; ILL. CONST. art. I, § 8; IND. CONST. art. I, § 13; IOWA CONST. art. I, § 10;
KAN. CONST. Bill of Rights, § 10; KY. CONST. Bill of Rights, § 11; LA. CONST. art. I, § 16; ME.
CONST. art. I, § 6; MD. CONST. Declaration of Rights, art. XXI; MASS. CONST. pt. 1, art. XII;
MICH. CONST. art. I, § 20; MINN. CONST. art. I, § 6; MISS. CONST. art. III, § 26; MO. CONST.
art. I, § 18(a); MONT. CONST. art. II, § 24; NEB. CONST. art. I, § 11; N.H. CONST. pt. 1, art.
XV; N.J. CONST. art. I, § 10; N.M. CONST. art. II, § 14; N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 6; N.C. CONST.
art. I, § 23; OHIO CONST. art. I, § 10; OKLA. CONST. art. II, § 20; OR. CONST. art. I, § 11; PA.
CONST. art. I, § 9; R.I. CONST. art. I, § 10; S.C. CONST. art. I, § 14; S.D. CONST. art. VI, § 7;
TENN. CONST. art. I, § 9; TEX. CONST. art. I, § 10; UTAH CONST. art. I, § 12; VT. CONST. ch. 1,
art. X; VA. CONST. art. I, § 8; WASH. CONST. art. I, § 22; W. VA. CONST. art. III, § 14; WIS.
CONST. art. I, § 7; WYO. CONST. art. I, § 10.
236 WIS. CONST. art. I, § 7.
237 UTAH CONST. art. I, § 12.
238 U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
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FIGURE 16.  CONFRONTATION CLAUSES IN STATE CONSTITUTIONS
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Eight states out of twelve that wrote new constitutions between 1776 and
1791 included confrontation clauses,239 and thirty-two out of thirty-seven
states, an Article V three-quarters consensus, had confrontation clauses in
their state constitutions in 1868 when the Fourteenth Amendment was rati-
fied.240  Today, forty-seven states—comprising 94% of the states and 98.4%
of the population241—guarantee criminal defendants the right to confronta-
tion in their state constitutions.242  This right was a fundamental right in
1868, and it has come to be protected even more thoroughly over time.
239 Calabresi, Agudo & Dore, supra note 5, at 1497.
240 See Calabresi & Agudo, supra note 5, at 63.
241 See 2010 Census, supra note 12 (303,203,091 out of 308,143,815 residents).
242 See ALA. CONST. art. I, § 6; ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 11; ARIZ. CONST. art. II, § 24; ARK.
CONST. art. II, § 10; CAL. CONST. art. I, § 15; COLO. CONST. art. II, § 16; CONN. CONST. art. I,
§ 8; DEL. CONST. art. I, § 7; FLA. CONST. art. I, § 16; GA. CONST. art. I, § 1, para. 14; HAW.
CONST. art. I, § 14; ILL. CONST. art. I, § 8; IND. CONST. art. I, § 13; IOWA CONST. art. I, § 10;
KAN. CONST. Bill of Rights, § 10; KY. CONST. Bill of Rights, § 11; LA. CONST. art. I, § 16; ME.
CONST. art. I, § 6; MD. CONST. Declaration of Rights, art. XXI; MASS. CONST. pt. 1, art. XII;
MICH. CONST. art. I, § 20; MINN. CONST. art. I, § 6; MISS. CONST. art. III, § 26; MO. CONST.
art. I, § 18(a); MONT. CONST. art. II, § 24; NEB. CONST. art. I, § 11; N.H. CONST. pt. 1, art.
XV; N.J. CONST. art. I, § 10; N.M. CONST. art. II, § 14; N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 6; N.C. CONST.
art. I, § 23; OHIO CONST. art. I, § 10; OKLA. CONST. art. II, § 20; OR. CONST. art. I, § 11; PA.
CONST. art. I, § 9; R.I. CONST. art. I, § 10; S.C. CONST. art. I, § 14; S.D. CONST. art. VI, § 7;
TENN. CONST. art. I, § 9; TEX. CONST. art. I, § 10; UTAH CONST. art. I, § 12; VT. CONST. ch. 1,
art. X; VA. CONST. art. I, § 8; WASH. CONST. art. I, § 22; W. VA. CONST. art. III, § 14; WIS.
CONST. art. I, § 7; WYO. CONST. art. I, § 10.
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F. Due Process Rights
The Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution each
contain a due process clause,243 both of which ensure that individuals cannot
be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law.  In 2018,
forty-nine states—comprising 98% of the states and 97.1% of the U.S. popu-
lation244—include a similar clause in their state constitutions, thereby pro-
tecting due process rights at the state level.245  New Jersey is the only state
without a due process clause.  Louisiana’s due process clause closely mirrors
the Federal Constitution, providing that “[n]o person shall be deprived of
life, liberty, or property, except by due process of law.”246  Another common
formulation can be found in Vermont’s constitution, which holds that no
person can “be justly deprived of liberty, except by the laws of the land, or
the judgment of the person’s peers.”247  Kansas’s constitution uses a final
typical format, stating that “[a]ll persons, for injuries suffered in person, rep-
utation or property, shall have remedy by due course of law, and justice
administered without delay.”248
243 U.S. CONST. amend V (“No person shall be . . . deprived of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law . . . .”); id. amend. XIV, § 1 (“[N]or shall any State deprive any
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law . . . .”).
244 See 2010 Census, supra note 12 (299,351,921 out of 308,143,815 residents).
245 See ALA. CONST. art. I, §§ 6, 13; ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 7; ARIZ. CONST. art. II, § 4;
ARK. CONST. art. II, §§ 8, 21; CAL. CONST. art. I, §§ 7(a), 15, 24, 29; COLO. CONST. art. II,
§ 25; CONN. CONST. art. I, § 8; DEL. CONST. art. IV, § 37; FLA. CONST. art. I, § 9; GA. CONST.
art. I, § 1, para. 1; HAW. CONST. art. I, § 5; IDAHO CONST. art. I, § 13; ILL. CONST. art. I, § 2;
IND. CONST. art. I, § 12; IOWA CONST. art. I, § 9; KAN. CONST. Bill of Rights, § 18; KY. CONST.
Bill of Rights, §§ 11, 14; LA. CONST. art. I, §§ 2, 22; ME. CONST. art. I, §§ 6, 6-A; MD. CONST.
Declaration of Rights, arts. XIX, XXIV; MASS. CONST. pt. 1, arts. XI, XII; MICH. CONST. art.
I, § 17; MINN. CONST. art. I, § 7; MISS. CONST. art. III, § 14; MO. CONST. art. I, § 10; MONT.
CONST. art. II, § 17; NEB. CONST. art. I, § 3; NEV. CONST. art. I, § 8; N.H. CONST. pt. 1, art.
XV; N.M. CONST. art. II, § 18; N.Y. CONST. art. I, §§ 1, 6; N.C. CONST. art. I, § 19; N.D.
CONST. art. I, §§ 9, 12; OHIO CONST. art. I, § 16; OKLA. CONST. art. II, §§ 7, 29; OR. CONST.
art. I, § 10; PA. CONST. art. I, §§ 9, 11; R.I. CONST. art. I, §§ 2, 10; S.C. CONST. art. I, § 3; S.D.
CONST. art. VI, § 2; TENN. CONST. art. I, § 8; TEX. CONST. art. I, §§ 13, 19; UTAH CONST. art.
I, §§ 7, 11; VT. CONST. ch. 1, art. X; VA. CONST. art. I, §§ 8, 11; WASH. CONST. art. I, § 3; W.
VA. CONST. art. III, § 10; WIS. CONST. art. I, § 8; WYO. CONST. art. I, § 6.  The state without a
due process clause is New Jersey.
246 LA. CONST. art. I, § 2.
247 VT. CONST. ch. 1, art. X.  This “law of the land” language is derived from the old
English Magna Carta. See Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 756–57 (1997) (Souter,
J., concurring in the judgment) (mentioning that prior to the ratification of the Four-
teenth Amendment of the Federal Constitution, state constitutions commonly contained
either due process clauses similar to that found in the Fifth Amendment of the Federal
Constitution, or they contained language from the old English Magna Carta, which served
as a textual antecedent to the due process clause).
248 KAN. CONST. Bill of Rights, § 18.  We count “due course of law” language as a form
of a due process clause, because we believe that it is synonymous with the phrase “due
process of law.” Due Course of Law, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (2d ed. 1910).
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FIGURE 17.  DUE PROCESS OR LAW OF THE LAND CLAUSES IN
STATE CONSTITUTIONS
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The language used in the state due process clauses has shifted over time.
In 1868, the majority of the state constitutions that contained due process
clause analogs used rhetoric like Vermont’s constitution, guaranteeing due
process rights by referencing “the law of the land.”249  The typical formula-
tion in 1868 was that no person can be deprived of life, liberty or property
“but by the judgment of his peers or the law of the land.”250  Today, more
states use the due process of law formulation than use the law of the land
language, which actually dates back to Magna Carta signed by King John in
1215.251  The two formulations mean the same thing, which is why we believe
that substantive due process is an oxymoron and why it is the Privileges or
Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment that is the guarantee for
most of our enumerated and unenumerated rights.  In 1791, nine out of
twelve states that wrote new constitutions between 1776 and 1791 included
due process clauses that all used the traditional Magna Carta language
authorizing deprivations of life, liberty, or property by the law of the land.252
No state used the due process of law language.  This suggests that when the
Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause was ratified in 1791, an Article V three-
quarters majority of the twelve states that had written new constitutions
249 See Calabresi & Agudo, supra note 5, at 66 (“All in all, eighteen of the thirty states
with due process clauses in 1868 used the ‘by the law of the land’ language while fourteen
used the words ‘due process of law.’”).  Note that in our original analysis, id., we coded
thirty states as having due process of law clauses in their state constitutions in 1868.  We
now believe—upon further review—that thirty-five out of thirty-seven states had such
clauses.  The only states in 1868 without due process clauses were New Jersey and
Wisconsin.
250 Id. at 65–66 (quoting N.H. CONST. of 1784, pt. 1, art. XV).
251 See English Translation of Magna Carta, BRIT. LIBR. (July 28, 2014), https://www.bl
.uk/magna-carta/articles/magna-carta-english-translation#.
252 Calabresi, Agudo & Dore, supra note 5, at 1500.
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believed that people could be deprived of life, liberty, or property by the law
of the land.  The original understanding of the Fifth Amendment Due Pro-
cess Clause was thus a belief in procedural but not substantive due process.
By 1868, thirty-five out of thirty-seven states used the due process of law lan-
guage,253 and in 2018, thirty-seven states use a “due process of law” provi-
sion,254 seventeen states use a “due course of law” provision,255 and sixteen
states use a “law of the land” provision,256 though it is worth noting that
there is significant overlap, such that many states use more than one formula-
tion in their state constitutions.257
G. Property Rights
The next major topic addressed within the Federal Constitution is prop-
erty rights.258  In particular, the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment pro-
vides that the federal government may not use its eminent domain powers to
seize private property without giving just compensation to the property
owner.259  As we describe below, state constitutional law also addresses the
fundamental questions of how the state may interact with property owners
without violating their private property rights.
253 See supra note 244.
254 ALA. CONST. art. I, §§ 6, 13; ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 7; ARIZ. CONST. art. II, § 4; ARK.
CONST. art. II, § 8; CAL. CONST. art. I, §§ 7(a), 15, 24, 29; COLO. CONST. art. II, § 25; CONN.
CONST. art. I, § 8; DEL. CONST. art. IV, § 37; FLA. CONST. art. I, § 9; GA. CONST. art. I, § 1,
para. 1; HAW. CONST. art. I, § 5; IDAHO CONST. art. I, § 13; ILL. CONST. art. I, § 2; IOWA
CONST. art. I, § 9; LA. CONST. art. I, §§ 2, 22; ME. CONST. art. I, § 6-A; MICH. CONST. art. I,
§ 17; MINN. CONST. art. I, § 7; MISS. CONST. art. III, § 14; MO. CONST. art. I, § 10; MONT.
CONST. art. II, § 17; NEB. CONST. art. I, § 3; NEV. CONST. art. I, § 8; N.H. CONST. pt. 1, art.
XV; N.M. CONST. art. II, § 18; N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 6; N.D. CONST. art. I, §§ 9, 12; OKLA.
CONST. art. II, §§ 7, 29; R.I. CONST. art. I, § 2; S.C. CONST. art. I, § 3; S.D. CONST. art. VI,
§ 2; UTAH CONST. art. I, § 7; VA. CONST. art. I, § 11; WASH. CONST. art. I, § 3; W. VA. CONST.
art. III, § 10; WIS. CONST. art. I, § 8; WYO. CONST. art. I, § 6.
255 CONN. CONST. art. I, § 10; DEL. CONST. art. I, § 9; IND. CONST. art. I, § 12; KAN.
CONST. Bill of Rights, § 18; KY. CONST. Bill of Rights, § 14; ME. CONST. art. I, § 19; MISS.
CONST. art. III, § 24; NEB. CONST. art. I, § 13; N.C. CONST. art. I, § 18; OHIO CONST. art. I,
§ 16; OR. CONST. art. I, § 10; PA. CONST. art. I, § 11; S.D. CONST. art. VI, § 20; TENN. CONST.
art. I, § 17; TEX. CONST. art. I, §§ 13, 19; UTAH CONST. art. I, § 11; W. VA. CONST. art. III,
§ 17.
256 ARK. CONST. art. II, § 21; DEL. CONST. art. I, §§ 7, 9; HAW. CONST. art. I, § 8; KY.
CONST. Bill of Rights, § 11; ME. CONST. art. I, § 6; MD. CONST. Declaration of Rights, arts.
XIX, XXIV; MASS. CONST. pt. 1, art. XII; MINN. CONST. art. I, § 2; N.H. CONST. pt. 1, art.
XV; N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 1; N.C. CONST. art. I, § 19; PA. CONST. art. I, § 9; R.I. CONST. art. I,
§ 10; TENN. CONST. art. I, § 8; TEX. CONST. art. I, § 19; VA. CONST. art. I, § 8.
257 See e.g., KY. CONST. Bill of Rights, §§ 11, 14; TEX. CONST. art. I, § 19; VA. CONST. art.
I, §§ 8, 11.
258 For a detailed discussion of property rights in the Federal Constitution, see Frank I.
Michelman, Property as a Constitutional Right, 38 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1097 (1981).
259 U.S. CONST. amend. V.
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1. Takings Clauses
Takings clauses, like the one found in the Fifth Amendment of the Fed-
eral Constitution,260 place important limitations on the governmental power
of eminent domain.  In 2018, forty-nine states—representing 98% of the
states and 96.9% of the U.S. population261—have takings clauses in their
state constitutions.262  Wisconsin’s constitution uses a typical formulation of
the clause, providing that “[t]he property of no person shall be taken for
public use without just compensation therefor.”263  Other states include addi-
tional detail in their takings clauses.  Ohio’s constitution, for example, states
that:
Private property shall ever be held inviolate, but subservient to the public
welfare.  When taken in time of war or other public exigency, imperatively
requiring its immediate seizure or for the purpose of making or repairing
roads, which shall be open to the public, without charge, a compensation
shall be made to the owner, in money; and in all other cases, where private
property shall be taken for public use, a compensation therefor shall first be
made in money, or first secured by a deposit of money; and such compensa-
tion shall be assessed by a jury, without deduction for benefits to any prop-
erty of the owner.264
Arizona’s constitution also provides additional detail, holding that:
Private property shall not be taken for private use, except for private ways of
necessity, and for drains, flumes, or ditches, on or across the lands of others
for mining, agricultural, domestic, or sanitary purposes.  No private property
shall be taken or damaged for public or private use without just compensa-
tion having first been made, paid into court for the owner, secured by bond
as may be fixed by the court, or paid into the state treasury for the owner on
such terms and conditions as the legislature may provide, and no right of
way shall be appropriated to the use of any corporation other than munici-
260 Id. (“[N]or shall private property be taken for public use, without just
compensation.”).
261 See 2010 Census, supra note 12 (298,608,332 out of 308,143,815 residents).
262 See ALA. CONST. art. I, § 23; ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 18; ARIZ. CONST. art. II, § 17; ARK.
CONST. art. II, §§ 22–23; id. art. XII, § 9; CAL. CONST. art. I, § 19; COLO. CONST. art. II,
§§ 14–15; CONN. CONST. art. I, § 11; DEL. CONST. art. I, § 8; FLA. CONST. art. X, § 6; GA.
CONST. art. I, § 3, para. 1; HAW. CONST. art. I, § 20; IDAHO CONST. art. I, § 14; ILL. CONST.
art. I, § 15; IND. CONST. art. I, § 21; IOWA CONST. art. I, § 18; KAN. CONST. art. XII, § 4; KY.
CONST. Bill of Rights, § 13; LA. CONST. art. I, § 4; ME. CONST. art. I, § 21; MD. CONST. art.
III, § 40; MASS. CONST. pt. 1, art. X; MICH. CONST. art. X, § 2; MINN. CONST. art. I, § 13;
MISS. CONST. art. III, § 17; MO. CONST. art. I, § 26; MONT. CONST. art. II, § 29; NEB. CONST.
art. I, § 21; NEV. CONST. art. I, § 8; N.H. CONST. pt. 1, arts. XII(a), XIV; N.J. CONST. art. I,
§ 20; N.M. CONST. art. II, § 20; N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 7; N.D. CONST. art. I, § 16; OHIO CONST.
art. I, § 19; OKLA. CONST. art. II, §§ 23–24; OR. CONST. art. I, § 18; PA. CONST. art. I, § 10;
R.I. CONST. art. I, § 16; S.C. CONST. art. I, § 13; S.D. CONST. art. VI, § 13; TENN. CONST. art.
I, § 21; TEX. CONST. art. I, § 17(d); UTAH CONST. art. I, § 22; VT. CONST. ch. 1, arts. II, IX;
VA. CONST. art. I, §§ 6, 11; WASH. CONST. art. I, § 16; W. VA. CONST. art. III, § 9; WIS. CONST.
art. I, § 13; WYO. CONST. art. I, §§ 32–33.
263 WIS. CONST. art. I, § 13.
264 OHIO CONST. art. I, § 19.
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pal, until full compensation therefore be first made in money, or ascertained
and paid into court for the owner, irrespective of any benefit from any
improvement proposed by such corporation, which compensation shall be
ascertained by a jury, unless a jury be waived as in other civil cases in courts
of record, in the manner prescribed by law.  Whenever an attempt is made
to take private property for a use alleged to be public, the question whether
the contemplated use be really public shall be a judicial question, and deter-
mined as such without regard to any legislative assertion that the use is
public.265
All in all, then, although the states may differ in their particular phrasing
of the takings clause, forty-nine of them offer this protection for private
property.
The state without a takings clause, North Carolina, did have references
to eminent domain in its constitution.  Specifically, the North Carolina Con-
stitution indicated that eminent domain may not be used for health-care
facilities,266 capital projects for industry,267 capital projects for agricul-
ture,268 or higher-education facilities.269  However, since these clauses did
not discuss the power of eminent domain generally (e.g., by clarifying when
the power of eminent domain can legitimately be used), and did not provide
the typical protection of just compensation for any private property seized
under the eminent domain power, we do not count North Carolina’s consti-
tution as including a takings clause.
In 1791, when the Federal Bill of Rights was ratified, six out of twelve
states that had written new constitutions between 1776 and 1791 had takings
clauses in their state constitutions.270  By 1868, when the Fourteenth Amend-
ment was ratified, thirty-three out of thirty-seven states—a three-quarters Arti-
cle V consensus—had takings clauses.271  Today, every state but one272 has
such a clause.  This protection for private property, then, has only grown in
scope over time, and it is a right that is deeply rooted in American history
and tradition as well as by an overwhelming consensus of the state constitu-
tions today in 2018.
265 ARIZ. CONST. art. II, § 17.
266 N.C. CONST. art. V, § 8.
267 Id. art. V, § 9.
268 Id. art. V, § 11.
269 Id. art. V, § 12.
270 Calabresi, Agudo & Dore, supra note 5, at 1505–06.
271 See Calabresi & Agudo, supra note 5, at 72.
272 See generally N.C. CONST.
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FIGURE 18.  TAKINGS CLAUSES IN STATE CONSTITUTIONS
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2. Monopolies
One question “that arose early in the history of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment was whether the Amendment conferred on individuals a fundamental
right” to be protected against monopolistic market powers.273  The U.S.
Supreme Court addressed this question directly in 1873 in The Slaughter-
House Cases,274 where it held that there is “no fundamental right to be free of
monopolies.”275  Since “the Slaughter-House decision has never been over-
ruled, and remains a binding precedent which [the courts are] bound to
follow,”276 the Federal Constitution does not include any protections against
monopolies.
The state constitutions diverge from the Federal Constitution regarding
the prohibition of monopolies, as they resoundingly protect this form of eco-
nomic freedom.  In 2018, forty-five of the states—comprising 90% of the
states and 88.6% of the U.S. population277—prohibit the existence of
monopolistic powers in some way within their state constitutions.278  Of
273 Calabresi & Agudo, supra note 5, at 73.
274 Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873).
275 Calabresi & Agudo, supra note 5, at 73.
276 Meadows v. Odom, 356 F. Supp. 2d 639, 642 (M.D. La. 2005) (“While many legal
scholars and lower courts may have criticized portions of the Slaughter-House opinion, it is
equally clear that the Slaughter-House decision has never been overruled, and remains a
binding precedent which this Court is bound to follow.”).
277 See 2010 Census, supra note 12 (272,883,000 out of 308,143,815 residents).
278 See ALA. CONST. art. IV, § 103; ALASKA CONST. art. VIII, §§ 3, 15, 17; ARIZ. CONST. art.
XIV, § 15; ARK. CONST. art. II, § 19; CAL. CONST. art. I, § 7; COLO. CONST. art. II, § 11; id.
art. XV, §§ 4–6, 13; CONN. CONST. art. I, § 1; GA. CONST. art. III, § 6, para. 5(c)(1); HAW.
CONST. art. I, § 21; IDAHO CONST. art. I, § 2; id. art. XI, §§ 1, 5, 12; ILL. CONST. art. I, § 16;
IND. CONST. art. I, § 23; IOWA CONST. art. VIII, § 12; KAN. CONST. Bill of Rights, art. II; KY.
CONST. Bill of Rights, § III; LA. CONST. art. III, § 12; id. art. XII, § 12; ME. CONST. art. I,
§ 23; MD. CONST. Declaration of Rights, art. XLI; MASS. CONST. pt. 1, art. VI; MINN. CONST.
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\94-1\NDL102.txt unknown Seq: 58 21-NOV-18 10:57
106 notre dame law review [vol. 94:1
those, twenty-one states—representing 42% of the states and 36.5% of the
U.S. population279—explicitly reference monopolies or monopolistic power
structures within their relevant constitutional provisions.280  Wyoming’s con-
stitution, for instance, provides that “[p]erpetuities and monopolies are con-
trary to the genius of a free state, and shall not be allowed.  Corporations
being creatures of the state, endowed for the public good with a portion of its
sovereign powers, must be subject to its control.”281  New Mexico uses
another formulation, stating that “[t]he legislature shall enact laws to prevent
trusts, monopolies and combinations in restraint of trade.”282
Out of the remaining twenty-four states with antimonopoly clauses, fif-
teen states had constitutional clauses banning the state from granting any
corporation or group special privileges or immunities that are not equally
granted to all other civilians.283  Virginia’s constitution utilizes a common
formulation, stating that “[t]he General Assembly shall not enact any local,
special, or private law . . . [g]ranting to any private corporation, association,
or individual any special or exclusive right, privilege, or immunity.”284  South
Dakota’s constitution uses another format, holding that “[n]o law shall be
passed granting to any citizen, class of citizens or corporation, privileges or
immunities which upon the same terms shall not equally belong to all citi-
zens or corporations.”285
art. XIII, § 6; MISS. CONST. art. VII, §§ 198, 198-A; MO. CONST. art. I, § 13; id. art. XI, §§ 2,
9, 12; MONT. CONST. art. XIII, §§ 1, 6; NEB. CONST. art. III, § 18; id. art. X, §§ 4, 7; NEV.
CONST. art. XV, § 4; N.H. CONST. pt. 2, art. LXXXIII; N.J. CONST. art. IV, § 7; N.M. CONST.
art. IV, §§ 24, 26, 38; N.Y. CONST. art. III, § 17; N.C. CONST. art. I, § 34; N.D. CONST. art.
XII, § 16; OHIO CONST. art. II, § 1e(B)(1); OKLA. CONST. art. II, § 32; id. art. V, § 44; OR.
CONST. art. I, § 20; PA. CONST. art. I, § 17; S.D. CONST. art. VI, § 18; TENN. CONST. art. I,
§§ 22, 29; TEX. CONST. art. I, § 26; UTAH CONST. art. XII, § 20; VT. CONST. ch. 2, § 63; VA.
CONST. art. IV, § 14; WASH. CONST. art. I, § 12; id. art. XII, § 22; W. VA. CONST. art. XI, §§ 3,
9, 11; WIS. CONST. art. IV, § 31; WYO. CONST. art. I, §§ 30–31.  The five states without any
monopolies clauses are Delaware, Florida, Michigan, Rhode Island, and South Carolina.
279 See 2010 Census, supra note 12 (112,551,100 out of 308,143,815 residents).
280 See ALA. CONST. art. IV, § 103; ARIZ. CONST. art. XIV, § 15; ARK. CONST. art. II, § 19;
GA. CONST. art. III, § 6, para. 5(c)(1); MD. CONST. Declaration of Rights, art. XLI; MINN.
CONST. art. XIII, § 6; MISS. CONST. art. VII, §§ 198, 198-A; MONT. CONST. art. XIII, § 6; NEV.
CONST. art. XV, § 4; N.H. CONST. pt. 2, art. LXXXIII; N.M. CONST. art. IV, § 38; N.C.
CONST. art. I, § 34; N.D. CONST. art. XII, § 16; OHIO CONST. art. I, § 1e(B)(1); OKLA.
CONST. art. II, § 32; id. art. V, § 44; TENN. CONST. art. I, § 22; TEX. CONST. art. I, § 26; UTAH
CONST. art. XII, § 20; VT. CONST. ch. 2, § 63; WASH. CONST. art. XII, § 22; WYO. CONST. art.
I, § 30.
281 WYO. CONST. art. I, § 30.
282 N.M. CONST. art. IV § 38.
283 See CAL. CONST. art. I, § 7; CONN. CONST. art. I, § 1; IND. CONST. art. I, § 23; KY.
CONST. Bill of Rights, § 3; LA. CONST. art. III, § 12; ME. CONST. art. I, § 23; MASS. CONST. pt.
1, art. VI; NEB. CONST. art. III, § 18; N.J. CONST. art. IV, § 7; N.Y. CONST. art. III, § 17; OR.
CONST. art. I, § 20; S.D. CONST. art. VI, § 18; VA. CONST. art. IV, § 14; W. VA. CONST. art. XI,
§ 3; WIS. CONST. art. IV, § 31.
284 VA. CONST. art. IV, § 14.
285 S.D. CONST. art. VI, § 18.
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We count these clauses as a type of antimonopoly clause because they
prohibit the state from granting special monopolistic privileges to any corpo-
ration that are not equally granted to all other citizens and corporations.  We
believe this approach is supported by Justice Field’s dissent in The Slaughter-
House Cases, where he stated:
If exclusive privileges of this character can be granted to a corporation
of seventeen persons, they may, in the discretion of the legislature, be
equally granted to a single individual.  If they may be granted for twenty-five
years, they may be equally granted for a century, and in perpetuity.  If they
may be granted for the landing and keeping of animals intended for sale or
slaughter they may be equally granted for the landing and storing of grain
and other products of the earth, or for any article of commerce.  If they may
be granted for structures in which animal food is prepared for market they
may be equally granted for structures in which farinaceous or vegetable food
is prepared.  They may be granted for any of the pursuits of human industry,
even in its most simple and common forms.  Indeed, upon the theory on
which the exclusive privileges granted by the act in question are sustained,
there is no monopoly, in the most odious form, which may not be
upheld.286
Thus, since these states prohibit the granting of special privileges and
immunities to any corporations or groups, we believe that they have thereby
protected civilians against monopolies within their state constitutions.
By the same token—although these cases are less cut and dry—eight
additional states protect against monopolistic powers in their constitutions by
ensuring that no law making an irrevocable grant of special privileges or
immunities shall be passed.287  Idaho’s constitution, for example, states that
“no special privileges or immunities shall ever be granted that may not be
altered, revoked, or repealed by the legislature,”288 and Missouri’s constitu-
tion provides “[t]hat no . . . law . . . making any irrevocable grant of special
privileges or immunities, can be enacted.”289  Though these clauses appear
to allow the state to grant temporary monopolistic powers, we count them as
antimonopoly clauses overall because they prohibit the perpetual granting of
286 Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 89 (1872) (Field, J., dissenting); see
also id. at 119–22 (Bradley, J., dissenting) (holding that monopolies, which are “exclusive
right[s], given to one person, or corporation, to the exclusion of all others” necessarily
abridge the privileges of those other citizens).
287 See COLO. CONST. art. II, § 11; HAW. CONST. art. I, § 21; IDAHO CONST. art. I, § 2; ILL.
CONST. art. I, § 16; IOWA CONST. art. VIII, § 12; KAN. CONST. Bill of Rights, § 2; MO. CONST.
art. I, § 13; PA. CONST. art. I, § 17.  Iowa’s constitution is interesting because it appears to
try to have its cake and eat it too by including two types of antimonopolistic language.
IOWA CONST. art. VIII, § 12 (“Subject to the provisions of this article, the general assembly
shall have power to amend or repeal all laws for the organization or creation of corpora-
tions, or granting of special or exclusive privileges or immunities, by a vote of two thirds of
each branch of the general assembly; and no exclusive privileges, except as in this article
provided, shall ever be granted.”).  We count Iowa here as having the second, more limited
form of antimonopoly language, just to be conservative with our analysis.
288 IDAHO CONST. art. I, § 2.
289 MO. CONST. art. I, § 13.
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special privileges or immunities.  In that sense, these eight states do have
antimonopoly clauses in their state constitutions, though the clauses are less
powerful than the ones featured in their counterparts discussed above.
It is worth noting that three of those eight states also had additional
clauses related to limiting monopolistic powers in their state constitutions,
such as Colorado’s constitution, which provided that “[n]o telegraph com-
pany shall consolidate with, or hold a controlling interest in, the stock or
bonds of any other telegraph company owning or having the control of a
competing line, or acquire, by purchase or otherwise, any other competing
line of telegraph,”290 and that “[n]o railroad corporation, or the lessees or
managers thereof, shall consolidate its stock, property or franchises with any
other railroad corporation owning or having under its control a parallel or
competing line.”291
The final state with antimonopoly language in its constitution is Alaska.
Alaska’s constitution discusses monopolies within the context of natural
resources, holding that “[w]herever occurring in their natural state, fish,
wildlife, and waters are reserved to the people for common use,”292 and that
“[l]aws and regulations governing the use or disposal of natural resources
shall apply equally to all persons similarly situated with reference to the sub-
ject matter and purpose to be served by the law or regulation.”293  Alaska’s
constitution also prohibits monopolistic fisheries, stating:
No exclusive right or special privilege of fishery shall be created or
authorized in the natural waters of the State.  This section does not restrict
the power of the State to limit entry into any fishery for purposes of resource
conservation, to prevent economic distress among fishermen and those
dependent upon them for a livelihood and to promote the efficient develop-
ment of aquaculture in the State.294
Since Alaska provides these robust protections for natural resources and
prohibits the existence of monopolistic forces in the fishery industry, we
count it as a constitution with antimonopoly language.  Thus, overall, forty-
five states include antimonopoly clauses in their state constitution in one
form or another.
This is a fairly large shift from the legal situation that existed in 1868
when the Fourteenth Amendment was ratified.  At that time, only twenty-two
out of thirty-seven states—representing 59.5% of the states—had some form
of antimonopoly clause, and only five states had clauses directly using the
290 COLO. CONST. art. XV, § 13.
291 Id. art. XV, § 5.  Other states aside from these eight also included clauses about
monopolies that referred to particular industries.  For example, West Virginia discussed
railroad monopolies. W. VA. CONST. art. XI, § 11 (“No railroad corporation shall consoli-
date its stock, property or franchise with any other railroad owning a parallel or competing
line, or obtain the possession or control of such parallel or competing line, by lease or
other contract, without the permission of the Legislature.”).
292 ALASKA CONST. art. VIII, § 3.
293 Id. art. VIII, § 17.
294 Id. art. VIII, § 15.
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word “monopoly.”295  In 1791, when the Federal Bill of Rights was ratified,
only two out of fourteen states had clauses barring monopolies,296 even
though Thomas Jefferson strongly but unsuccessfully urged James Madison
to include one in the Federal Bill of Rights.
FIGURE 19.  LIMITING MONOPOLIES IN STATE CONSTITUTIONS
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The right to be free of either government-created monopolies or of pri-
vate monopoly power appears to have grown up or gained traction almost
entirely in the modern era.  We see this as a striking finding.
3. Legal Recourse for Property-Related Injuries
Though the Federal Constitution does not include an equivalent analog,
over three-quarters of the states provide a right to legal recourse for any inju-
ries sustain related to private property.  Indeed, thirty-nine states—represent-
ing 78% of the states—contain these legal recourse clauses.297  Alabama’s
295 See Calabresi & Agudo, supra note 5, at 73.  Note that in our earlier analysis, we only
coded a state as having a monopoly clause in its state constitution if that clause expressly
used the word “monopoly.” Id.  There were only five such states. Id. We now view that
approach as too narrow and believe that twenty-two of the states in 1868 should be consid-
ered as having an antimonopoly clause.  Those states are: Alabama, Arkansas, Connecticut,
Illinois, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Missouri,
Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, North Carolina, Ohio, Oregon, Tennessee, Texas,
Vermont, and Virginia.
296 Calabresi, Agudo & Dore, supra note 5, at 1506.
297 See ALA. CONST. art. I, § 13; ARIZ. CONST. art. II, § 11; ARK. CONST. art. II, § 13; COLO.
CONST. art. II, § 6; CONN. CONST. art. I, § 10; DEL. CONST. art. I, § 9; FLA. CONST. art. I, § 21;
IDAHO CONST. art. I, § 18; ILL. CONST. art. I, § 12; IND. CONST. art. I, § 12; KAN. CONST. Bill
of Rights, § 18; KY. CONST. Bill of Rights, § 14; LA. CONST. art. I, § 22; ME. CONST. art. I,
§ 19; MD. CONST. Declaration of Rights, art. XIX; MASS. CONST. pt. 1, art. XI; MINN. CONST.
art. I, § 8; MISS. CONST. art. III, § 24; MO. CONST. art. I, § 14; MONT. CONST. art. II, § 16;
NEB. CONST. art. I, § 13; N.H. CONST. pt. 1, art. XIV; N.C. CONST. art. I, § 18; N.D. CONST.
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constitution utilizes a typical approach, holding “that every person, for any
injury done him, in his lands, goods, person, or reputation, shall have a rem-
edy by due process of law; and right and justice shall be administered without
sale, denial, or delay.”298  Some states used slightly modified language.  One
such state is Wisconsin, and its constitution states that:
Every person is entitled to a certain remedy in the laws for all injuries, or
wrongs which he may receive in his person, property, or character; he ought
to obtain justice freely, and without being obliged to purchase it, completely
and without denial, promptly and without delay, conformably to the laws.299
Thus, thirty-nine states include provisions in their constitutions mandating
that the court system address any injuries related to private property.300
FIGURE 20.  LEGAL RECOURSE CLAUSES IN STATE CONSTITUTIONS
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Six out of twelve state constitutions written between 1776 and 1791 had
1egal recourse clauses.301  When the Fourteenth Amendment was ratified in
1868, twenty-eight states out of thirty seven states had legal recourse
clauses.302  Today, the percentage of states with such clauses has increased
slightly to thirty-nine states out of fifty—78% of the states in 2018, compared
to 76% percent in 1868.
art. I, § 9; OHIO CONST. art. I, § 16; OKLA. CONST. art. II, § 6; OR. CONST. art. I, § 10; PA.
CONST. art. I, § 11; R.I. CONST. art. I, § 5; S.C. CONST. art. I, § 9; S.D. CONST. art. VI, § 20;
TENN. CONST. art. I, § 17; TEX. CONST. art. I, § 13 (does not specifically mention delay);
UTAH CONST. art. I, § 11; VT. CONST. ch. 1, art. IV; WASH. CONST. art. I, § 10; W. VA. CONST.
art. III, § 17; WIS. CONST. art. I, § 9; WYO. CONST. art. I, § 8.
298 ALA. CONST. art. I, § 13.
299 WIS. CONST. art. I, § 9.
300 Among these thirty-nine state constitutions, only Texas’s clause fails to mention
delay or promptness. TEX. CONST. art. I, § 13.
301 Calabresi, Agudo & Dore, supra note 5, at 1506–07.
302 See Calabresi & Agudo, supra note 5, at 73–74.
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H. The Right to Trial by Jury
The next major right protected in the Federal Constitution is the right
to trial by jury.  Specifically, the Sixth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution
guarantees the right to trial by jury in all criminal cases,303 and the Seventh
Amendment ensures that jury trials are used in all civil- or common-law suits
where more than twenty dollars is at issue.304  We turn now to a discussion of
how the states treat this fundamental American right.
1. Criminal Juries
In another display of constitutional homogeneity, all fifty states protect a
right to trial by jury in criminal cases within their state constitutions.305  Kan-
sas’s constitution uses a typical formulation, holding that “[t]he right of trial
by jury shall be inviolate.”306  Other states include additional rules about
criminal jury trials in their constitutional clauses, such as giving guidelines
about the appropriate size of juries and establishing rules under which the
parties to a case may waive their right to trial by jury.  Idaho’s constitution,
for instance, states that:
The right of trial by jury shall remain inviolate; but in civil actions, three-
fourths of the jury may render a verdict, and the legislature may provide that
in all cases of misdemeanors five-sixths of the jury may render a verdict.  A
trial by jury may be waived in all criminal cases, by the consent of all parties,
expressed in open court, and in civil actions by the consent of the parties,
signified in such manner as may be prescribed by law.  In civil actions the
jury may consist of twelve or of any number less than twelve upon which the
parties may agree in open court.  Provided, that in cases of misdemeanor
and in civil actions within the jurisdiction of any court inferior to the district
303 U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
304 U.S. CONST. amend. VII.
305 See ALA. CONST. art. I, § 11; ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 11; ARIZ. CONST. art. II, § 23; ARK.
CONST. art. II, §§ 7, 10; CAL. CONST. art. I, § 16; COLO. CONST. art. II, § 23; CONN. CONST.
art. I, § 19; DEL. CONST. art. I, §§ 4, 7; FLA. CONST. art. I, §§ 16, 22; GA. CONST. art. I, § 1,
para. 11; HAW. CONST. art. I, § 14; IDAHO CONST. art. I, § 7; ILL. CONST. art. I, § 13; IND.
CONST. art. I, §§ 13, 19; IOWA CONST. art. I, §§ 9, 10; KAN. CONST. Bill of Rights, §§ 5, 10; KY.
CONST. Bill of Rights, § 7; LA. CONST. art. I, § 17; ME. CONST. art. I, § 6; MD. CONST. Decla-
ration of Rights, arts. V, XXI; MASS. CONST. pt. 1, arts. XII, XV; MICH. CONST. art. I, §§ 14,
20; MINN. CONST. art. I, §§ 4, 6; MISS. CONST. art. III, § 31; MO. CONST. art. I, §§ 18(a),
22(a); MONT. CONST. art. II, §§ 24, 26; NEB. CONST. art. I, §§ 6, 11; NEV. CONST. art. I, § 3;
N.H. CONST. pt. 1, art. XVI; N.J. CONST. art. I, §§ 9, 10; N.M. CONST. art. II, §§ 12, 14; N.Y.
CONST. art. I, § 2; N.C. CONST. art. I, § 24; N.D. CONST. art. I, § 13; OHIO CONST. art. I, §§ 5,
10; OKLA. CONST. art. II, §§ 19, 20; OR. CONST. art. I, §§ 11, 16; PA. CONST. art. 1, §§ 6, 9;
R.I. CONST. art. I, §§ 10, 15; S.C. CONST. art. I, § 14; S.D. CONST. art. VI, §§ 6, 7; TENN.
CONST. art. I, §§ 6, 9; TEX. CONST. art. I, §§ 10, 15; UTAH CONST. art. I, §§ 10, 12; VT.
CONST. ch. 1, arts. X, XII; VA. CONST. art. I, § 8; WASH. CONST. art. I, §§ 21, 22; W. VA.
CONST. art. III, §§ 13, 14; WIS. CONST. art. I, §§ 5, 7; WYO. CONST. art. I, §§ 9, 10.
306 KAN. CONST. Bill of Rights, § 5.
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court, whether such case or action be tried in such inferior court or in dis-
trict court, the jury shall consist of not more than six.307
In contrast, Hawaii’s constitution couches the right to criminal juries in
a clause that lists multiple other jury-related rights guarantees.  It holds:
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy
and public trial by an impartial jury of the district wherein the crime shall
have been committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained
by law, or of such other district to which the prosecution may be removed
with the consent of the accused . . . .308
In this sense, the right to trial by jury in criminal cases is clearly consid-
ered a universal right in 2018, at least according to the state constitutions.
Eleven out of twelve states that wrote new constitutions between 1776
and 1791 included a right to jury trial in criminal cases—a three-quarters
Article V consensus.309  Moreover, a unanimous majority of thirty-seven states
guaranteed the right to criminal jury trials in 1868 when the Fourteenth
Amendment was ratified.310  It would appear from looking only at the bare
text of state constitutional law that not much has changed since 1868.  In
practice, however, only about 5% of all criminal cases end up being tried by a
jury, while the other 95% are plea bargained with prosecutors.  In our view,
part of the reason for this shift is the high expense of modern jury trials,
which we believe have a high cost due to the use of ridiculous rules on voir
dire—and with respect to peremptory challenges—all of which tend to make
criminal jury trials for everyone unaffordable.  Legislatures have responded
to this situation by giving enormous charging discretion to prosecutors at
both the federal and the state level, which is why 95% of all cases end up
being plea bargained.  Matters are not helped by the fact that 95% of all jury
trials end with a conviction and almost no convictions are overturned by
courts on appeal.  An innocent criminal defendant threatened with thirty
years of imprisonment unless he pleads guilty to a crime, which leads to five
year of imprisonment, will choose to plead guilty.  This is a bad problem
commonly referred to as the “trial tax”311 which we believe urgently needs to
be fixed.
Modern civil-law countries like France and Germany use a mixed bench
for criminal trials, such as by using three professional judges and nine lay-
307 IDAHO CONST. art. I, § 7.
308 HAW. CONST. art. I, § 14.
309 Calabresi, Agudo & Dore, supra note 5, at 1510–11.
310 See Calabresi & Agudo, supra note 5, at 76–77.  In our original analysis, we only
coded thirty-six states as having a guarantee to a criminal jury trial in their state constitu-
tions in 1868. Id. On further review, we believe this was an undercount and that a unani-
mous thirty-seven states—including Louisiana—guaranteed the right to jury trials in
criminal cases in their constitutions in 1868. See, e.g., LA. CONST. of 1868 tit. 1, art. VI.
311 See, e.g., Portia Allen-Kyle, The Lakeith Smith Case Demonstrates the System’s Brokenness,
ACLU (April 12, 2018), https://www.aclu.org/blog/smart-justice/lakeith-smith-case-dem
onstrates-systems-brokenness (“[S]entences after trial are much harsher than those given
to people who accept plea bargains.  It is often called a ‘trial tax’ . . . .”).
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person judges who all deliberate together in the jury room to decide a case.
Under such a system, conviction requires a vote of at least eight–four that the
defendant is guilty.  In our view, there are many reasons to think that a mixed
bench system may be preferable to the jury trial system that we use in
America today.  One such reason is that while there is some plea bargaining
that now goes on in Germany, Italy, and France, plea bargaining and the
“trial tax” are not nearly as big of a problem in those countries as they are in
the United States.312
FIGURE 21.  RIGHT TO CRIMINAL JURIES IN STATE CONSTITUTIONS
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2. Civil Juries
Forty-nine states—representing 98% of the states and 98.5% of the U.S.
population313—guarantee the right to jury trials in all civil- or common-law
cases within their state constitutions.314  Thirty-six of those states—represent-
312 See Yue Ma, Prosecutorial Discretion and Plea Bargaining in the United States, France,
Germany, and Italy: A Comparative Perspective, 12 INT’L CRIM. JUST. REV. 22, 24 (2002).
313 See 2010 Census, supra note 12 (303,610,443 out of 308,143,815 residents).
314 See ALA. CONST. art. I, § 11; ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 16; ARIZ. CONST. art. II, § 23; ARK.
CONST. art. II, § 7; CAL. CONST. art. I, § 16; COLO. CONST. art. II, § 23; CONN. CONST. art. I,
§ 19; DEL. CONST. art. I, § 4; FLA. CONST. art. I, § 22; GA. CONST. art. I, § 1, para. 11; HAW.
CONST. art. I, § 13; IDAHO CONST. art. I, § 7; ILL. CONST. art. I, § 13; IND. CONST. art. I, § 20;
IOWA CONST. art. I, § 9; KAN. CONST. Bill of Rights, § 5; KY. CONST. Bill of Rights, § 7; ME.
CONST. art. I, § 20; MD. CONST. Declaration of Rights, art. V; MASS. CONST. pt. 1, art. XV;
MICH. CONST. art. I, § 14; id. art. IV, § 44; MINN. CONST. art. I, § 4; MISS. CONST. art. III,
§ 31; MO. CONST. art. I, § 22(a); MONT. CONST. art. II, § 26; NEB. CONST. art. I, § 6; NEV.
CONST. art. I, § 3; N.H. CONST. pt. 1, art. XX; N.J. CONST. art. I, § 9; N.M. CONST. art. II,
§ 12; N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 2; N.C. CONST. art. I, § 25; N.D. CONST. art. I, § 13; OHIO CONST.
art. I, § 5; OKLA. CONST. art. II, § 19; OR. CONST. art. I, § 17; PA. CONST. art. I, § 6; R.I.
CONST. art. I, § 15; S.C. CONST. art. I, § 14; S.D. CONST. art. VI, § 6; TENN. CONST. art. I, § 6;
TEX. CONST. art. I, § 15; UTAH CONST. art. I, § 10; VT. CONST. ch. 1, art. XII; VA. CONST. art.
I, § 11; WASH. CONST. art. I, § 21; W. VA. CONST. art. III, § 13; WIS. CONST. art. I, § 5; WYO.
CONST. art. I, § 9.  The state without a civil juries clause is Louisiana.
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ing 72% of the states and 67.4% of the U.S. population315—explicitly men-
tioned the right to a civil jury trial in the text of their relevant constitutional
clauses.316  Oregon’s constitution, for instance, provided that “[i]n all civil
cases the right of Trial by Jury shall remain inviolate.”317  The other thirteen
states did not explicitly mention civil juries.  Illinois was one such state, and
its constitution holds that “[t]he right of trial by jury as heretofore enjoyed
shall remain inviolate.”318
As with the criminal jury clauses, some states provide additional details
and guidelines about the right to a civil jury trial within their relevant consti-
tutional clauses.  Michigan’s constitution, as an example, states that “[t]he
legislature may authorize a trial by a jury of less than 12 jurors in civil
cases.”319  The Minnesota Constitution gives even greater detail about civil
jury trials, holding that:
315 See 2010 Census, supra note 12 (207,744,099 out of 308,143,815 residents).
316 See ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 16; ARIZ. CONST. art. II, § 23; ARK. CONST. art. II, § 7; CAL.
CONST. art. I, § 16; COLO. CONST. art. II, § 23; GA. CONST. art. I, § 1, para. 11; HAW. CONST.
art. I, § 13; IDAHO CONST. art. I, § 7; IND. CONST. art. I, § 20; ME. CONST. art. I, § 20; MD.
CONST. Declaration of Rights, art. V; MASS. CONST. pt. 1, art. XV; MICH. CONST. art. I, § 14;
id. art. IV, § 44; MINN. CONST. art. I, § 4; MISS. CONST. art. III, § 31; MO. CONST. art. I,
§ 22(a); MONT. CONST. art. II, § 26; NEB. CONST. art. I, § 6; NEV. CONST. art. I, § 3; N.H.
CONST. pt. 1, art. XX; N.J. CONST. art. I, § 9; N.M. CONST. art. II, § 12; N.Y. CONST. art. I,
§ 2; N.C. CONST. art. I, § 25; N.D. CONST. art. I, § 13; OHIO CONST. art. I, § 5; OKLA. CONST.
art. II, § 19; OR. CONST. art. I, § 17; PA. CONST. art. I, § 6; R.I. CONST. art. I, § 15; S.D.
CONST. art. VI, § 6; UTAH CONST. art. I, § 10; WASH. CONST. art. I, § 21; W. VA. CONST. art.
III, § 13; WIS. CONST. art. I, § 5; WYO. CONST. art. I, § 9.
317 OR. CONST. art. I, § 17.
318 ILL. CONST. art. I, § 13.  We count this clause as protecting a right to civil juries
because, as a historical matter, the right to a jury trial in both civil and criminal cases was
already established in Illinois prior to the drafting of this constitutional clause, making the
“heretofore” reference include both criminal and civil juries as a basic right. See Kakos v.
Butler, 63 N.E.3d 901, 906 (Ill. 2016) (“This court has long interpreted the phrase ‘as
heretofore enjoyed’ to mean ‘the right of a trial by jury as it existed under the common law
and as enjoyed at the time of the adoption of the respective Illinois constitutions.’” (quot-
ing People v. Lobb, 161 N.E.2d 325, 331 (Ill. 1959))).
Other states, like Kansas, also provide general protections of the right to a jury trial in
their state constitutions. KAN. CONST. Bill of Rights, § 5.  Given the “backdrop” of English
common law that helped shape the legal system in America, we think these general protec-
tions imply a right to both criminal and civil juries, since both rights were protected in
England. See Calabresi & Agudo, supra note 5, at 77.  This view “is confirmed by examina-
tion of Noah Webster’s authoritative 1828 American Dictionary of the English Language,”
which defines petty juries
as usually consisting “of twelve men” who “attend courts to try matters of fact in
civil causes, and to decide both the law and the fact in criminal prosecutions.”
The original public meaning of a clause generally protecting the right to a jury
trial would thus most likely have been understood . . . as applying to civil as well as
criminal juries.
Id. at 78 (quoting NOAH WEBSTER, AN AMERICAN DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE
(1828)).
319 MICH. CONST. art. IV, § 44.
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The right of trial by jury shall remain inviolate, and shall extend to all cases
at law without regard to the amount in controversy.  A jury trial may be
waived by the parties in all cases in the manner prescribed by law.  The legis-
lature may provide that the agreement of five-sixths of a jury in a civil action
or proceeding, after not less than six hours’ deliberation, is a sufficient ver-
dict.  The legislature may provide for the number of jurors in a civil action
or proceeding, provided that a jury have at least six members.320
As such, the right to a civil jury trial appears to be well established within
the state constitutions.
The lone state without a right to civil jury trials—the southern state of
Louisiana—is the only state in the Union with a tie to the civil-law legal tradi-
tion of France and Spain under which there is no right to jury trial, rather
than the common-law tradition, which originated in England and Wales.321
A crucial difference between the civil-law and common-law traditions is that
the civil-law tradition “does not rely on jury trials.”322  It is thus understanda-
ble that Louisiana, which was once a part of Spain and then a part of
France,323 would decline to offer a right to civil jury trial.
Twelve out of twelve states that wrote new constitutions between 1776
and 1791 included the right to civil jury trial.324  Moreover, thirty-six states
out of thirty-seven guaranteed a right to civil jury trial in 1868 when the Four-
teenth Amendment was adopted.325  There can be no question but that the
right to civil jury trial is deeply rooted in American history and tradition.
The situation in reality, however, is much more complex.  No civil-law nation
provides a right to civil jury trial, and two-thirds of the world’s people proba-
bly live in civil-law countries with no right to civil jury trial.  England and
Wales have abandoned the use of civil jury trials in all civil cases except for
slander and libel cases.326  Canada and Australia have also abandoned the
use of civil jury trial.327  Thus the United States stands alone among the
countries of the world in making any use at all of civil jury trial, and even in
the United States, the institution is dying out.  We do not use civil jury trials
in administrative law cases, and jury trial in civil cases has been mostly elimi-
320 MINN. CONST. art. I, § 4.
321 See Calabresi & Agudo, supra note 5, at 77 (citing Christopher Osakwe, Louisiana
Civil Law: The Cinderella of American Law, 60 TUL. L. REV. 1105, 1105–06 (1986)).
322 Id.; see also Douglas G. Smith, Structural and Functional Aspects of the Jury: Comparative
Analysis and Proposals for Reform, 48 ALA. L. REV. 441, 461 (1997) (explaining that, although
they experimented to some extent with jury trials, most countries with a civil-law tradition
have abandoned the practice in favor of “a ‘mixed court’ composed of a panel having both
professional and lay judges”).
323 See Robert Lee, The True Cost of the Louisiana Purchase, SLATE (Mar. 1, 2017), http://
www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/history/2017/03/how_much_did_the_louisi
ana_purchase_actually_cost.html (“Spain had ceded the Louisiana Territory to France,
and [France], in turn, offloaded it to American diplomats . . . .”).
324 Calabresi, Agudo & Dore, supra note 5, at 1511–12.
325 See Calabresi & Agudo, supra note 5, at 77–78.
326 See Gerald Walpin, America’s Failing Civil Justice System: Can We Learn from Other Coun-
tries?, 41 N.Y. L. SCH. L. REV. 647, 652 (1997).
327 Id.
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nated by the combination of arbitration agreements and settling cases before
they go to trial.  It may be only a matter of time before the civil jury trial
disappears in the United States, despite these state constitutional protections.
The U.S. Supreme Court also has held, incorrectly in our view, that there is
no right to civil jury trial in administrative law cases.328  Since almost all
important federal civil cases involve administrative law rather than the com-
mon law, the Supreme Court has, in effect, abolished the right to civil jury
trial even though it has been supported by an Article V majority of three-
quarters of the states in 1791, 1868, and 2018.
FIGURE 22.  RIGHT TO CIVIL JURIES IN STATE CONSTITUTIONS
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I. Rights Against Excessive Punishment
The Eighth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution focuses on the impor-
tant topic of protecting civilians from excessive punishment.329  Specifically,
it forbids the state from exacting on the civilian population excessive bail,
excessive fines, and cruel and unusual punishment.  However, it is worth not-
ing that:
One ambiguity of the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause is whether it
forbids all disproportionate punishments or only a certain set of punish-
ments that were thought to be cruel and unusual 200 years ago, like drawing
and quartering.  Debate has also focused on the question of whether the
Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause forbids practices that would be con-
demned, as Trop v. Dulles says, under the “evolving standards of decency that
mark the progress of a maturing society.”330
328 Atlas Roofing Co. v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm’n, 430 U.S. 442,
455 (1977).
329 U.S. CONST. amend. VIII (“Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines
imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.”).
330 See Calabresi & Agudo, supra note 5, at 81 (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101
(1958)).
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Unsurprisingly, the states have a lot to say on this subject within their
2018 state constitutions, which we describe in greater detail below.
1. Excessive Bail
Forty-eight states in 2018—representing 96% of the states and 89.7% of
the U.S. population331—provided that excessive bail ought not to be permit-
ted within their state constitutions.332  Many of the states paired up their
protection against excessive bail with their protection against excessive fines
and cruel and unusual punishment, merging their excessive punishment
clause into one neat package.  This format often closely tracked the Eighth
Amendment.333  One typical example, Iowa’s constitution, states that
“[e]xcessive bail shall not be required; excessive fines shall not be imposed,
and cruel and unusual punishment shall not be inflicted.”334  Other states
kept their excessive punishment clauses separate.  Alabama’s constitution, for
instance, uses an independent clause for the protection against excessive
bail, holding “[t]hat all persons shall, before conviction, be bailable by suffi-
cient sureties, except for capital offenses, when the proof is evident or the
presumption great; and that excessive bail shall not in any case be
required.”335
Nine states out of twelve, which wrote constitutions between 1776 and
1791, recognized a right to be free of demands for excessive bail.336  The
right to be free of demands for excessive bail was also recognized by thirty-six
out of thirty-seven state constitutions when the Fourteenth Amendment was
ratified in 1868.337  This is an Article V supermajority.  The right to be free of
331 See 2010 Census, supra note 12 (276,511,873 out of 308,143,815 residents).
332 See ALA. CONST. art. I, § 16; ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 12; ARIZ. CONST. art. II, § 15; ARK.
CONST. art. II, § 9; CAL. CONST. art. I, § 12; COLO. CONST. art. II, § 20; CONN. CONST. art. I,
§ 8; DEL. CONST. art. I, § 11; GA. CONST. art. I, § 1, para. 17; HAW. CONST. art. I, § 12; IDAHO
CONST. art. I, § 6; IND. CONST. art. I, § 16; IOWA CONST. art. I, § 17; KAN. CONST. Bill of
Rights, § 9; KY. CONST. Bill of Rights, § 17; LA. CONST. art. I, § 18; ME. CONST. art. I, § 9;
MD. CONST. Declaration of Rights, art. XXV; MASS. CONST. pt. 1, art. XXVI; MICH. CONST.
art. I, § 16; MINN. CONST. art. I, § 5; MISS. CONST. art. III, § 29; MO. CONST. art. I, § 21;
MONT. CONST. art. II, § 22; NEB. CONST. art. I, § 9; NEV. CONST. art. I, § 6; N.H. CONST. pt.
1, art. XXXIII; N.J. CONST. art. I, § 12; N.M. CONST. art. II, § 13; N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 5; N.C.
CONST. art. I, § 27; N.D. CONST. art. I, § 11; OHIO CONST. art. I, § 9; OKLA. CONST. art. II,
§ 9; OR. CONST. art. I, § 16; PA. CONST. art. I, § 13; R.I. CONST. art. I, § 8; S.C. CONST. art. I,
§ 15; S.D. CONST. art. VI, § 23; TENN. CONST. art. I, § 16; TEX. CONST. art. I, § 13; UTAH
CONST. art. I, § 9; VT. CONST. ch. 2, § 40; VA. CONST. art. I, § 9; WASH. CONST. art. I, § 14; W.
VA. CONST. art. III, § 5; WIS. CONST. art. I, § 6; WYO. CONST. art. I, § 14.  The two states
without an excessive bail clause are Florida and Illinois.
333 U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
334 IOWA CONST. art. I, § 17.
335 ALA. CONST. art. I, § 16.
336 Calabresi, Agudo & Dore, supra note 5, at 1516–17.
337 See Calabresi & Agudo, supra note 5, at 81–82.  Note that in our original analysis, we
counted all thirty-seven states as having excessive bail clauses. Id. We now revise that num-
ber to thirty-six and argue that the Illinois Constitution did not contain an excessive bail
clause in 1868.
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demands for excessive bail is thus a right deeply rooted in American history
and tradition as well as by a huge consensus of the states today, in 2018.
FIGURE 23.  RIGHT AGAINST EXCESSIVE BAIL IN STATE CONSTITUTIONS
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2. Excessive Fines
Forty-eight states in 2018—comprising 96% of the states and 94.4% of
the U.S. population338—provide in their state constitutions that excessive
fines cannot be imposed as a form of punishment upon criminal defend-
ants.339  Wyoming utilizes a typical clause, stating that “[e]xcessive bail shall
not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor shall cruel or unusual pun-
ishment be inflicted.”340  Vermont’s constitution includes an unusual formu-
lation, holding that “all fines shall be proportioned to the offences.”341  We
count Vermont’s clause as an excessive fines clause because as a definitional
matter, a fine that is proportioned to the offense cannot be excessive.  In that
338 See 2010 Census, supra note 12 (290,779,811 out of 308,143,815 residents).
339 See ALA. CONST. art. I, § 15; ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 12; ARIZ. CONST. art. II, § 15; ARK.
CONST. art. II, § 9; CAL. CONST. art. I, § 17; COLO. CONST. art. II, § 20; CONN. CONST. art. I,
§ 8; DEL. CONST. art. I, § 11; FLA. CONST. art. I, § 17; GA. CONST. art. I, § 1, para. 17; HAW.
CONST. art. I, § 12; IDAHO CONST. art. I, § 6; IND. CONST. art. I, § 16; IOWA CONST. art. I,
§ 17; KAN. CONST. Bill of Rights, § 9; KY. CONST. Bill of Rights, § 17; ME. CONST. art. I, § 9;
MD. CONST. Declaration of Rights, art. XXV; MASS. CONST. pt. 1, art. XXVI; MICH. CONST.
art. I, § 16; MINN. CONST. art. I, § 5; MISS. CONST. art. III, § 28; MO. CONST. art. I, § 21;
MONT. CONST. art. II, § 22; NEB. CONST. art. I, § 9; NEV. CONST. art. I, § 6; N.H. CONST. pt.
1, art. XXXIII; N.J. CONST. art. I, § 12; N.M. CONST. art. II, § 13; N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 5; N.C.
CONST. art. I, § 27; N.D. CONST. art. I, § 11; OHIO CONST. art. I, § 9; OKLA. CONST. art. II,
§ 9; OR. CONST. art. I, § 16; PA. CONST. art. I, § 13; R.I. CONST. art. I, § 8; S.C. CONST. art. I,
§ 15; S.D. CONST. art. VI, § 23; TENN. CONST. art. I, § 16; TEX. CONST. art. I, § 13; UTAH
CONST. art. I, § 9; VT. CONST. ch. 2, § 39; VA. CONST. art. I, § 9; WASH. CONST. art. I, § 14; W.
VA. CONST. art. III, § 5; WIS. CONST. art. I, § 6; WYO. CONST. art. I, § 14.
340 WYO. CONST. art. I, § 14.
341 VT. CONST. ch. 2, § 39.
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sense, Vermont’s constitution necessarily protects civilians against excessive
fines.
The two states without an excessive fines clause are Illinois and Louisi-
ana.  This is interesting because while Illinois did not have an excessive bail
or an excessive fines clause, Louisiana’s constitution did contain an excessive
bail clause.  In that sense, it appears that Louisiana’s constitution values pro-
tecting against excessive bail, but does not value protecting against excessive
fines as a form of punishment.  On the flip side, Florida’s constitution did
not contain an excessive bail clause but does contain an excessive fines
clause, making it a mirror image of Louisiana.  We are unsure what implica-
tions this observation has, but thought it was worth pointing out.
FIGURE 24.  RIGHT AGAINST EXCESSIVE FINES IN STATE CONSTITUTIONS
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Ten states out of twelve that wrote new constitutions between 1776 and
1791 banned excessive fines.342  Thirty-five states out of thirty-seven recog-
nized the right to be free of excessive fines in 1868 when the Fourteenth
Amendment was ratified.343  The right to be free of excessive fines is thus a
right that is deeply rooted in American history and tradition as well as by a
huge consensus of the states today, just like the right to be free from exces-
sive bail.
3. Cruel and Unusual Punishment
Historically, the ban on cruel and unusual punishment has its roots in
the English Bill of Rights of 1689.344  Indeed, the language of the English Bill
of Rights of 1689 was near-exactly replicated in the Federal Eighth Amend-
342 Calabresi, Agudo & Dore, supra note 5, at 1517–18.
343 See Calabresi & Agudo, supra note 5, at 82.
344 An Act Declaring the Rights and Liberties of the Subject, and Setting the Succession
of the Crown (Bill of Rights), 1689, 1 W & M, c. 2 (Eng.) (“[E]xcessive Baile ought not to
be required nor excessive Fines imposed nor cruell and unusuall Punishments inflicted.”).
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ment,345 which was then reproduced in many state constitutions.346  Pres-
ently, and throughout the longstanding history of the ban on cruel and
unusual punishment, spirited debates have been waged over which punish-
ments ought to be rightfully considered cruel and unusual.347  In particular,
much of the debate centers on whether the death penalty should be seen as
cruel or unusual, and whether it should be prohibited on that basis.348
Forty-seven of the states in 2018—representing 94% of the states and
94.5% of the U.S. population349—had clauses in their state constitutions ban-
ning cruel and unusual punishment.350  A typical formulation, such as the
one used in Ohio’s constitution, holds that “[e]xcessive bail shall not be
required; nor excessive fines imposed; nor cruel and unusual punishments
inflicted.”351  There were slight differences in how the states phrased their
clauses.  In particular, some states banned “cruel and unusual punish-
345 U.S. CONST. amend. VIII (“Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines
imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.”).
346 E.g., WASH. CONST. art. I, § 14 (“Excessive bail shall not be required, excessive fines
imposed, nor cruel punishment inflicted.”).
347 See, e.g., Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 281 (1972) (Brennan, J., concurring)
(describing four possible principles that could be used to determine whether a given pun-
ishment is cruel or unusual, including whether or not the given punishment represents an
affront to human dignity, whether the punishment is “inflicted in wholly arbitrary fashion,”
whether the punishment is “clearly and totally rejected throughout society,” and whether
the punishment is “patently unnecessary”); see also Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 169–73
(1976) (explaining the history of the ban on cruel and unusual punishment and the evolu-
tion of the debate about what constitutes cruel and unusual punishment in American
jurisprudence).
348 The Supreme Court has repeatedly found that the death penalty does not constitute
cruel and unusual punishment, but left-leaning judges have continued to dissent in these
cases. See, e.g., Glossip v. Gross, 135 S. Ct. 2726, 2776–77 (2015) (Breyer, J., dissenting)
(calling for a full briefing on whether the death penalty violates the Constitution and stat-
ing that it is highly likely, in his view, that the death penalty does violate the Eighth
Amendment).
349 See 2010 Census, supra note 12 (291,113,345 out of 308,143,815 residents).
350 See ALA. CONST. art. I, § 15; ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 12; ARIZ. CONST. art. II, § 15; ARK.
CONST. art. II, § 9; CAL. CONST. art. I, § 17; COLO. CONST. art. II, § 20; DEL. CONST. art. I,
§ 11; FLA. CONST. art. I, § 17; GA. CONST. art. I, § 1, para. 17; HAW. CONST. art. I, § 12;
IDAHO CONST. art. I, § 6; IND. CONST. art. I, § 16; IOWA CONST. art. I, § 17; KAN. CONST. Bill
of Rights, § 9; KY. CONST. Bill of Rights, § 17; LA. CONST. art. I, § 20; ME. CONST. art. I, § 9;
MD. CONST. Declaration of Rights, art. XXV; MASS. CONST. pt. 1, art. XXVI; id. arts. of
amend. CXVI; MICH. CONST. art. I, § 16; MINN. CONST. art. I, § 5; MISS. CONST. art. III, § 28;
MO. CONST. art. I, § 21; MONT. CONST. art. II, § 22; NEB. CONST. art. I, § 9; NEV. CONST. art.
I, § 6; N.H. CONST. pt. 1, art. XXXIII; N.J. CONST. art. I, § 12; N.M. CONST. art. II, § 13; N.Y.
CONST. art. I, § 5; N.C. CONST. art. I, § 27; N.D. CONST. art. I, § 11; OHIO CONST. art. I, § 9;
OKLA. CONST. art. II, § 9; OR. CONST. art. I, § 16; PA. CONST. art. I, § 13; R.I. CONST. art. I,
§ 8; S.C. CONST. art. I, § 15; S.D. CONST. art. VI, § 23; TENN. CONST. art. I, § 16; TEX. CONST.
art. I, § 13; UTAH CONST. art. I, § 9; VA. CONST. art. I, § 9; WASH. CONST. art. I, § 14; W. VA.
CONST. art. III, § 5; WIS. CONST. art. I, § 6; WYO. CONST. art. I, § 14.  The three states with-
out a cruel and unusual punishment clause are Connecticut, Illinois, and Vermont.
351 OHIO CONST. art. I, § 9.
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ments,”352 others prohibited “cruel or unusual punishment,”353 and still
others outlawed “cruel punishment” without a reference to unusual.354  Nev-
ertheless, at the end of the day, forty-seven states included clauses in their
state constitutions that acted as analogs to the Eighth Amendment of the
Federal Constitution, thereby protecting their civilians from excessive pun-
ishment in this regard.
Eight states out of twelve that wrote new constitutions between 1776 and
1791 banned either “cruel and unusual” or “cruel” punishments.355  In 1868,
when the Fourteenth Amendment was ratified, thirty-four states out of thirty-
seven had cruel and unusual punishment clauses in their state constitu-
tions.356  The right to be free from cruel or unusual punishments is thus a
right that is deeply rooted in American history and tradition, as well as by a
huge consensus of the states today.
FIGURE 25.  RIGHT AGAINST CRUEL AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT
IN STATE CONSTITUTIONS
94%
92%
57%
0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%
2018
1868
1791
1791: n=14; 1868: n=37; 2018: n=50 
4. Proportional Punishment
Finally, thirteen states—comprising 26% of the states and 16.4% of the
U.S. population357—went one step further and required, in some shape or
form, that all punishments be proportioned to the offense committed.358
352 E.g., TENN. CONST. art. I, § 16.
353 E.g., TEX. CONST. art. I, § 13.
354 E.g., S.D. CONST. art. VI, § 23.
355 Calabresi, Agudo & Dore, supra note 5, at 1518–19.
356 See Calabresi & Agudo, supra note 5, at 82–83.
357 See 2010 Census, supra note 12 (50,594,773 out of 308,143,815 residents).
358 See ILL. CONST. art. I, § 11; IND. CONST. art. I, § 16; ME. CONST. art. I, §§ 9, 14; MD.
CONST. Declaration of Rights, art. XVI; NEB. CONST. art. I, § 15; N.H. CONST. pt. 1, art.
XVIII; OR. CONST. art. I, §§ 13, 15, 16; R.I. CONST. art. I, § 8; S.C. CONST. art. I, § 15; TENN.
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The states used three noteworthy language variations when they banned
disproportionate punishment.  First, eight states used explicit language when
discussing the proportionality of punishment in their state constitutions.
New Hampshire’s constitution, for example, states that:
All penalties ought to be proportioned to the nature of the offense.  No wise
Legislature will affix the same punishment to the crimes of theft, forgery,
and the like, which they do to those of murder and treason.  Where the same
undistinguishing severity is exerted against all offenses, the people are led to
forget the real distinction in the crimes themselves, and to commit the most
flagrant with as little compunction as they do the lightest offenses.  For the
same reason a multitude of sanguinary laws is both impolitic and unjust. The
true design of all punishments being to reform, not to exterminate
mankind.359
Nebraska’s constitution uses a more concise formulation, simply holding
that “[a]ll penalties shall be proportioned to the nature of the offense.”360
Second, four states banned disproportionate punishment by ensuring that
punishments do not utilize unnecessary rigor.361  Tennessee’s constitution
used a common format, stating “[t]hat no person arrested and confined in
jail shall be treated with unnecessary rigor.”362  Third, four states outlawed
sanguinary or corporal punishments in their state constitutions.363  Mary-
land’s constitution, for example, provides “[t]hat sanguinary Laws ought to
be avoided as far as it is consistent with the safety of the State; and no Law to
inflict cruel and unusual pains and penalties ought to be made in any case, or
at any time, hereafter,”364 and South Carolina’s constitution states that
CONST. art. I, §§ 13, 32; UTAH CONST. art. I, § 9; W. VA. CONST. art. III, § 5; WYO. CONST. art.
I, §§ 15, 16.
359 N.H. CONST. pt. 1, art. XVIII.
360 NEB. CONST. art. I, § 15.
361 OR. CONST. art. I, § 13; TENN. CONST. art. I, § 13; UTAH CONST. art. I, § 9; WYO.
CONST. art. I, § 16.  The Oregon Constitution includes both an explicit reference to pro-
portionality and an “unnecessary rigor” reference within their state constitution. Compare
OR. CONST. art. I, § 13 (“No person arrested, or confined in jail, shall be treated with
unnecessary rigor.”), with OR. CONST. art. I, § 16 (“Excessive bail shall not be required, nor
excessive fines imposed.  Cruel and unusual punishments shall not be inflicted, but all
penalties shall be proportioned to the offense.”).  We count these four clauses as banning
disproportionate punishment because, by definition, using the appropriate amount of
rigor would lead to a proportional punishment.
362 TENN. CONST. art. I, § 13.
363 ME. CONST. art. I, §§ 9, 14; MD. CONST. Declaration of Rights, art. XVI; N.H. CONST.
pt. 1, art. XVIII; S.C. CONST. art. I, § 15.  Maine and New Hampshire both included explicit
references to proportionality as well as references to sanguinary punishments in their state
constitutions.  We count these four clauses as requiring proportional punishment because
the words “sanguinary” and “corporal” imply bloody, overly harsh punishments that consti-
tute a form of unnecessary rigor, thereby implying disproportionality to the offense. ME.
CONST. art. I, § 9; N.H. CONST. pt. 1, art. XVIII.  In practice, these types of clauses limit
punishment based on proportionality reasoning, so we count them as a type of propor-
tional punishment clause.
364 MD. CONST. Declaration of Rights, art. XVI.
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“[e]xcessive bail shall not be required, nor shall excessive fines be imposed,
nor shall cruel, nor corporal, nor unusual punishment be inflicted, nor shall
witnesses be unreasonably detained.”365  Though corporal and sanguinary
punishments do not always raise questions of proportionality as applied to
particular cases, the concern for proportionality in punishment is the likely
motivation for restricting or eliminating these classes of penalties.
Strikingly, Illinois’s constitution contains a proportionality clause even
though it did not include clauses explicitly referencing excessive bail, exces-
sive fines, or cruel and unusual punishment.  It holds that “[a]ll penalties
shall be determined both according to the seriousness of the offense and
with the objective of restoring the offender to useful citizenship.”366  It could
be argued that by stating that “[a]ll penalties” must be proportional to the
seriousness of the offense, Illinois’s constitution is inherently implying that
bail and fines must not be excessive, and that punishments must not be cruel
and unusual.  However, we did not count their constitution as protecting
those rights since they did not include an explicit reference to those rights
within their state constitution.  In addition, we did not include Vermont in
our total because—though it forbids disproportional fines in its constitu-
tion367—it does not impose this limiting principle to incarceration.
Four states out of the twelve that wrote new constitutions between 1776
and 1791 required that punishments be proportional to the crime commit-
ted.368  In 1868, when the Fourteenth Amendment was ratified, twelve states
out of thirty-seven had proportionality requirements in their state constitu-
tions.369  The right to be punished in a way that is proportionate to the
offenses one might commit thus has some basis in state constitutional law
both in 1868 and in 2018, but there is not an Article V consensus of three-
quarters of states endorsing this constitutional right.  It may be that the right
to be free of disproportionate punishments is an unenumerated constitu-
tional right, as we shall discuss below.
365 S.C. CONST. art. I, § 15.
366 ILL. CONST. art. I, § 11.
367 VT. CONST. ch. 2, § 39 (“And all fines shall be proportioned to the offences.”).
368 Calabresi, Agudo & Dore, supra note 5, at 1519–20.
369 See Calabresi & Agudo, supra note 5, at 83–85.  Note that in our original analysis, we
coded only nine states as having proportionality requirements in their state constitutions in
1868. Id. We have now counted clauses banning sanguinary punishments or “infamous
punishments” as proportionality clauses, bringing the total up to twelve.  The twelve states
are Illinois, Indiana, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Ohio, Oregon,
Rhode Island, South Carolina, Tennessee, and West Virginia. See ILL. CONST. of 1848, art.
XIII, § 14; IND. CONST. of 1851, art. I, § 16; ME. CONST. of 1820, art. I, § 9; MD. CONST. of
1864, Declaration of Rights art. XIV; MASS. CONST. of 1780, pt. 1, art. XII; N.H. CONST. pt.
1, art. XXVIII; OHIO CONST. art. I, § 9; OR. CONST. of 1857, art I, § 16; R.I. CONST. of 1842,
art. I, § 8; S.C. CONST. of 1868, art. I, § 16; TENN. CONST. of 1835, art. I, § 16; W. VA. CONST.
of 1872, art. III, § 5.
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FIGURE 26.  PROPORTIONAL PUNISHMENT CLAUSES IN
STATE CONSTITUTIONS
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Some lawyers have argued that Weems v. United States370 bans dispropor-
tionate punishments, but the modern Supreme Court rejected this view by a
five–four vote in upholding the constitutionality of California’s three-strikes
law, which imposed life imprisonment for anyone convicted of committing
three felonies, even in cases where the felonies are minor.371  Since we think
the three-strikes policy is a clear example of disproportionate punishment, it
appears that the Supreme Court does not consider this right to be enshrined
in the Federal Constitution.  We find it very odd that the Eighth Amendment
would require proportionality as to bail and fines, which involve losses of
property, but that it would not require proportionality as to much more seri-
ous losses such as those involving the loss of life or liberty.  The Eighth
Amendment is one sentence long: “Excessive bail shall not be required, nor
excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.”372
Under the canon of construction known as noscitur a sociis—a text acquires
its meaning from the company it keeps—the Cruel and Unusual Punishment
Clause should be read to harmonize with the bans on “excessive” bail and
fines.  We would read the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause as banning
“excessive” deprivations of life and liberty and as therefore containing a pro-
portionality requirement.
J. State Constitutional Acknowledgement of Unenumerated Rights
The Ninth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution states that “[t]he enu-
meration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny
or disparage others retained by the people.”373  Certain scholars have argued
370 217 U.S. 349 (1910).
371 See Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11 (2003).
372 US. CONST. amend. VIII.
373 U.S. CONST. amend. IX.
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that the text of the Ninth Amendment inherently “secures natural-law
unenumerated rights from congressional intrusion.”374  These scholars fur-
ther argue that the drafters of the Fourteenth Amendment used intentionally
vague language because they “wanted it to protect ‘fundamental rights,’ . . .
as ‘a delegation to future constitutional decision-makers to protect certain
rights that the document neither lists, at least not exhaustively, nor even in
any specific way gives direction for finding.’”375  Others contend that the
clause was placed in the Constitution “simply to avoid arguments that the
federal Bill of Rights preempted the protection of other rights such as those
in state bills of rights,” thereby defending our nation from overly broad inter-
pretations of federal power.376  This “raises rather insistently the question of
whether state bills of rights” contain “what Professor John Yoo has called
‘baby Ninth Amendments.’”377  As we discuss below, it turns out that many of
them do.
1. Recognition of “Lockean” Rights and Natural or Unalienable Rights
Thirty-nine of the states—representing 78% of the states, which is an
Article V consensus of three-quarters of the states, and comprising 74.6% of
the U.S. population378—include Lockean rights clauses in their state consti-
tutions that refer to a contractarian understanding of fundamental rights
that exist in a natural law form, prior to the creation of the state.379  These
states have essentially “declared as a matter of positive state constitutional
law” that there exist certain unenumerated natural, inalienable, inviolable, or
inherent basic rights.380  Arkansas’s constitution uses a typical formulation,
holding that:
374 Calabresi & Agudo, supra note 5, at 87 (citing DANIEL A. FARBER, RETAINED BY THE
PEOPLE: THE “SILENT” NINTH AMENDMENT AND THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS AMERICANS
DON’T KNOW THEY HAVE 197 (2007)).  Indeed, these scholars contend that the Ninth
Amendment was established to preserve these federal unenumerated rights. Id.
375 Id. at 87 n.363 (citing FARBER, supra note 374, at 69).
376 Id. at 87 (citing Kurt T. Lash, The Lost Jurisprudence of the Ninth Amendment, 83 TEX.
L. REV. 597, 600–01 (2005)). See generally FARBER, supra note 374.
377 Id. at 87 & n.365 (citing John Choon Yoo, Our Declaratory Ninth Amendment, 42
EMORY L.J. 967, 968–69 (1993)).
378 See 2010 Census, supra note 12 (230,009,053 out of 308,143,815 residents).
379 See ALA. CONST. art. I, § 1; ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 1; ARK. CONST. art. II, § 2; CAL.
CONST. art. I, § 1; COLO. CONST. art. II, § 3; CONN. CONST. art. I, § 1; DEL. CONST. pmbl.;
FLA. CONST. art. I, § 2; HAW. CONST. art. I, § 2; IDAHO CONST. art. I, § 1; ILL. CONST. art. I,
§ 1; IND. CONST. art. I, § 1; IOWA CONST. art. I, § 1; KAN. CONST. Bill of Rights, § 1; KY.
CONST. Bill of Rights, § 1; LA. CONST. art. I, § 1; ME. CONST. art. I, § 1; MASS. CONST. arts. of
amend. CVI; MO. CONST. art. I, § 2; MONT. CONST. art. II, § 3; NEB. CONST. art. I, § 1; NEV.
CONST. art. I, § 1; N.H. Const. pt. 1, arts. I, II, III; N.J. CONST. art. I, § 1; N.M. CONST. art. II,
§ 4; N.C. CONST. art. I, § 1; N.D. CONST. art. I, § 1; OHIO CONST. art. I, § 1; OKLA. CONST.
art. II, § 2; OR. CONST. art. I, § 1; PA. CONST. art. I, § 1; S.D. CONST. art. VI, § 1; TEX. CONST.
art. I, § 3; UTAH CONST. art. I, § 1; VT. CONST. ch. 1, art. I; VA. CONST. art. I, § 1; W. VA.
CONST. art. III, § 1; WIS. CONST. art. I, § 1; WYO. CONST. art. I, § 2.
380 Calabresi & Agudo, supra note 5, at 88.
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All men are created equally free and independent, and have certain
inherent and inalienable rights; amongst which are those of enjoying and
defending life and liberty; of acquiring, possessing and protecting property,
and reputation; and of pursuing their own happiness.  To secure these rights
governments are instituted among men, deriving their just powers from the
consent of the governed.381
Massachusetts’s constitution contains another common format, stating
that:
All people are born free and equal and have certain natural, essential
and unalienable rights; among which may be reckoned the right of enjoying
and defending their lives and liberties; that of acquiring, possessing and pro-
tecting property; in fine, that of seeking and obtaining their safety and hap-
piness.  Equality under the law shall not be denied or abridged because of
sex, race, color, creed or national origin.382
Some states used less clear-cut references to this Lockean principle of
natural or unalienable rights.  Missouri’s constitution, for instance, holds:
That all constitutional government is intended to promote the general wel-
fare of the people; that all persons have a natural right to life, liberty, the
pursuit of happiness and the enjoyment of the gains of their own industry;
that all persons are created equal and are entitled to equal rights and oppor-
tunity under the law; that to give security to these things is the principal
office of government, and that when government does not confer this secur-
ity, it fails in its chief design.383
And Oregon’s constitution provides less clearly that:
We declare that all men, when they form a social compact are equal in right:
that all power is inherent in the people, and all free governments are
founded on their authority, and instituted for their peace, safety, and happi-
ness; and they have at all times a right to alter, reform, or abolish the govern-
ment in such manner as they may think proper.384
We believe these constitutional provisions capture the underlying con-
tractarian understanding of natural rights and liberties that was enshrined in
Locke’s writing.  In that sense, we count them as states that protect a Lockean
understanding of inherent and unalienable rights.
These references to Lockean natural rights
deserve special mention because their presence in state constitutions . . .
could be read to indicate a belief that certain rights . . . exist in and of
themselves as preexisting entitlements.  In other words, it suggests that our
constitutions and bills of rights do not create rights but simply declare or recog-
nize their existence.385
381 ARK. CONST. art. II, § 2.
382 MASS. CONST. art. of amend. CVI.
383 MO. CONST. art. I, § 2.
384 OR. CONST. art. I, § 1.
385 See Calabresi & Agudo, supra note 5, at 88.
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Though positivists might reject this view as antiquated, it is worth noting
that over three-quarters of the states in 2018 include these Lockean rights
clauses in their constitutions—some states have even added or reaffirmed
their Lockean rights clauses in recent years386—indicating that this under-
standing of fundamental rights is both current and widespread through our
nation.
FIGURE 27.  LOCKEAN RIGHTS CLAUSES IN STATE CONSTITUTIONS
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This is undoubtedly an undercount of the states with Lockean rights
clauses for two reasons.  First, we did not count a constitution as containing a
Lockean rights clause if it merely stated that governments “are established to
protect and maintain individual rights.”387  Such a provision does not assume
that governments create positive rights, but rather assumes that individual
rights preexist the government (which the government then protects and
maintains), yet the continuing validity of these rights outside government
protection is not made explicit after the government is formed.  Second—
and more significantly—we separated out one class of Lockean clauses for
special treatment in the next section, what we call “Lockean power clauses.”
These are clauses that recognize the right and legitimate power of the people
to reform or abolish their form of government.  While most states have what
we call both Lockean rights clauses and Lockean power clauses, only New
York has neither.
In 1868, when the Fourteenth Amendment was ratified, twenty-seven out
of thirty-seven state constitutions—only one state short of an Article V three-
quarters consensus—had Lockean rights clauses in their state constitu-
386 E.g., CAL. CONST. art. I, § 1 (added in 1974); FLA. CONST. art. I, § 2 (added in 1998);
HAW. CONST. art. I, § 2 (added in 1978).
387 ARIZ. CONST. art. II, § 2 (1912); WASH. CONST. art I, § 1 (1889).
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tions.388  The first state to add such a clause was Virginia in June 1776.389
Indeed, George Mason’s first draft of Virginia’s bill of rights included a Lock-
ean rights clause that was ultimately copied by Pennsylvania and Massachu-
setts, as well as by many other states.390  The most relevant copying of George
Mason’s language was by Thomas Jefferson in the Declaration of Indepen-
dence, which Congress ratified on July 4, 1776 and which we believe is a
source of federal constitutional law.391  Consider first George Mason’s initial
draft of a Lockean rights proviso, which was published in newspapers
throughout the thirteen colonies in May 1776:
That all men are by nature equally free and independent, and have cer-
tain inherent rights, of which, when they enter into a state of society, they
cannot, by any compact, deprive or divest their posterity; namely, the enjoy-
ment of life and liberty, with the means of acquiring and possessing prop-
erty, and pursuing and obtaining happiness and safety.
That all power is vested in, and consequently derived from, the people;
that magistrates are their trustees and servants, and at all times amenable to
them.392
Now compare George Mason’s language above, which Thomas Jefferson
took and, in Professor Calabresi’s view, improved greatly in the text of the
Declaration of Independence:
We hold these Truths to be self-evident, that all Men are created equal, that
they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that
among these are Life, Liberty, and the Pursuit of Happiness—That to secure
these Rights, Governments are instituted among Men, deriving their just
Powers from the Consent of the Governed, that whenever any Form of Gov-
ernment becomes destructive of these Ends, it is the Right of the People to
alter or to abolish it, and to institute new Government, laying its Foundation
on such Principles, and organizing its Powers in such Form, as to them shall
seem most likely to effect their Safety and Happiness.393
388 See ALA. CONST. of 1868, art. I, § 1; CAL. CONST. of 1849, art. I, § 1; CONN. CONST. of
1818, art. I, § 1; DEL. CONST. of 1831, pmbl.; FLA. CONST. of 1868, Declaration of Rights,
§ 1; ILL. CONST. of 1848, art. XIII, § 1; IND. CONST. of 1851, art. I, § 1; IOWA CONST. of 1857,
art. I, § 1; KAN. CONST. of 1859, Bill of Rights, § 1; KY. CONST. of 1850, art. XIII, §§ 1, 4; LA.
CONST. of 1868, tit. I, art. I; ME. CONST. of 1820, art. I, § 1; MASS. CONST. of 1780, Declara-
tion of Rights, art. I; MO. CONST. of 1865, art. I, § 1; NEB. CONST. of 1866, art. I, § 1; NEV.
CONST. of 1864, art. I, § 1; N.H. CONST. of 1784, pt. I, arts. I, II, III; N.J. CONST. of 1844, art.
I, § 1; N.C. CONST. of 1868, art. I, § 1; OHIO CONST. of 1851, art. I, § 1; OR. CONST. of 1857,
art. I, § 1; PA. CONST. of 1838, art. IX, § 1; S.C. CONST. of 1868, art. I, § 1; TEX. CONST. of
1866, art. I, §§ 2, 21; VT. CONST. of 1793, ch. I, art. I; VA. CONST. Declaration of Rights of
1776, § 1; WIS. CONST. of 1848, art. I, § 1.
389 Virginia Declaration of Rights, AVALON PROJECT (last visited Sept. 23, 2018), http://
avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/virginia.asp.
390 Id.
391 THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776).
392 Virginia Declaration of Rights, supra note 389.
393 THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776).
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To us, it seems self-evident that the Declaration of Independence codi-
fied nationally the Lockean equality right guarantees that almost three-
quarters of the states used in their state constitutions in 1868 when the Four-
teenth Amendment was ratified, and that many more use today in 2018.  Pau-
line Maier makes this argument in her book American Scripture: Making the
Declaration of Independence.394  Seven states out of twelve that had written con-
stitutions between 1776 and 1791, in fact, included Lockean natural rights
clauses,395 even though—as Akhil Reed Amar, in The Bill of Rights: Creation
and Reconstruction, has correctly argued—the period of the Founding was
more collectivist than was the more individualistic period of
Reconstruction.396
Some have argued that the right to enjoy life and liberty or to seek and
obtain happiness and safety are too vague as guarantees to be judicially
enforceable.  We disagree.  We think that the widespread inclusion of Lock-
ean rights provisos in the state constitutions supports Professor Randy Bar-
nett’s argument that there should be a presumption of liberty in
constitutional law rather than a presumption of constitutionality.397
We recognize that since there is no judicial review clause in the Constitu-
tion—the way Congress has a Commerce Clause, and the President has the
Commander in Chief power—that when cases challenging the legality of cer-
tain governmental decisions reach the courts, the legislature and the execu-
tive branch (which we think are coequal constitutional interpreters to the
courts) have already asserted that the government action in question was
constitutional.  Professor Calabresi made this argument in his book review of
Professor Barnett’s book, The Originalist and Normative Case Against Judicial
Activism: A Reply to Professor Randy Barnett, and he still adheres to depart-
mentalism as he explained in that book review.398
However, Professor Calabresi now thinks that when the government
deprives someone of life, liberty, or property, it must show, by a preponder-
ance of the evidence (i.e., by 51% of the evidence), that the law it has passed,
as Corfield v. Coryell said in dicta, is a just law enacted “for the general good of
the whole” people.399  Professor Calabresi thus thinks that where the evi-
dence of unconstitutionality is 50% to 50%, there should be a presumption
of constitutionality for departmentalist reasons.  We disagree with the
rational basis test as it was used in Williamson v. Lee Optical400 and with United
States v. Carolene Products Co.,401 since they do not recognize the presumption
394 PAULINE MAIER, AMERICAN SCRIPTURE: MAKING THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE
(1997).
395 Calabresi, Agudo & Dore, supra note 5, at 1522–23.
396 See generally AMAR, supra note 136.
397 See generally RANDY E. BARNETT, RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION (2004).
398 Steven G. Calabresi, The Originalist and Normative Case Against Judicial Activism: A
Reply to Professor Randy Barnett, 103 MICH. L. REV. 1081 (2005) (reviewing BARNETT, supra
note 397).
399 Corfield v. Coryell, 6 F. Cas. 546, 552 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823) (No. 3,230).
400 348 U.S. 483 (1955).
401 304 U.S. 144 (1938).
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of liberty.  We agree on presumption of liberty grounds with Lochner v. New
York,402 Griswold v. Connecticut,403 and Lawrence v. Texas,404 and with Obergefell
v. Hodges.405  Professor Calabresi continues to think that Roe v. Wade406 is
wrongly decided because he believes that life begins at fourteen days after
conception, when a fertilized egg becomes implanted in a woman’s uterus.
Once that has happened, Professor Calabresi believes that the fetus is a per-
son with Fourteenth Amendment rights that cannot be violated by having an
abortion.
Professor Calabresi does not believe that there is a right to privacy in the
Fourteenth Amendment, but he does think there is a right to enjoy liberty
and to seek and obtain happiness and safety.  In our view, the Connecticut
law outlawing the use of birth control violated this right, as did laws criminal-
izing same-sex sexual relationships and same-sex marriage.  Professor Cala-
bresi’s views are set forth in a more sustained way in an article titled On
Liberty and the Fourteenth Amendment: The Original Understanding of the Lockean
Natural Rights Guarantees.407
The widespread presence of Lockean clauses in state constitutional law
both today and in 1868 suggests that the enumerated rights in the Federal
Bill of Rights should be applied purposively rather than literally, in a way that
enhances liberty rather than restricting it.  We thus agree with Sherbert v. Ver-
ner, which interpreted the word “prohibit” in the Free Exercise Clause to
mean causing “any burden,” rather than criminally prohibiting the free exer-
cise of religion.408
We also think that even though the First Amendment read literally
applies only to acts of Congress, the federal courts have, of course, been right
to apply it to executive branch actions as well.  We think both (1) that the
First Amendment’s guarantee of freedom of speech and of the press ought
not to be read literally as to apply only to printing presses, and (2) that it
should also apply to freedom of expression on the internet, via video broad-
casting, in personal letters, and in private diaries.  Again, we would read
“freedom of speech and of the press” to mean freedom of expression.  We
would allow petitions to be made via email and not only on parchment, and
we would protect the right of the people to assemble in an internet chat
room as well as in public parks.  For this reason, we believe that freedom of
expression ought to apply to new forms of communication, rather than
merely historical forms.
We would also read the Second Amendment right to keep and bear arms
in a liberty-enhancing way and we are thus persuaded that the Court cor-
402 198 U.S. 45 (1905), overruled in part by Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726 (1963).
403 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
404 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
405 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015).
406 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
407 Steven G. Calabresi & Sofı´a M. Vickery, On Liberty and the Fourteenth Amendment: The
Original Understanding of the Lockean Natural Rights Guarantees, 93 TEX. L. REV. 1299 (2015).
408 See Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 402–03 (1963).
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rectly decided District of Columbia v. Heller.409  We would read the Fourth
Amendment as forbidding telephone wiretaps, as the Warren Court did
when it overruled a contrary Supreme Court opinion by Chief Justice Taft
from the 1920s.410  We also think it applies to the attaching of GPS devices to
cars, as the Supreme Court recently held,411 and to the bringing of drug-
sniffing dogs up to someone’s front door, as in Florida v. Jardines.412  Profes-
sor Calabresi would even go further and protect privacy on the internet,
including the so-called right to have information forgotten.
We agree with Justices Scalia and Thomas’s broad, liberty-enhancing
reading of the Confrontation Clause as requiring a face-to-face encounter
with one’s accuser.413  Moreover, we also agree that there is and should be a
regulatory takings doctrine even if regulations do not literally seize and evict
you from your property.414  We would enforce the “public use” language in
the Takings Clause and thus would agree with the four dissenting Justices in
Kelo v. City of New London.415
We would also apply the Seventh Amendment right to civil jury trials to
administrative law civil cases and we thus disagree with the Supreme Court’s
hyperliteral reading of the Seventh Amendment in Atlas Roofing Co. v. Occu-
pational Safety & Health Review Commission.416  We all think that, if ever a civil
jury trial is needed, it is in police brutality lawsuits or in other civil cases to
which the federal government is a party.  In particular, Professor Calabresi
regards the opinion in Atlas Roofing as shameful, disgraceful, and completely
inconsistent with the purposive approach that the Supreme Court has taken
to other parts of the Bill of Rights.
And, finally, we would, as we indicated above, read the Eighth Amend-
ment as containing a proportionality requirement for deprivations of life and
liberty just as it does expressly for deprivations of property via excessive bail
or excessive fines.
We feel comfortable in taking this purposive approach to the Bill of
Rights precisely because we think that the Lockean clauses suggest that we
should do so.  It is difficult to see how an individual can enjoy life and liberty
or seek and obtain happiness and safety in a world where the Bill of Rights is
not read with a presumption of liberty in mind.  That is what we think the
Lockean clauses mean.417
409 554 U.S. 570 (2008).
410 Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928), overruled in part by Katz v. United
States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
411 Grady v. North Carolina, 135 S. Ct. 1368 (2015) (per curiam).
412 569 U.S. 1 (2013).
413 See, e.g., Marx v. Texas, 528 U.S. 1034 (1999) (Scalia, J., dissenting to denial of
certiorari).
414 See Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987).
415 545 U.S. 469 (2005).
416 430 U.S. 442 (1977).
417 See Calabresi & Vickery, supra 407.
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2. Ninth Amendment Analogs
Thirty-three states in 2018—representing 66% of the states—contain
clauses that are analogous to the Ninth Amendment in the Federal Constitu-
tion.418  These “baby Ninth Amendments,” in contrast to the Federal Consti-
tution, “declared that the enumeration of rights in state constitutions should
not be construed to impair or deny other rights retained by the people.”419
Utah’s constitution utilizes a formulation that is almost identical to the Fed-
eral Constitution, holding that “[t]his enumeration of rights shall not be con-
strued to impair or deny others retained by the people.”420
Two-thirds of the states include baby Ninth Amendment clauses in their
state constitutions, indicating that their constitutions were not intended to
limit rights retained by the people, a position enjoying widespread support
today.  Three additional states—Massachusetts, New Hampshire, and West
Virginia421—which lack a direct Ninth Amendment analog—have what
might be called a “baby Tenth Amendment,” an even stronger assertion that
some rights are reserved to the people.
Not a single state out of fourteen had a Ninth Amendment analog in
1791, at the time of the ratification of the Federal Ninth Amendment,422
which is perhaps not surprising given that seven out of twelve state constitu-
tions at this time had Lockean rights clauses.
Again, scholars disagree over whether or not “the principal thrust of the
federal Ninth Amendment is . . . a protection for unenumerated, natural-law
individual rights.”423  Professor Akhil Reed Amar has contended that the
baby Ninth Amendments “present in the state constitutions in 1868 at the
time of the ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment may intimate a trans-
formation of the Ninth Amendment from a federalism clause in 1791 to
more of ‘a free-floating affirmation of unenumerated rights.’”424  We think
418 See ALA. CONST. art. I, § 36; ALASKA CONST. art. I, §  21; ARIZ. CONST. art. II, § 33;
ARK. CONST. art. II, § 29; CAL. CONST. art. I, § 24; COLO. CONST. art. II, § 28; FLA. CONST.
art. I, § 1; GA. CONST. art. I, § 1, para. 29; HAW. CONST. art. I, §§ 15, 22; IDAHO CONST. art. I,
§ 21; ILL. CONST. art. I, § 24; id. art. II, § 2; IOWA CONST. art. I, § 25; KAN. CONST. Bill of
Rights, § 20; LA. CONST. art. I, § 24; ME. CONST. art. I, § 24; MD. CONST. Declaration of
Rights, art. III; MICH. CONST. art. I, § 23; MINN. CONST. art. I, § 16; MISS. CONST. art. III,
§ 32; MONT. CONST. art. II, § 34; NEB. CONST. art. I, § 26; NEV. CONST. art. I, § 20; N.J.
CONST. art. I, § 21; N.M. CONST. art. II, § 23; N.C. CONST. art. I, § 36; OHIO CONST. art. I,
§ 20; OKLA. CONST. art. II, § 33; OR. CONST. art. II, § 33; R.I. CONST. art. I, § 24; UTAH
CONST. art. I, § 25; VA. CONST. art. I, § 17; WASH. CONST. art. I, § 30; WYO. CONST. art. I,
§ 36.
419 Calabresi & Agudo, supra note 5, at 89.  The states with baby Ninth Amendments
were: Alabama, California, Florida, Iowa, Kansas, Louisiana, Maine, Maryland, Minnesota,
Mississippi, Nebraska, Nevada, New Jersey, North Carolina, Ohio, Oregon, Rhode Island,
and South Carolina.
420 UTAH CONST. art. 1, § 25.
421 MASS. CONST. pt. 1, art. IV; N.H. CONST. pt. 1, art. VII; W. VA. CONST. art. I, § 2.
422 Calabresi, Agudo & Dore, supra note 5, at 1525.
423 Calabresi & Agudo, supra note 5, at 90 (citing Lash, supra note 376, at 715).
424 Id. (quoting AMAR, supra note 136, at 280).
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there is ample evidence that the states embrace this idea of natural, unalien-
able rights, indicated both by their inclusion of baby Ninth Amendments and
by their inclusion of Lockean rights language, as discussed above.  For this
reason, we believe unenumerated rights are protected by their state constitu-
tional law and by the Fourteenth Amendment through its Privileges or
Immunities Clause.
FIGURE 28.  NINTH AMENDMENT ANALOGS IN STATE CONSTITUTIONS
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K. Other State Constitutional Rights Without Federal Analogs
We have now exhausted the list of rights secured by the Federal Bill of
Rights in the U.S. Constitution.  There are, however, a few additional rights
we found in state constitutions “that are of great interest to federal constitu-
tional case law.”425  We turn to a discussion of those rights now.
1. Power over Government
Forty-nine of the states in 2018—representing 98% of the states and
93.7% of the U.S. population426—include Lockean power clauses in their
state constitutions.427  These clauses give citizens considerable power over
425 Id. at 92.
426 See 2010 Census, supra note 2 (288,765,713 out of 308,143,815 residents).
427 See ALA. CONST. art. I, § 2; ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 2; ARIZ. CONST. art. II, § 2; ARK.
CONST. art. II, § 1; CAL. CONST. art. II, § 1; COLO. CONST. art. II, §§ 1–2; CONN. CONST. art.
II, § 2; DEL. CONST. pmbl.; FLA. CONST. art. I, § 1; GA. CONST. art. II, § 2, paras. 1–2; HAW.
CONST. art. I, § 1; IDAHO CONST. art. I, § 2; ILL. CONST. art. I, § 1; IND. CONST. art. I, § 1;
IOWA CONST. art. I, § 2; KAN. CONST. Bill of Rights, § 2; KY. CONST. Bill of Rights, § 4; LA.
CONST. art. I, § 1; ME. CONST. art. I, § 2; MD. CONST. Declaration of Rights, art. I; MASS.
CONST. pt. I, arts. IV, V, VII; MICH. CONST. art. I, § 1; MINN. CONST. art. I, § 1; MISS. CONST.
art. III, §§ 5–6; MO. CONST. art. I, § 1; MONT. CONST. art. II, §§ 1–2; NEB. CONST. art. I, § 1;
NEV. CONST. art. I, § 2; N.H. CONST. pt. I, arts. I, III, VII, VIII; N.J. CONST. art. I, § 2(a);
N.M. CONST. art. II, §§ 2–3; N.C. CONST. art. I, §§ 2–3; N.D. CONST. art. I, § 2; OHIO CONST.
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their state governments, such as by indicating that all political power is inher-
ent in the people, or by granting citizens an innate right to alter or reform
the government if it fails to properly protect their interests.  These clauses
have their roots in both the writing of John Locke and in the Declaration of
Independence.428  Nine states out of twelve that wrote their constitutions
between 1776 and 1791 had such clauses,429 which is an Article V three-
quarters majority of the states that chose to write new constitutions—some-
thing Rhode Island and Connecticut initially refused to do.
Some state Lockean power clauses use stronger language than others,
but all of the clauses give citizens power over their state governments and
indicate that, at least to some extent, the state government is answerable to
the people.  An example of a strong Lockean power clause is Oregon’s:
We declare that all men, when they form a social compact are equal in right:
that all power is inherent in the people, and all free governments are
founded on their authority, and instituted for their peace, safety, and happi-
ness; and they have at all times a right to alter, reform, or abolish the govern-
ment in such manner as they may think proper.430
Massachusetts’s constitution includes another strong Lockean power
clause.  It states that “[a]ll power residing originally in the people, and being
derived from them, the several magistrates and officers of government,
vested with authority, whether legislative, executive, or judicial, are their sub-
stitutes and agents, and are at all times accountable to them,”431 and that:
Government is instituted for the common good; for the protection,
safety, prosperity and happiness of the people; and not for the profit, honor,
or private interest of any one man, family, or class of men: Therefore the
people alone have an incontestable, unalienable, and indefeasible right to
institute government; and to reform, alter, or totally change the same, when
their protection, safety, prosperity and happiness require it.432
art. I, § 2; OKLA. CONST. art. II, § 1; OR. CONST. art. I, § 1; PA. CONST. art. I, § 2; R.I. CONST.
art. I, § 1; S.C. CONST. art. I, § 1; S.D. CONST. art. VI, §§ 1, 26; TENN. CONST. art. I, § 1–2;
TEX. CONST. art. I, § 2; UTAH CONST. art. I, § 2; VT. CONST. ch. 1, arts. V, VI, VII; VA. CONST.
art. I, §§ 2–3; WASH. CONST. art. I, § 1; W. VA. Const. art. II, § 2; id. art. III, §§ 2–3; WIS.
CONST. art. I, § 1; WYO. CONST. art. I, § 1.
428 THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776) (“We hold these Truths to
be self-evident, that all Men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with
certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and the Pursuit of Happi-
ness—That to secure these Rights, Governments are instituted among Men, deriving their
just Powers from the Consent of the Governed, that whenever any Form of Government
becomes destructive of these Ends, it is the Right of the People to alter or to abolish it, and
to institute new Government, laying its Foundation on such Principles, and organizing its
Powers in such Form, as to them shall seem most likely to effect their Safety and
Happiness.”).
429 Calabresi, Agudo & Dore, supra note 5, at 1481.
430 OR. CONST. art. I, § 1.
431 MASS. CONST. pt. I, art. V.
432 MASS. CONST. pt. I, art. VII.
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In this sense, many of the state Lockean power clauses grant sweeping
power to the citizens, allowing them great influence over their state
governments.
Weak Lockean power clauses, in contrast, do not mention any specific
right to alter, reform, or abolish the government, yet they still indicate that
the government’s power is derived from the people and that governments
can only operate in a just manner when they have the consent of their citi-
zenry.  Washington’s constitution, for example, states that “[a]ll political
power is inherent in the people, and governments derive their just powers
from the consent of the governed, and are established to protect and main-
tain individual rights.”433  It is worth pointing out that some states, like Colo-
rado and Montana, have constitutions that contain both a weak and a strong
formulation of this Lockean right to power over the government.
Four states have constitutions that contain a Lockean power clause
alongside a caveat indicating that the people can only alter and reform their
state governments in ways that are not contrary to the Federal Constitu-
tion.434  Mississippi’s constitution, for example, provides that:
The people of this state have the inherent, sole, and exclusive right to
regulate the internal government and police thereof, and to alter and abol-
ish their constitution and form of government whenever they deem it neces-
sary to their safety and happiness; Provided, Such change be not repugnant
to the constitution of the United States.435
Oklahoma’s constitution has a similar clause.  It states that:
All political power is inherent in the people; and government is insti-
tuted for their protection, security, and benefit, and to promote their gen-
eral welfare; and they have the right to alter or reform the same whenever
the public good may require it:  Provided, such change be not repugnant to
the Constitution of the United States.436
As such, four of the states limit the extent to which the people can exer-
cise power over their state governments.  Still, almost 100% of the states
include a Lockean power clause in their state constitutions in 2018.  The Dec-
laration of Independence represents the only legal assertion of this right to
alter and abolish forms of government at the federal level in American his-
tory, to our knowledge.
The eleven slave states that rebelled against the Union from 1860 to
1865 claimed they were exercising a Lockean power to alter and abolish their
form of government.  This was the Confederacy’s legal claim to legitimacy
during the War of the Rebellion, as Abraham Lincoln called it, between 1861
and 1865.  In fact, the eleven southern states ceded their sovereignty when
they, by convention, chose to ratify the Constitution, and the Constitution
433 WASH. CONST. art. I, § 1.
434 COLO. CONST. art. II, § 2; MISS. CONST. art. III, § 6; N.C. CONST. art. I, § 3; OKLA.
CONST. art. II, § 1.
435 MISS. CONST. art. III, § 6.
436 OKLA. CONST. art. II, § 1.
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\94-1\NDL102.txt unknown Seq: 88 21-NOV-18 10:57
136 notre dame law review [vol. 94:1
makes it perfectly clear that “We the People of the United States” are sover-
eign.437  This is why Article IV, Section 3 of the Constitution explicitly allows
new states to join the Union, but there is no clause specifying a way to leave
the Union.  Accordingly, we think that state secession, absent a constitutional
amendment providing for it, is an illegal act, and thus agree completely with
Abraham Lincoln.
FIGURE 29.  LOCKEAN POWER CLAUSES IN STATE CONSTITUTIONS
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2. Class-Based Legislation
Forty-six of the states in 2018—representing 92% of the states and 88.9%
of the U.S. population438—include protections against class-based legislation
in their state constitutions.439  In essence, class-based legislation is any law
that separates the population into groups such that one group is advantaged
437 U.S. CONST. pmbl.
438 See 2010 Census, supra note 12 (273,791,017 out of 308,143,815 residents).
439 See ALA. CONST. art. I, §§ 22, 29; ALASKA CONST. art. I, §§ 3, 15; ARIZ. CONST. art. II,
§§ 9, 13, 16, 29; ARK. CONST. art. II, §§ 3, 17, 18, 19; CAL. CONST. art. I, §§ 7, 8, 22, 31;
COLO. CONST. art. II, § 11; CONN. CONST. art. I, §§ 1, 18, 20; DEL. CONST. art. I, §§ 15, 19;
GA. CONST. art. I, § 1, paras. 2, 7, 10, 20, 25; HAW. CONST. art. I, §§ 3, 5, 8, 9, 21; IDAHO
CONST. art. I, §§ 2, 4; ILL. CONST. art. I, §§ 3, 16, 17, 18, 19; id. art. III, § 8; IND. CONST. art.
I, §§ 23, 30, 35; IOWA CONST. art. I, § 6; KAN. CONST. Bill of Rights, arts. II, 12, 19; KY.
CONST. Bill of Rights, arts. III, V; LA. CONST. art. I, §§ 3, 12; id. art. III, § 12; id. art. XII,
§ 12; ME. CONST. art. I, §§ 6-A, 11, 23; MD. CONST. Declaration of Rights, arts. XXVII, XLII;
MASS. CONST. pt. I, arts. VI, VII; MINN. CONST. art. I, §§ 2, 15; id. art. XII, § 1; MO. CONST.
art. I, §§ 2, 13, 30; MONT. CONST. art. II, §§ 4, 31; NEB. CONST. art. I, §§ 3, 15, 16, 25, 30;
N.H. CONST. pt. I, arts. II, IX, X; N.J. CONST. art. I, § 5; id. art. IV, § 7; N.M. CONST. art. II,
§ 18; id. art. IV, § 26; id. art. VII, § 3; N.Y. CONST. art. I, §§ 1, 11; N.C. CONST. art. I, §§ 11,
19, 29, 32, 33; N.D. CONST. art. I, §§ 21, 22; OHIO CONST. art. I, §§ 2, 12, 17; OKLA. CONST.
art. II, §§ 15, 36, 51; OR. CONST. art. I, §§ 20, 25, 29; PA. CONST. art. I, §§ 17, 19, 24, 26; R.I.
CONST. art. I, § 2; S.C. CONST. art. I, §§ 3, 4; S.D. CONST. art. VI, §§ 3, 12, 18; TENN. CONST.
art. I, §§ 12, 30; id. art. XI, § 8; TEX. CONST. art. I, §§ 3, 4, 19, 21; UTAH CONST. art. I, §§ 23,
24; id. art. IV, § 1; VT. CONST. ch. I, art. VII; VA. CONST. art. I, §§ 3, 4, 11; WASH. CONST. art.
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and one group is relegated to a form of second-rate or second-class citizen-
ship.  This relegation can occur through laws that grant special benefits to
some groups that are not equally granted to others.  For example, we have
argued that banning same-sex marriage creates a form of second-class citizen-
ship for LGBTQ people, by granting special advantages to heterosexual
couples that are not equally granted to all people in committed
relationships.440
Some of the states ban class legislation by including in their state consti-
tutions a type of privileges or immunities clause that prevents the govern-
ment from granting any special privileges or immunities to one individual
(or group of individuals) that are not equally granted to all civilians.  Wash-
ington’s constitution, for instance, holds that “[n]o law shall be passed grant-
ing to any citizen, class of citizens, or corporation other than municipal,
privileges or immunities which upon the same terms shall not equally belong
to all citizens, or corporations.”441  Oregon’s constitution similarly states that
“[n]o law shall be passed granting to any citizen or class of citizens privileges,
or immunities, which, upon the same terms, shall not equally belong to all
citizens.”442  We count these clauses as protecting against class-based legisla-
tion because they prevent the government from consigning some groups to a
form of second-class citizenship by stripping them of entitlements and bene-
fits given to others.  Thirty-nine of the state constitutions—representing 78%
of the states and 78.7% of the U.S. population443—include this type of privi-
leges or immunities clause.444
This is a striking increase in the number of state constitutions having
privileges or immunities clauses compared to 1868 when the Fourteenth
Amendment was ratified.  Only nineteen out of thirty-seven states had privi-
I, §§ 8, 12, 15, 28; W. VA. CONST. art. II, § 4; id. art. III, §§ 18, 19; WIS. CONST. art. I, §§ 12,
14; WYO. CONST. art. I, §§ 2, 3, 34; id. art. III, § 27; id. art. VI, § 1.
440 For a detailed discussion of the history of bans on class- or caste-based legislation in
American jurisprudence, see Steven G. Calabresi & Hannah M. Begley, Originalism and
Same-Sex Marriage, 70 U. MIAMI L. REV. 648 (2016), which discusses same-sex marriage.
441 WASH. CONST. art. I, § 12.
442 OR. CONST. art. I, § 20.
443 See 2010 Census, supra note 12 (242,395,676 out of 308,143,815 residents). R
444 See ALA. CONST. art. I, § 22; ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 15; ARIZ. CONST. art. II, §§ 9, 13,
29; ARK. CONST. art. II, §§ 18, 19; CAL. CONST. art. I, § 7; COLO. CONST. art. II, § 11; CONN.
CONST. art. I, § 1; GA. CONST. art. I, § 1, para. 10; HAW. CONST. art. I, § 21; IDAHO CONST.
art. I, § 2; ILL. CONST. art. I, § 16; IND. CONST. art. I, § 23; IOWA CONST. art. I, § 6; KAN.
CONST. Bill of Rights, § 2; KY. CONST. Bill of Rights, § 3; LA. CONST. art. I, § 12; id. art. XII,
§ 12; ME. CONST. art. I, § 23; MASS. CONST. pt. I, art. VI; MINN. CONST. art. XII, § 1; MO.
CONST. art. I, § 13; MONT. CONST. art. II, § 31; NEB. CONST. art. I, § 16; N.J. CONST. art. IV,
§ 7; N.M. CONST. art. IV, § 26; N.C. CONST. art. I, § 32; N.D. CONST. art. I, § 21; OHIO
CONST. art. I, §§ 2, 17; OKLA. CONST. art. V, § 51; OR. CONST. art. I, § 20; PA. CONST. art. I,
§ 17; S.C. CONST. art. I, § 3; S.D. CONST. art. VI, § 12; TENN. CONST. art. XI, § 8; TEX.
CONST. art. I, § 3; UTAH CONST. art. I, § 23; VA. CONST. art. I, § 4; WASH. CONST. art. I, §§ 8,
12; W. VA. CONST. art. III, § 19; WYO. CONST. art. III, § 27.
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leges or immunities clauses in 1868.445  Nine out of the twelve states that
wrote constitutions between 1776 and 1791 included either privileges or
immunities clauses or equal protection clauses that forbade class legisla-
tion.446  We suspect that many state constitutions adopted since 1868 have
copied the privileges or immunities language found in the Fourteenth
Amendment.  This may explain why there are more states today with these
clauses than there were in 1868.
FIGURE 30.  LIMITS ON CLASS-BASED LEGISLATION IN
STATE CONSTITUTIONS
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Five additional states include language in their state constitutions that
could arguably be conceived of as another form of a privileges or immunities
clause.447  Vermont’s constitution, to begin with, holds:
That government is, or ought to be, instituted for the common benefit,
protection, and security of the people, nation, or community, and not for
the particular emolument or advantage of any single person, family, or set of
persons, who are a part only of that community; and that the community
hath an indubitable, unalienable, and indefeasible right, to reform or alter
government, in such manner as shall be, by that community, judged most
conducive to the public weal.448
New Hampshire’s constitution, by comparison, states that:
445 See Calabresi & Agudo, supra note 5, at 96–97.  Note that in our earlier analysis, id.,
we only coded thirteen states as having privileges or immunities clauses.  We believe that
was an undercount, and now contend that nineteen states had privileges or immunities
clauses in their state constitutions in 1868.  Those states are Alabama, Arkansas, Connecti-
cut, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Massachusetts, Missouri, Nebraska,
North Carolina, Ohio, Oregon, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, and Virginia.
446 Calabresi, Agudo & Dore, supra note 5, at 1527–29.
447 MASS. CONST. pt. I, art. VII; N.H. CONST. pt. I, art. X; R.I. CONST. art. I, § 2; VT.
CONST. ch. I, art. VII; VA. CONST. art. I, § 3.
448 VT. CONST. ch. I, art. VII.
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Government being instituted for the common benefit, protection, and secur-
ity, of the whole community, and not for the private interest or emolument
of any one man, family, or class of men; therefore, whenever the ends of
government are perverted, and public liberty manifestly endangered, and all
other means of redress are ineffectual, the people may, and of right ought to
reform the old, or establish a new government.  The doctrine of nonresis-
tance against arbitrary power, and oppression, is absurd, slavish, and destruc-
tive of the good and happiness of mankind.449
For these reasons, we think it is reasonable to claim that forty-four
states—representing 88% of the states and 84.4% of the U.S. popula-
tion450—include a privileges or immunities clause in their state constitution
that advocates for the prohibition of class- and caste-based legislation by
ensuring that all civilians are granted the same types of advantages and bene-
fits from the government.451
Additionally, twenty states in 2018—representing 40% of the states and
35.1% of the U.S. population452—include clauses in their state constitutions
that ban the existence of hereditary distinctions or titles of nobility.453  Mary-
land’s constitution contains a typical clause, providing “[t]hat no title of
nobility or hereditary honors ought to be granted in this State.”454  Penn-
sylvania’s constitution similarly holds that “[t]he Legislature shall not grant
any title of nobility or hereditary distinction, nor create any office the
appointment to which shall be for a longer term than during good behav-
ior.”455  We count these clauses as prohibiting class legislation because they
prevent the government from granting certain individuals—by virtue of their
family history, which is often tied to class—certain honors or privileges.  In
this sense, we believe that these clauses prohibit class-based legislation.
Nine states hold that all laws ought to be instituted for the benefit of the
whole, rather than for the enjoyment of a specific subgroup of citizens.456
Wyoming’s constitution, for instance, states that “[a]ll laws of a general
449 N.H. CONST. pt. I, art. X.
450 See 2010 Census, supra note 12 (259,939,107 out of 308,143,815 residents).
451 For additional analysis, see Steven G. Calabresi & Larissa C. Leibowitz, Monopolies
and the Constitution: A History of Crony Capitalism, 36 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 983 (2013).
452 See 2010 Census, supra note 12 (108,018,101 out of 308,143,815 residents). R
453 See ALA. CONST. art. I, § 29; ARIZ. CONST. art. II, § 29; ARK. CONST. art. II, § 19; CONN.
CONST. art. I, § 18; DEL. CONST. art. I, § 19; IND. CONST. art. I, § 35; KAN. CONST. Bill of
Rights, § 19; ME. CONST. art. I, § 23; MD. CONST. Declaration of Rights, art. XLII; MASS.
CONST. pt. I, art. VI; N.H. CONST. pt. I, art. IX; N.C. CONST. art. I, § 33; OHIO CONST. art. I,
§ 17; OR. CONST. art. I, § 29; PA. CONST. art. I, § 24; S.C. CONST. art. I, § 4; TENN. CONST.
art. I, § 30; VA. CONST. art. I, § 4; WASH. CONST. art. I, § 28; W. VA. CONST. art. III, § 19.
Georgia’s constitution also contains a similar clause. GA. CONST. art. I, § 1, para. 25 (“The
social status of a citizen shall never be the subject of legislation.”).
454 MD. CONST. Declaration of Rights, art. XLII.
455 PA. CONST. art. I, § 24.
456 See IOWA CONST. art. I, § 6; MASS. CONST. pt. I, art. VI; N.H. CONST. pt. I, art. X; N.D.
CONST. art. I, § 22; R.I. CONST. art. I, § 2; UTAH CONST. art. I,  24; VT. CONST. ch. I, art. VII;
VA. CONST. art. I, § 3; WYO. CONST. art. I, § 34.
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nature shall have a uniform operation,”457 and Rhode Island’s constitution
provides:
All free governments are instituted for the protection, safety, and happiness
of the people.  All the laws, therefore, should be made for the good of the
whole; and the burdens of the state ought to be fairly distributed among its
citizens.  No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due
process of law, nor shall any person be denied protection of the laws.  No
otherwise qualified person shall, solely by reason of race, gender or handi-
cap be subject to discrimination by the state, its agents or any person or
entity doing business with the state.  Nothing in this section shall be con-
strued to grant or secure any right relating to abortion or the funding
thereof.458
We count these states as including bans on class-based legislation in their
state constitutions because we believe that they promote the underlying value
of ensuring that laws do not benefit certain groups to the exclusion of others,
both because these laws must have a uniform operation and because they
must be made for the good of the whole.
Finally, two additional states have clauses explicitly outlawing any feudal
class systems.  Minnesota’s constitution, for example, holds that “[a]ll lands
within the state are allodial and feudal tenures of every description with all
their incidents are prohibited.  Leases and grants of agricultural lands for a
longer period than 21 years reserving rent or service of any kind shall be
void.”459  Wisconsin’s constitution includes a similar provision, stating that:
All lands within the state are declared to be allodial, and feudal tenures are
prohibited.  Leases and grants of agricultural land for a longer term than
fifteen years in which rent or service of any kind shall be reserved, and all
fines and like restraints upon alienation reserved in any grant of land, here-
after made, are declared to be void.460
We count these clauses as banning class-based legislation because they
prohibit feudalism, a system which discriminates in a class-based manner by
definition.  Feudalism, “like a system of racial-caste apartheid, violates the
notion that all citizens are born equal” by creating conditions in which a
feudal lord can essentially hold an individual in a state of perpetual
servanthood, necessarily relegating that individual to a form of second-rate
citizenship.461  As such, we think that bans on feudalism constitute bans on
class legislation.
We found bans on feudalism and allodium in twenty-eight out of thirty-
seven state constitutions in 1868 when the Fourteenth Amendment was rati-
fied—an Article V three-quarters consensus.462  Four state constitutions
457 WYO. CONST. art. I, § 34.
458 R.I. CONST. art. I, § 2.
459 MINN. CONST. art. I, § 15.
460 WIS. CONST. art. I, § 14.
461 Calabresi & Agudo, supra note 5, at 94.
462 Id. at 97–98.
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banned feudalism in 1791.463  Twenty states banned titles of nobility in
1868464 and eight states out of twelve that wrote constitutions between 1776
and 1791 banned title of nobility.465  Nineteen out of thirty-seven in 1868
had equal protection of the laws clauses.466  We thus think the Fourteenth
Amendment both as an original matter, and as a matter of present-day con-
sensus, bans class legislation enacted by the states, a conclusion leading us to
agree with Justice Field’s dissenting opinion in the Slaughter-House Cases.467
3. Separation of Powers
Forty of the states in 2018 comprising 80% of the states and 79.7% of the
U.S. population468—had clauses in their state constitutions explicitly requir-
ing a separation of powers among the legislative, executive, and judicial
branches of the state government.469  New Jersey’s constitution uses a typical
clause, stating that “[t]he powers of the government shall be divided among
three distinct branches, the legislative, executive, and judicial.  No person or
persons belonging to or constituting one branch shall exercise any of the
powers properly belonging to either of the others, except as expressly pro-
vided in this Constitution.”470  Mississippi’s constitution adds additional
detail, noting that “[t]he powers of the government of the State of Mississippi
shall be divided into three distinct departments, and each of them confided
to a separate magistracy, to-wit: those which are legislative to one, those
which are judicial to another, and those which are executive to another”471
and that:
No person or collection of persons, being one or belonging to one of
these departments, shall exercise any power properly belonging to either of
the others.  The acceptance of an office in either of said departments shall,
463 Calabresi, Agudo & Dore, supra note 5, at 1529–31.
464 See Calabresi & Agudo, supra note 5, at 98–99.
465 Calabresi, Agudo & Dore, supra note 5, at 1531–32.
466 See Calabresi & Agudo, supra note 5, at 94–96.
467 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 93 (1872) (Fields, J., dissenting).
468 See 2010 Census, supra note 12 (245,621,129 out of 308,143,815 residents).
469 See ALA. CONST. art. III, §§ 42, 43; id. amend. 905; ARIZ. CONST. art. III; ARK. CONST.
art. IV, §§ 1–2; CAL. CONST. art. III, § 3; COLO. CONST. art. III; CONN. CONST. art. II; FLA.
CONST. art. II, § 3; GA. CONST. art. I, § 2, para. 3; IDAHO CONST. art. II, § 1; ILL. CONST. art.
II, § 1; IND. CONST. art. III, § 1; IOWA CONST. art. III, § 1; KY. CONST. §§ 27–28; LA. CONST.
art. II, §§ 1–2; ME. CONST. art. III, §§ 1–2; MD. CONST. Declaration of Rights, art. VIII;
MASS. CONST. pt. I, art. XXX; MICH. CONST. art. III, § 2; MINN. CONST. art. III, § 1; MISS.
CONST. art. I, §§ 1–2; MO. CONST. art. II, § 1; MONT. CONST. art. III, § 1; NEB. CONST. art. II,
§ 1; NEV. CONST. art. III, § 1; N.H. CONST. pt. I, art. XXXVII; N.J. CONST. art. III, § 1; N.M.
CONST. art. III, § 1; N.C. CONST. art. I, § 6; OKLA. CONST. art. IV, § 1; OR. CONST. art. III,
§ 1; R.I. CONST. art. V; S.C. CONST. art. I, § 8; S.D. CONST. art. II; TENN. CONST. art. II,
§§ 1–2; TEX. CONST. art. II, § 1; UTAH CONST. art. V, § 1; VT. CONST. ch. II, § 5; VA. CONST.
art. I, § 5; W. VA. CONST. art. V, § 1; WYO. CONST. art. II, § 1.
470 N.J. CONST. art. III, § 1.
471 MISS. CONST. art. I, § 1.
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of itself, and at once, vacate any and all offices held by the person so
accepting in either of the other departments.472
Thus the vast majority—well over a three-quarters Article V consensus—
of the states have an explicit protection of the separation of powers doctrine
within their state constitutions.
It is worth noting that the ten states without explicit separation of pow-
ers clauses—Alaska, Delaware, Hawaii, Kansas, New York, North Dakota,
Ohio, Pennsylvania, Washington, and Wisconsin—do have distinct articles
for each branch of government within their state constitutions.  In turn,
those separate articles restrict each branch of government by describing its
limited powers and duties, thereby implicitly imparting a separation of pow-
ers doctrine into their state constitutions.  This approach to the separation of
powers is not unlike that of the Federal Constitution, which also lacks an
explicit separation of powers clause but certainly establishes and protects the
separation of powers at the federal level.
Still, the disconnect here between the Federal Constitution and the state
constitutions of the forty states with an explicit separation of powers clause “is
striking” because, as scholars like Professor Bruce Ackerman have observed,
James Madison “proposed adding a separation of powers clause to the Fed-
eral Constitution but the framers declined to do so.”473  Ackerman has
argued that this exclusion was intentional and meaningful,474 but the evi-
dence suggests the clause was rejected as being redundant because the three
vesting clauses had already constitutionalized the separation of powers at the
federal level.  Some have suggested that “the separation of powers is less
strictly followed at the state than at the federal level,”475 but our data suggest
that in 2018, 80% of the states recognize a fundamental right to the separa-
tion of powers.  “What, if anything, a court ought to do with this data is a
subject for another day.”476
472 Id. § 2.
473 See Calabresi & Agudo, supra note 5, at 104 (citing Bruce Ackerman, Liberating
Abstraction, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 317, 319 n.4 (1992)).  This proposed separation of powers
clause died in the Senate. See 2 BERNARD SCHWARTZ, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: A DOCUMENTARY
HISTORY 1028, 1146 (Leon Friedman et al. eds., 1971).
474 See Ackerman, supra note 473, at 319 n.4 (arguing that the exclusion of a separation
of powers clause in the Federal Constitution was “by no means unintentional”).
475 See Calabresi & Agudo, supra note 5, at 104 (citing Jim Rossi, Institutional Design and
the Lingering Legacy of Antifederalist Separation of Powers Ideals in the States, 52 VAND. L. REV.
1167, 1189 (1999)).
476 Id.
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FIGURE 31.  SEPARATION OF POWERS IN STATE CONSTITUTIONS
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Five states out of twelve that wrote new constitutions between 1776 and
1791 had explicit separation of powers clauses,477 and twenty-nine states out
of thirty-seven in 1868 when the Fourteenth Amendment was ratified had
specific separation of powers clauses in their state constitutions.478  This was
an Article V three-quarters consensus of the states in 1868.  Support for the
separation of powers has grown since 1791, and in both 1868 and today, in
2018, there have been an Article V three-quarters of the states consensus in
favor of constitutionalizing the separation of powers idea.  We conclude that
the separation of powers principle is therefore deeply rooted in American
history and tradition as well as in a present day Article V consensus of the
states.
This is relevant not only to Fourteenth Amendment cases in our view,
but also to Ninth Amendment cases, because we think one of the unenumer-
ated rights enjoyed by American citizens is a right not to face a governmental
official who is exercising two or three of the powers of government as
opposed to one.  This casts doubts on the rarely used historical practice of
allowing some federal judges to also simultaneously hold an executive office,
as occurred when Chief Justice John Jay negotiated the Jay Treaty with Great
Britain, or when Chief Justice Earl Warren chaired an executive branch
prosecutorial inquiry into the question of who had assassinated President
John F. Kennedy.
4. Education and Public Schools
Another right we found in the state constitutions in 1868 was “in many
ways the most important, and perhaps the most surprising,” and that was the
right to a free public school education.479  We found that more than thirty of
477 Calabresi, Agudo & Dore, supra note 5, at 1533–34.
478 See Calabresi & Agudo, supra note 5, at 103–04.
479 Id. at 108.
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the thirty-seven states had guaranteed a right to a free public school educa-
tion as of 1868.480  Thus when the Fourteenth Amendment was ratified, an
Article V consensus was that a free public school education was a fundamen-
tal right.481
We found that today, in 2018, all fifty states include clauses or entire
articles in their state constitutions that recognize a constitutional duty to pro-
vide a free public school education through a system of state-funded com-
mon schools.482  Indiana’s constitution, for example, holds that:
Knowledge and learning, generally diffused throughout a community, being
essential to the preservation of a free government; it shall be the duty of the
General Assembly to encourage, by all suitable means, moral, intellectual,
scientific, and agricultural improvement; and provide, by law, for a general
and uniform system of Common Schools, wherein tuition shall without
charge, and equally open to all.483
Idaho’s constitution uses another common format, stating that “[t]he
stability of a republican form of government depending mainly upon the
intelligence of the people, it shall be the duty of the legislature of Idaho, to
establish and maintain a general, uniform and thorough system of public,
free common schools.”484  While public schools are required in all fifty state
constitutions, in the text of the constitutional guarantee not all of them are
480 Steven G. Calabresi & Michael W. Perl, Originalism and Brown v. Board of Educa-
tion, 2014 MICH. ST. L. REV. 429, 460.
481 Id.
482 See ALA. CONST. art. XIV; id. art. XIV, § 256; ALASKA CONST. art. VII, § 1; ARIZ.
CONST. art. XI; id. art. XI, § 1; ARK. CONST. art. XIV; id. art. XIV, § 1; CAL. CONST. art. IX;
id. art. IX, §§ 1, 5; COLO. CONST. art. IX; id. art. IX, § 2; CONN. CONST. art. VIII; id. art. VIII,
§ 1; DEL. CONST. art. X; id. art. X, § 1; FLA. CONST. art. IX; id. art. IX, § 1; GA. CONST. art.
VIII; id. art. VIII, § 1, para. 1; HAW. CONST. art. X; id. art. X, § 1; IDAHO CONST. art. IX; id.
art. IX, § 1; ILL. CONST. art. X; id. art. X, § 1; IND. CONST. art. VIII; id. art. VIII, § 1; IOWA
CONST. art. IX, pt. 2, § 3; KAN. CONST. art. VI; id. art. VI, § 1; KY. CONST. arts. CLXXX-
III–CLXXXIX; LA. CONST. art. VIII; id. art. VIII, pmbl.; ME. CONST. art. VIII; id. art. VIII,
§ 1; MD. CONST. art. VIII, id. art. VIII, § 1; id. Declaration of Rights, art. XLIII; MASS.
CONST. pt. II, ch. V, § 2; MICH. CONST. art. VIII; id. art. VIII, § 2; MINN. CONST. art. XIII; id.
art. XIII, § 1; MISS. CONST. art. VIII; id. art. VIII, § 201; MO. CONST. art. IX; id. art IX, § 1;
MONT. CONST. art. X; id. art. X, § 1; NEB. CONST. art. VII, § 1; NEV. CONST. art. XI; id. art.
XI, § 2; N.H. CONST. pt. II, art. LXXXIII; N.J. CONST. art. VIII; id. art. VIII, § 4, pt. 1; N.M.
CONST. art. XII; id. art. XII, § 1; N.Y. CONST. art. XI; id. art. XI, § 1; N.C. CONST. art. I, § 15;
id. art. IX; id. art. IX, § 2; N.D. CONST. art. VIII; id. art. VIII, § 1; OHIO CONST. art. VI; id.
art. VI, § 2; OKLA. CONST. art. XIII, § 1; OR. CONST. art. VIII; id. art. VIII, §§ 2–3; PA.
CONST. art. III, pt. B; id. art. III, pt. B, § 14; R.I. CONST. art. XII; id. art. XII, § 1; S.C. CONST.
art. XI; id. art. XI, § 3; S.D. CONST. art. VIII; id. art. VIII, § 1; TENN. CONST. art. XI, § 12;
TEX. CONST. art. VII; id. art. VII, § 1; UTAH CONST. art. III, § 4; id. art. X; id. art. X, § 1; VT.
CONST. ch. II, § 68; VA. CONST. art. I, § 15; id. art. VIII; id. art. VIII, § 1; WASH. CONST. art.
IX; id. art. IX, §§ 1, 2; W. VA. CONST. art. XII; id. art. XII, §§ 1, 12; WIS. CONST. art. X; id.
art. X, § 3; WYO. CONST. art. I, § 23; id. art. VII; id. art. VII, § 1.
483 IND. CONST. art. VIII, § 1.
484 IDAHO CONST. art. IX, § 1.
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explicitly made free of charge to pupils or their families, though we think
that would usually be assumed.
The fact that all fifty state constitutions establish this duty “could be said
to create a right on the part of individuals” to a state-funded education, at
least at the state level.485  Such a possibility is monumentally important
because “[i]n Prigg v. Pennsylvania, the Supreme Court held that the individ-
ual constitutional right of slave owners to recover fugitive slaves implied that
the federal government had the power to pass a federal fugitive-slave law—a
power not expressly spelled out” in the Federal Constitution.486  By the same
token, one could argue that the U.S. government possesses the power under
Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment to pass a uniform system of fed-
eral education law, or to establish a federal right to be educated at the public
expense, since all fifty of the states include a similar duty in their state consti-
tutions, thereby establishing this right as a matter of positive state constitu-
tional law.
Part of the reason why this is an extraordinary finding is because of its
implication on the way we conceptualize American constitutionalism.
Indeed, “it is usually argued that a distinctive feature of American constitu-
tionalism is that it guarantees negative liberties against government but not
positive claims for entitlements from government.”487  Though that observa-
tion generally tends to be accurate, our data on state constitutional rights in
2018 “suggest that there may be at least one very fundamental positive-law
entitlement that all Americans have long possessed”—the right to a free and
open public education.488
As we noted above, we found that in 1868, when the Fourteenth Amend-
ment was ratified, a serious argument could be made that thirty-six of the
thirty-seven states had constitutions that imposed a duty on them to provide
free public schools.489  While one could quibble with three or four of these
state constitutional clauses,490 there is absolutely no doubt that there was an
Article V consensus of three-quarters of the states that there exists a funda-
mental right to a free public school education.
485 Calabresi & Agudo, supra note 5, at 108.
486 Id. (citing Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 539, 615 (1842)).
487 Id. (citing Jackson v. City of Joliet, 715 F.2d 1200, 1203 (7th Cir. 1983)).
488 Id.
489 See id. at 108–11.
490 One could argue, for instance, that Delaware, Illinois, New Jersey, and Virginia all
lacked public school clauses based on their phrasing.  Our prior analysis argues that every
state but Illinois should be considered as having a guarantee to a public school education
in 1868. See Calabresi & Agudo, supra note 5, at 108–11.
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FIGURE 32.  EDUCATION AND PUBLIC SCHOOLS IN
STATE CONSTITUTIONS
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In fact, even in 1791, we found that five state constitutions out of the
twelve that had been drafted between 1776 and 1791 imposed a duty on the
state to provide a free public school education.491  This is one of the few
fundamental positive entitlements that the Constitution enacts, given that it
is mostly a charter of negative liberties to be free of certain governmental
actions.  The right to a free public school education is thus deeply rooted in
American history and tradition as well as in a current consensus of the fifty
states.  We thus disagree with the dicta in San Antonio Independent School Dis-
trict v. Rodriguez, which denies that there is a fundamental right to a free
public school education in American constitutional law.492
A state may choose, as most states have, to fund public school education
mostly with local taxes to preserve local control over what is taught in the
public schools, but it does not follow from that that there is no federal consti-
tutional right to a public school education.  That right clearly exists and is
protected by the Fourteenth Amendment.493
III. SUMMARY
The following graphs summarize our findings.  Figure 33 is a graph of
the state constitutional rights with federal analogs, shown by the number of
states protecting each right.  Figure 34 is a similar graph of the state constitu-
tional rights with federal analogs, shown instead by the percentage of the
U.S. population (excluding the District of Columbia) that lives in a state pro-
tecting each right.  Figure 35 is a graph of the state constitutional rights with-
out federal analogs, ranked by the number of states protecting each right.
491 See Calabresi, Agudo & Dore, supra note 5, at 1540–41.
492 San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 17–18 (1973).
493 See Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954); Calabresi & Perl, supra note 480.
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Figure 36 shows similar results ranked by the percentage of the population
that lives in a state protecting each right.
FIGURE 33.  STATE RIGHTS IN 2018 WITH FEDERAL ANALOGS
(BY NUMBER OF STATE)
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FIGURE 34.  STATE RIGHTS IN 2018 WITH FEDERAL ANALOGS
(BY POPULATION)
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FIGURE 35.  STATE RIGHTS IN 2018 WITHOUT FEDERAL ANALOGS
(BY NUMBER OF STATES)
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FIGURE 36.  STATE RIGHTS IN 2018 WITHOUT FEDERAL ANALOGS
(BY POPULATION)
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IV. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
The first conclusion that we are led to by the data is how overwhelmingly
similar the state bills of rights are today in 2018, compared to the state bills of
rights in 1868 when the Fourteenth Amendment was ratified.  There has
been some evolution and change between the original list of rights in 1868
and the modern-day 2018 list of rights, but to a remarkable degree very little
has changed.  This suggests to us that an empirically based living Constitu-
tion and former Justice Scalia’s dead Constitution, as he famously called it,
are close siblings even if they are not identical twins.
The second conclusion supported by the data is that religious freedom
appears to be at least as important in America today as it was in 1868, an
assertion illustrated by the increase in modern times of references to God
and to ceremonial deism within the state constitutions.  We are also struck by
the evolution that has occurred in the last 226 years with respect to the Estab-
lishment Clause.  In 1791, many states had established churches, and the fed-
eral ban on the establishment of religion was seen as a protection of states’
rights, as opposed to being seen as an individual rights issue.  By 1868, this
had almost totally changed.  There were no established state churches in
1868 and a two-thirds (but not an Article V three-fourths majority) of the
states had antiestablishment clauses in their state constitutions.  Now, in
2018, all fifty states have come to the view that their state bills of rights should
prohibit the establishment of religion.  What is most striking about this evolu-
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tion is that, while the free exercise of religion clauses were considered cor-
nerstone rights through their widespread inclusion in state constitutional law
clauses in 1791, 1868, and 2018, the antiestablishment right is a newer and
younger entitlement.  To an originalist, then, the Establishment Clause is an
arguably less important idea than the Free Exercise Clause, which goes back
to America’s founding.
A third conclusion we are led to believe is that Blaine Amendments,
which forbid state money from going to religious officials or institutions, are
not justified if one looks at state constitutional law in 1868, whereas they are
justified if one looks at the modern-day 2018 state constitutions.  This is one
area of constitutional law where an originalist might justifiably find state
Blaine Amendments to be a violation of the Free Exercise Clause, while a
living constitutionalist or pragmatist who values the 2018 state constitutions
above the historical constitutions would come out the other way.
A fourth conclusion is that Second Amendment gun rights clauses are
much more prevalent in state constitutions today than they were in 1868,
when the Fourteenth Amendment was ratified.  In this sense, the modern-day
state constitutions offer much more evidence that the right to own a gun is
an individual right, rather than a collective right to own a rifle to serve in
your state’s National Guard unit or to protect the common defense.  This
increase may reflect a backlash arising from the attempt among twentieth-
century elites to disarm substantial portions of the populace.  From the evi-
dence, one might conclude that living constitutionalism ought to be pro-gun,
even though few constitutions elsewhere in the world currently protect the
right to own a gun.494
A fifth conclusion that bears noting is that whereas most states in 1868
did not have due process of law clauses in their state bills of rights (instead
having per legem terrae clauses, which said that no person could be deprived of
life, liberty, or property except by the law of the land or by the judgment of
their peers), that is no longer the case.495  By 2018, most states have dropped
the phrase “except by the law of the land or by the judgment of his peers”
and replaced it with the phrase “except by due process of law.”  This could
suggest a move in state constitutional law toward endorsing the use of sub-
stantive due process in the living Constitution, as opposed to the Constitu-
tion of 1868.
A sixth conclusion that was particularly disturbing to Professor Calabresi
(as a former law clerk of Judge Robert H. Bork and Justice Antonin Scalia)
was the discovery of the Lockean rights clauses, which were included in two-
thirds of the 1868 state bills of rights and in three-quarters of today’s state
constitutional bills of rights.  These clauses provide clear textual support for
providing constitutional protection to at least some unenumerated constitu-
494 See McCormick, supra note 159.  The English Bill of Rights of 1689 did protect the
right of all Protestant citizens of the realm to keep and bear arms, but modern English law
does not protect gun rights in the way American constitutional law does.  This clause is
therefore nothing more than a historical curiosity.
495 See Calabresi & Agudo, supra note 5, at 65–66.
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tional rights.  The existence of the Lockean rights clauses is a big problem for
the Bork-Scalia school of originalism, but it would not have troubled many
professors and lawyers of a more libertarian bent, such as Professors James
Lindgren and Randy Barnett.496
A seventh conclusion is that the state constitutions tend to protect a
right to equal citizenship by prohibiting second-rate or second-class forms of
citizenship.  This is seen both in their protection of Lockean rights guaran-
tees as well as in their prohibition of class-based legislation.  Both of these
rights are protected by a three-quarters majority of the states in 2018, indicat-
ing that they enjoy an Article V consensus across the states.  We find this
conclusion to be striking because it indicates that the right to be free from
class- or caste-based legislation is widespread throughout American history
and is supported by a present-day consensus of Americans, lending further
support to our argument that both originalists and pragmatists ought to
oppose laws that create second-rate forms of citizenship.497
The eighth and final conclusion, which is perhaps surprising, is the wide-
spread nature of the right of individual children to a state-funded public edu-
cation.  This right is both deeply rooted in American history and tradition,
and is upheld by a consensus of state constitutions in 2018.  Indeed, arguably
thirty-six out of thirty-seven states in 1868 imposed a duty in their state consti-
tution on the state legislature to provide everyone with a free public school
education.  Even in 1791, five states out of twelve that had written constitu-
tions imposed such a duty, and today, of course, all fifty state constitutions
impose such a duty.  There is thus an unenumerated fundamental right to a
free public school education in the United States, which is protected by the
Fourteenth Amendment and which Congress could enforce using Section
Five of the Fourteenth Amendment.
This leads to a parting thought which concerns the relevance of state
bills of rights in 1868 to the original public meaning of the Privileges or
Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.  We agree with Justice
Field’s dissenting opinion in The Slaughter-House Cases.  He asserts that funda-
mental common-law rights like the right to pursue your own profession are
496 For example, Attorney General Edwin Meese III, who was a big fan and friend of
Professor Bernard Siegan of the San Diego School of Law, a professor who believed that
Lochner v. New York was correctly decided.  Attorney General Meese told Professor Calabresi
that he believed Lochner v. New York was correctly decided when Professor Calabresi worked
for him as a Special Assistant in 1985 to 1987.  This puts Meese in the unenumerated
constitutional rights camp.  Meese indeed tried unsuccessfully to put both Siegan and Pro-
fessor Richard Epstein on the federal courts of appeals.  Siegan was stopped by the Senate,
and Epstein said he would take only the Supreme Court and nothing less.  Nonetheless,
Meese’s views—as well as the views of Siegan, Epstein, and now Professor Randy Barnett—
show that there is substantial support among self-professed originalists for recognizing and
enforcing unenumerated rights.
497 For further analysis on this question, see Calabresi & Begley, supra note 440, where
we contend that the historical evidence indicates that the Federal Constitution must pro-
tect rights like same-sex marriage in order to ensure that LGBTQ minorities are not rele-
gated to a subservient form of citizenship.
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privileges or immunities of state citizenship that are protected by the Four-
teenth Amendment, a guarantee arising because everyone who is born or
naturalized is both a citizen of the United States and of the state wherein they
reside.498  Thus, we believe that the state constitutional law fundamental
rights of all Americans are equally protected by the Privileges or Immunities
Clause of the Federal Fourteenth Amendment.  That Clause not only incor-
porates the Federal Bill of Rights against the states, as Justice Hugo Black and
Akhil Reed Amar have eloquently argued, but also protects all of one’s funda-
mental rights under state constitutional law as well.
Further, since the states have all protected in their constitutions many of
the same rights enshrined in the Federal Bill of Rights, this has implications
for Supreme Court caselaw on the incorporation and application of the Fed-
eral Bill of Rights to the states.  Even if Justice Black or Professor Amar were
wrong about incorporation (which we consider unlikely), nevertheless all the
same rights—and then some—would be protected by the Federal Fourteenth
Amendment, due to their widespread protection as a matter of state constitu-
tional law.  By federally protecting rights of state citizenship, the Fourteenth
Amendment federally protects all the rights in the state bills of rights in 1868.
That includes versions of all the rights in the Federal Bill of Rights.  Justice
Samuel Alito, the author of McDonald v. City of Chicago,499 cited approvingly
Professor Calabresi’s 2008 Texas Law Review article with Sarah E. Agudo in
incorporating against the states the Second Amendment, which in Heller the
Supreme Court had said guaranteed an individual right to keep and bear
arms.  Only twenty-two states out of thirty-seven had Second Amendment ana-
logues in 1868—a majority but not a supermajority.  In contrast, Lockean
rights clauses appeared in at least twenty-four and arguably in twenty-seven
state constitutions in 1868.  They must therefore be incorporated against the
states by the Fourteenth Amendment as well—along with the right to a free
public school education.
We hope we have now established that our data on the growth and
evolution of state bills of rights are useful to federal constitutional law, as well
as to the ongoing debates between originalists and living constitutional
pragmatists.  Ultimately, under both camps’ readings of the Fourteenth
Amendment, that Amendment protects a plethora of rights.
498 See supra note 461 and accompanying text.
499 561 U.S. 742 (2010).
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